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ABSTRACT 
Aircraft accident investigation centers upon the analysis of all available 
information about the accident flight in the period leading up to the final 
catastrophe.  Key among the sources of information is data captured and 
recorded in the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder, which are often 
referred to as the aircraft “black boxes”.  For some accidents, this flight data may 
be lost entirely or partially damaged and largely unusable.  The aircraft flight 
data recorders are the only place where flight data is recorded.  This single 
recording point is a vulnerability to the availability of flight data that can be 
addressed by creating another place where the data is stored. 
This thesis examines the feasibility of and discusses the technical 
framework necessary for a system that transmits flight data from an aircraft to a 
ground recording station.  The focus will be upon the requirements for security 
and assurance of the information flow, so that the confidentiality, integrity, 
availability and authenticity of the data are ensured. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THESIS STATEMENT 
The purpose of this thesis is to ask and answer the following questions. 
• Is it feasible to build a system that has the capability of transmitting 
flight data in real-time from commercial and military aircraft to a 
ground recording station? 
• What are the technical characteristics of such a system? 
• What are the information assurance characteristics of such a 
system? 
B. THESIS BACKGROUND 
Disasters occur in aviation despite the best efforts of the aviation 
community to prevent them.  Determining the cause of the accident from 
burning wreckage, or in the absence of wreckage, is essential.  By studying the 
causes of past accidents we can affect changes to present procedures, practices 
and manufacturing methods in the hopes of making the business of air 
transportation safer and more reliable.  
Presently, the primary method of collecting flight data concerning the 
technical state of the aircraft before and during the accident sequence is to use 
the so-called aircraft “black boxes” (Flight Data Recorder [FDR] and Cockpit 
Voice Recorder [CVR]), which are devices aboard the aircraft that record various 
flight parameters and audio signals and are designed to survive the crash.  But, 
they do not always survive the crash or are not always locatable.  It is relatively 
common that some or all data contained in recovered flight recorders is too 
damaged to be useful.  When this occurs, valuable data is lost and the cause of 
the accident may never be known. 
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To allow the greatest possibility of having flight data available to post-
crash investigators, it is proposed that the data presently recorded only by the 
on-board flight recorders also be transmitted off the aircraft and recorded at a 
location on the ground.  This should be in addition to, and as a backup system 
for, the present system of FDR and CVR devices. 
The technical problem of transmitting flight data from all of the aircraft 
wishing to do so to the ground involves the following key components: 
• A method of collecting the data that is to be transmitted off 
the aircraft 
• A method of formatting flight data for transmission 
• A method of radio transmission of the data 
• A communications network capable of handling 
transmissions originating from all aircraft seeking to 
transmit such data at any point in time 
• A data link network capable of sending the flight data 
received by the communications network to a ground 
collection and recording station 
• A ground station capable of capturing and storing the flight 
data 
All of these system components require security measures to ensure the 
data arrives at the ground recording station and is known to be genuine and not 
compromised in any way. 
C. THESIS SCOPE 
This thesis is a FL5001 view of the design of a system having the capability 
of remote, ground-based recording of flight data.  The proposed system is called 
the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System.   
                                                 
 
1 FL means “Flight Level”.  Each FL is approximately equal to 100 vertical feet, making FL500 
approximately equal to 50,000 feet. 
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The major components of this thesis are: 
• Introduction 
• Present State Of Flight Data Capture And Recording 
• Transmission Of Flight Data Off Aircraft 
• Data Network 
• Ground Capture And Storage 
• Practical Aviation Concerns 
• Summary, Conclusions and Future Research 
D. AUTHOR’S BACKGROUND / THESIS DESIGN 
The author holds three FAA airman certificates: 
• Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate with ratings for Single-
engine and Multiengine (Land) 
• Certified Flight Instructor (CFI) certificate with ratings for Single- 
and Multiengine (MEI) and Instrument—Airplane (CFII) 
• Flight Dispatcher certificate 
 
Much of the aviation information presented is drawn from the author’s 
professional activities within the aviation industry, which includes being a 
corporate pilot and flight instructor for a major airline. 
This thesis attempts to bridge between aviation and computer science.  To 
accomplish this goal, it is necessary to present information on “both sides of the 
fence”. 
The thesis attempts to present relevant information to both disciplines, so 
that each understands the concerns of the other as relates to the Real-Time Flight 
Data Transmission System. 
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E. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
This section presents general background information about flight data 
recording.  Specific information is presented in subsequent chapters. 
1. Why Record Flight Data? 
Flight data is recorded to enhance flight safety.  The goal is to save lives 
and reduce property damage. 
The availability of the data contained in the flight recorders is vital to 
crash investigators as they attempt to determine the cause of an aircraft accident.  
If we understand the cause of a disaster, then we can apply this knowledge in the 
creation of safer regulations, safer procedures, better training, better engineering 
and better manufacturing techniques. 
2. What Is A Flight Recorder (A.K.A. “Black Box”)? 
A flight recorder is an electronic device placed aboard an aircraft.  It 
receives information from sensors located around the aircraft that measure the 
technical state of the aircraft, records this information, and is designed to survive 
the tremendous forces experienced during and after an air crash — maybe the 
only thing that survives the crash — so investigators may use the information to 
help analyze the cause of the crash. 
A flight recorder, commonly known as a “black box”, is actually painted 
orange.  This is to facilitate location of the recorder among the crash debris field. 
3. A Brief History Of Flight Data Recorders 
While flying today is very safe, in the past many terrible air crashes have 
claimed thousands of lives.  What went wrong?  In part, the safety of flight 
comes from knowing the answer to this question.  Beginning in the 1940’s, we 
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have been concerned with knowing all we can about what went on aboard the 
accident aircraft by placing a crash-hardened recording device on board. 
But, the forces experienced by a crashing aircraft are extreme.  Technology 
had to be invented to create a device that could withstand these extreme forces.  
As a result, the earlier flight recorders had a rather high rate of failure. 
The first generation of flight data recorders used a process of embossing 
information on metal foil.  The metal foil media could only be used once.  
Although the foil recording was very robust and it survived crashes fairly well, 
the boxes in which the recorders were contained did not sufficiently protect 
them.  Loss of data was common as was failure of the recorder mechanism. 
Metal foil is not capable of storing a large quantity of data.  Early 
recorders placed only five flight parameters (such as airspeed, altitude and 
heading) on the foil.  This limited amount of information is helpful when 
investigating the accident, but it is often insufficient and does not provide 
enough clues to answer investigator’s questions. 
The second generation of flight data recorders used magnetic tape.  In the 
mid-1960’s, hardening technology had advanced far enough to allow these 
fragile devices with vulnerable media to be used.  In addition to recording many 
more flight parameters than the original five, magnetic tape also allowed 
recording of sound.  The cockpit voice recorder became a mandatory piece of 
equipment on all commercial aircraft.  Regulations required that the last thirty 
minutes of cockpit voice communications be recorded. 
The third generation of flight data recorders are solid-state devices.  They 
are capable of recording many more parameters than magnetic tape devices and 
do it in a digital format, which is more precise and reliable.  The recording 
devices often have no moving parts, which makes them more resistant to the 
extreme forces experienced during the accident sequence [Source: L02]. 
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4. Who Uses Flight Data And For What Purpose? 
The primary consumer of recorded flight data is the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).  The NTSB investigates air crashes, 
produces extensive reports of many factors concerning the accident, and makes 
safety recommendations to the FAA as a result of the findings of the 
investigation. 
A secondary use of recorded flight data is to diagnose aircraft 
performance and systems.  Although this usually does not come from the flight 
data recorders used for accident investigation, it often does use the same sensor 
network that is used to gather information for the flight data recorders. 
It is important to note that data stored in the recorders is not used for 
certificate enforcement action against flight crews, nor is the raw data usually 
releasable to the general public.  The NTSB may release transcripts of cockpit 
communications or findings as a result of flight data analysis, but does not 
release the actual raw data.  Data concerning crashes that occur outside the 
United States may not be as tightly controlled as data concerning crashes that 
occur within the United States. 
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5. Who Records Flight Data? 
The operators of certain aircraft are required to use flight data recorders.  
Operators of other aircraft may or may not be required to use them.  The 
distinction involves the type of operation being conducted, including whether it 
is civilian or military. 
a) Civilian Use Of Flight Recorders 
The three most common types of operations are: 
• 14 CFR Part 121 operations: Airlines 
• 14 CFR Part 135 operations: Air Charter 
• 14 CFR Part 91 operations:  General Aviation 
 
Part 121 operators are required to use flight data recorders for all 
flights.  Part 135 and Part 91 operators are required to use flight data recorders if 
they operate large, transport category aircraft.  Otherwise, for smaller aircraft, 
they are not required to use flight data recorders. 
b) Military Use Of Flight Recorders 
The military is interested in safety of flight and operates a fleet of 
aircraft carrying passengers.  However, for tactical and “mission” operations, the 
military does not always require the use of flight recorders. 
When military operations use flight recorders, the technical issues 
presented in this thesis also apply to those situations. 
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6. What Is Flight Data? 
Items of interest to crash investigators consist of these broad categories of 
information: 
• Flight performance 
• Engine performance 
• Control surface situation 
• Aircraft systems status 
• Environmental data 
• Sounds 
• Air-to-ground communications 
 
There is no particular maximum amount of information the flight 
recorders can capture other than the number of items the particular recorder in 
use can handle, but there are minimum specifications. 
The required data items that must be recorded are found in FAR 121.343 
“Flight Recorders”, and FAR 121.344 “Digital Flight Recorders for Transport 
Category Airplanes”.  See section II.E of this thesis for a listing of regulatory 
requirements for specific data items required by the FAA [Source: F02]. 
7. What Types Of Recorders Are There? 
There are two flight recorders in use today, the Flight Data Recorder 
(FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). 
The FDR records flight situation data and information about the aircraft.  
Please see sections II.C and II.E for specific data items that are recorded. 
The CVR records cockpit voice data.  Please see section II.B for more 
information.   
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a) Flight Data Recorder (FDR) 
Figure 1 shows a digital flight data recorder (DFDR) manufactured 
by L3 Communications [From Source: L01]. 
 
 
Figure 1. Flight Data Recorder 
b) Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) 
Figure 2 shows a cutaway view of a cockpit voice recorder 
manufactured by L3 Communications [From Source: L01]. 
 
Figure 2. Cutaway Of Cockpit Voice Recorder 
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8. Where Are Flight Data Recorders Located? 
The recorders are placed near the rear of the aircraft.  This section of the 
airframe experiences the least violent conditions during the crash sequence.  
Therefore, recorders have the best chance of survival when placed at the rear of 
the aircraft. 
Figure 3 shows typical placement of flight recorders and sensors around 
the aircraft [From Source: S01]. 
 
Figure 3. Location Of Flight Recorders 
9. How Does A Recorder Get Its Data? 
Sensors are placed around the aircraft wherever there is interesting data to 
be measured (see section II.E for a list of the types of data that is measured.)  
Sensors feed their data through wires or some kind of data network to the 
recorders located at the rear of the aircraft. 
10. During What Phases Of Flight Is Data Recorded? 
The recorders are turned on as part of the start-up procedure.  They run 
continuously throughout all phases of the flight: start up, taxi, take off, climb, 
cruise, descent, approach, landing, taxi and shut down. 
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11. When Is Flight Data Used? 
It would be nice to say flight data contained in the recorders is never used, 
but sadly that is not true.  The data is accessed only after an aircraft accident or 
incident in which there is substantial damage to the aircraft, or those involving 
death or serious injury.  NTSB regulation 830 formally defines these situations.  
FAR 121.343(i) requires that flight recorder information be saved if a flight 
terminates due to the reasons stated in NTSB 830. 
NTSB accident investigators use recorded flight data in the course of the 
accident investigation as they attempt to determine the cause of the accident or 
incident. 
Recorded flight data is not required to be made available in other 
circumstances, such as hijackings and so on, although certainly the contents of 
the flight recorders would be examined when a hijacked aircraft is recovered. 
Recorded flight data is not used for investigation of certificate 
enforcement action directed against the flight crew. 
12. Crash Survivability Of Flight Recorders 
The FDR and CVR are designed to survive an air crash enough to allow 
investigators to access the data they contain.  Please see section II.G for flight 
recorder crash survival specifications. 
Figures 4 through 7 show images of recovered flight recorders 
[All Figures From Source: N05]. 
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 Figure 4. EgyptAir 990 Flight Data Recorder (View 1) 
 
Figure 5. EgyptAir 990 Flight Data Recorder (View 2) 
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 Figure 6. EgyptAir 990 Cockpit Voice Recorder 
 
Figure 7. Alaska Airlines Flight 261 Flight Data Recorder 
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II. FLIGHT DATA CAPTURE AND RECORDING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section discusses the present state of flight data capture and 
recording.  Discussed will be the various sources of audio and voice information 
available during flight, the various sources of flight data, recorder crash 
standards, the regulatory environment, a brief background on recorder 
manufacturers, a description of the data networks on board aircraft and an 
assessment of the present security threat. 
The present state of flight data capture and recording must be understood 
because it forms the basis for moving forward.  Any new technology that is 
introduced, such as a system capable of transmitting real-time flight data to a 
ground recording station, will extend the state-of-the-art for collection of 
information made available to crash investigators. 
As new technology is developed to extend the art of air crash 
investigation, the questions are who will do it, what will be done, where do the 
changes need to be made, when should it be completed and perhaps most important a 
clear understanding of why we should do it.  It is therefore important to understand 
what is currently done in order to put a remote recording system in proper 
context. 
B. AUDIO SOURCES 
This section discusses the various sources of voice information that are 
available for recording during a flight. 
The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) is the flight recorder used to capture 
audio information.  Perhaps “cockpit voice recorder” is a misnomer.  Although 
most of it does, not all voice information comes from the cockpit.  There are 
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aircraft that have audio sources available outside the cockpit.  “Aircraft audio 
recorder” might be a more descriptive term. 
It is important to understand that there is an intercom system available to 
the flight crew.  The crew often uses headsets or earpieces with boom 
microphones to communicate with each other through the intercom.  However, 
in a relatively quiet cockpit, such as that found in many modern transport jets, in 
some situations it is possible the flight crew may communicate simply by talking 
to each other and bypassing the intercom system. 
All cockpits must have reinforced, tamper proof doors and the cockpit 
must be inaccessible to unauthorized persons during flight.  It is necessary for 
the flight deck crew to communicate with the flight attendant(s), so it is clear an 
intercom system must be present for this purpose. 
The intercom system allows the flight crew to communicate with each 
other.  Additionally, all radio communications with air traffic control, company 
dispatch, maintenance, and other sources is available to the crew using the same 
system.  These communications are recorded through both the captain’s and first 
officer’s audio stream. 
The actual connection between the audio source and the CVR is analog on 
most aircraft.  Only the very newest generation of aircraft have digital audio 
systems.  Once the data reaches the recorder, depending upon the type of 
recorder in use, it may be recorded on analog tape or in digital memory.  In the 
case of digital recorders, which are usually referred to as “solid state” recorders, 




The captain is a required flight crewmember with pilot-in-command 
authority over the flight.  The captain may or may not manipulate the flight 
controls at any given time, but always has an active role in the conduct of the 
flight. 
The captain occupies the left seat in the cockpit.  The intercom channel 
from the captain’s microphone is one of the primary inputs into the cockpit voice 
recorder. 
Anything the captain says into the microphone is recorded, including 
conversation with other crewmembers and radio communications.  If the captain 
chooses not to use the intercom to communicate with other members of the crew, 
it is possible some of the things said by the captain may not be recorded, or at 
least not recorded clearly. 
2. First Officer 
The first officer (FO) is a required flight crewmember with second-in-
command authority over the flight.  As is true of the captain, the FO may or may 
not manipulate the flight controls at any given time, but always has an active role 
in the conduct of the flight. 
The intercom channel from the first officer’s microphone is one of the 
primary inputs into the cockpit voice recorder. 
The first officer occupies the right seat in the cockpit.  Similar to the 
arrangement available to the captain, anything the FO says into the FO’s 
microphone will be recorded, including conversation with other flight 
crewmembers, public address announcements to passengers and radio 
communications.  But, conversation spoken directly to other crewmembers may 
not be recorded or not recorded clearly. 
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3. Cockpit Area Microphone 
Early in the history of crash investigation when cockpit voice recorders 
became available, crash investigators discovered that significant amounts of 
useful information was not available to them if only the captain and first officer 
microphones were recorded. 
The cockpit area microphone (CAM) is centrally located in the cockpit, not 
tied to an intercom channel, so that the sounds heard in the cockpit are available 
to crash investigators. 
The cockpit area microphone is one of the primary inputs into the cockpit 
voice recorder. 
The CAM picks up the sound of warning bells and chimes, landing gear 
lowering and retracting, certain flight control surfaces moving, engine noises, 
and any number of other sounds heard in the cockpit while in flight.  It also picks 
up conversation, whether spoken directly between crewmembers or as they are 
using the intercom, although on the recordings this is often difficult or 
impossible to understand because the audio level of such conversations is similar 
to or not as loud as the ambient level of noise in the cockpit. 
4. Cabin Microphone 
Less common than the captain’s microphone, first officer’s microphone 
and cockpit area microphone, an aircraft may be equipped with one or more 
cabin microphones.  These are usually found on larger aircraft or on the very 
newest aircraft. 
The lead flight attendant may be stationed in a certain location.  A cabin 
microphone may be found in that area. 
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Other locations for cabin microphones might be one or more in the 
passenger cabins, such as the upper deck of first class on a Boeing 747, first class, 
business class, and economy. 
If installed, the cabin microphone(s) may be input(s) into the cockpit voice 
recorder. 
C. FLIGHT DATA SOURCES 
The source of the data recorded by the FDR is an array of sensors located 
around the aircraft.  The sensors transmit data to the FDR through a digital data 
bus.  The rate at which an individual sensor produces data varies from 
continuous to once per second or longer, although most measurable data items 
do not need extremely fast sampling rates to give investigators sufficient 
information about that item. 
Broad categories of data sources are as follows.  For more specific 
regulatory requirements, see section II.E. 
1. Flight Situation 
This is information about the aeronautical or flying situation of the 
aircraft, such as heading, altitude, airspeed, vertical speed and angle of attack. 
2. Engine Condition 
This is information about the performance and condition of the engine, 
such as RPM of the propeller or fan, engine pressure ratio and oil temperature. 
3. Flight Control Inputs 
This is information about what control inputs the pilots are making to 
cause the aircraft to do what it is doing, such as rudder pedal position, aileron 
control deflection, flap lever position and elevator control pressure. 
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4. Flight Control Situation 
This is information about what the flight control surfaces are actually 
doing, as opposed to what the flight crew is trying to make them do through 
their flight control inputs, such as rudder deflection, aileron deflection, elevator 
deflection, trim tab position and flap deflection. 
5. Environmental Situation 
This is information about the environment in which the aircraft is flying, 
such as outside air temperature, wind speed and direction, type of precipitation 
experienced (rain, snow, sleet, etc.) and presence of ice. 
D. VIDEO SOURCES 
Although not mandated, one of the areas in which there is interest is 
cockpit video. 
Even by recording the captain’s microphone, FO’s microphone and CAM, 
some of the flight crew’s actions and communication relevant to crash 
investigation may be missed.  Non-verbal gestures, such as a thumbs-up, can 
only be captured if there is a visual record of what happens in the cockpit. 
Additionally, there are some displays showing information to the flight 
crew that are not usually recorded, such as the weather radar.  Having a visual 
record of these otherwise un-recorded displays may provide important clues to 
accident investigators. 
Video produces relatively a lot of data compared to flight data and voice.  
The volume of data depends largely upon such factors as whether the image is 
black-and-white or in color, the pixel resolution and the frame rate per second.  
The necessary frame rate is a matter of debate.  The goal of using cockpit video in 
the first place is to provide adequate crash investigation data, not to watch a 
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movie of the goings-on in the cockpit on a large home theatre system with 
surround sound.  So, is it adequate to see maybe four frames per second, which 
makes the movements in the cockpit appear somewhat jerky, or do investigators 
need to see smooth movement at maybe thirty frames per second?  For the 
purpose of this thesis, this question can remain unanswered, although the 
answer does significantly impact the volume of information any Real-Time Flight 
Data Transmission System must handle. 
It should be noted that a video image of flight instruments that are 
recorded by other means, such as the indication of airspeed, altitude or heading, 
is probably not very useful.  Only in the case where the instrument fails to show 
the proper value would there be a need to have a video image of it, but the 
probability of this situation occurring is essentially zero.  Therefore, seeing 
everything the flight crew sees isn’t strictly necessary. 
One potential benefit of having cockpit video available is monitoring 
extremely unusual events in the cockpit.  It might be nice to actually see such 
things as a terrorist breaking into the cockpit, seizing control, threatening the 
flight crew, and so on.  On the other hand, simply knowing that it happened may 
be good enough.  United Airlines flight 93, the so-called “fourth aircraft” 
hijacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001, which crashed in western 
Pennsylvania killing all souls on board, is a good example of an event where 
cockpit video may have answered many questions as to what went on aboard the 
aircraft.  While we generally know what happened in this case, the families of the 
passengers and crew, as well as the public at large, desire to know more. 
For the purpose of this thesis, cockpit video is of interest as a source of a 
large volume of data that must be considered when designing a remote 
transmission system. 
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E. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires the use of flight data 
recorders for certain aircraft.  Not every flying machine must have such a device.  
The two factors that determine whether an aircraft must have flight recorders are 
the size of the aircraft and the operating environment. 
1. Flight Recorder Regulations: Operations Other Than Air Carrier 
a) All Aircraft 
14 CFR Part 91 GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES 
applies to all aviation operations conducted within the jurisdiction of the United 
States.  In general, private flying, agricultural flying, flight instruction, corporate 
aviation, gliders, balloons and airships do not require flight recorders unless the 
flying is done in large (which has a specific FAA definition) or multiengine 
turbine-powered aircraft. 
FAR 91.609 specifies flight recorder requirements for large and 
transport category aircraft operated under Part 91.  Because FAR 91 applies to all 
aircraft and other sections of 14 CFR apply specifically to various types of for-
hire operations, the rules in Part 91 will most likely be superseded or added to by 
other rules, such as Part 135 (commuter and air taxi) or 121 (air carrier). 
b) Commuter And On Demand (Air Taxi) 
14 CFR Part 135 OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: COMMUTER 
AND ON DEMAND OPERATIONS AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON 
BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT applies to on demand air taxi operations and for-hire 
operations that do not have a set schedule.  Examples include the charter of a 
small aircraft (air taxi) or a casino flying guests to their location (commuter).  For 
large and multiengine turbine-powered aircraft operating under Part 135, FAR 
 22 
135.152 specifies the exact data values that must be recorded.  The list is 
essentially the same as the list found in the air carrier regulations (Part 121). 
2. Flight Recorder Regulations: Air Carrier 
14 CFR Part 121 OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, 
AND SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS applies to airlines.  An understanding of 
the distinction between domestic, flag or supplemental carrier is not necessary 
for this thesis, but has to do with the size, schedule type and operating area of 
the air carrier operation. 
For flight operations conducted under Part 121, FAR 121.343, FAR 121.344 
and FAR 121.344a specify flight data recorder (FDR) requirements and FAR 
121.359 specifies the requirements for cockpit voice recorders (CVR). 
a) FAR 121.343(g) 
The flight data recorder must be “operated continuously from the 
instant the airplane begins the takeoff roll until it has completed the landing roll 
at an airport”. 
b) FAR 121.343(h) 
For recorders of recent manufacture, there must be 25 hours of 
recorded data.  One hour of the oldest data may be erased for maintenance 
purposes and no record need be kept more than 60 days. 
c) FAR 121.343(i) 
If a flight is terminated due to a situation involving substantial 
property damage or loss of life, the data from the flight recorders must be kept 
for at least 60 days or longer, if required. 
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d) FAR 121.343(d) 
Certain types of digital flight recorder systems must record the 




4. Vertical acceleration 
5. Heading 
6. Time of each radio transmission either to or from air traffic control 
7. Pitch attitude 
8. Roll attitude 
9. Longitudinal acceleration 
10. Pitch trim position 
11. Control column or pitch control surface position 
12. Control wheel or lateral control surface position 
13. Rudder pedal or yaw control surface position 
14. Thrust of each engine 
15. Position of each thrust reverser 
16. Trailing edge flap or cockpit flap control position 
17. Leading edge flap or cockpit flap control position 
e) FAR 121.344 
Newer digital flight recorders must record the following data 
items: 
1. Time 
2. Pressure altitude 
3. Indicated airspeed 
4. Heading -- primary flight crew reference (if selectable, record 
discrete, true or magnetic) 
5. Normal acceleration (Vertical) 
6. Pitch attitude 
7. Roll attitude 
8. Manual radio transmitter keying, or CVR/DFDR synchronization 
reference 
9. Thrust/power of each engine -- primary flight crew reference 
10. Autopilot engagement status 
11. Longitudinal acceleration 
12. Pitch control input 
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13. Lateral control input 
14. Rudder pedal input 
15. Primary pitch control surface position 
16. Primary lateral control surface position 
17. Primary yaw control surface position 
18. Lateral acceleration 
19. Pitch trim surface position or parameters of paragraph (a)(82) of 
this section if currently recorded 
20. Trailing edge flap or cockpit flap control selection (except when 
parameters of paragraph (a)(85) of this section apply) 
21. Leading edge flap or cockpit flap control selection (except when 
parameters of paragraph (a)(86) of this section apply) 
22. Each Thrust reverser position (or equivalent for propeller airplane) 
23. Ground spoiler position or speed brake selection (except when 
parameters of paragraph (a)(87) of this section apply) 
24. Outside or total air temperature 
25. Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) modes and engagement 
status, including autothrottle 
26. Radio altitude (when an information source is installed) 
27. Localizer deviation, MLS Azimuth 
28. Glideslope deviation, MLS Elevation 
29. Marker beacon passage 
30. Master warning 
31. Air/ground sensor (primary airplane system reference nose or 
main gear) 
32. Angle of attack (when information source is installed) 
33. Hydraulic pressure low (each system) 
34. Ground speed (when an information source is installed) 
35. Ground proximity warning system 
36. Landing gear position or landing gear cockpit control selection 
37. Drift angle (when an information source is installed) 
38. Wind speed and direction (when an information source is installed) 
39. Latitude and longitude (when an information source is installed) 
40. Stick shaker/pusher (when an information source is installed) 
41. Windshear (when an information source is installed) 
42. Throttle/power lever position 
43. Additional engine parameters (as designated in Appendix M of this 
part) 
44. Traffic alert and collision avoidance system 
45. DME 1 and 2 distances 
46. Nav 1 and 2 selected frequency 
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47. Selected barometric setting (when an information source is 
installed) 
48. Selected altitude (when an information source is installed) 
49. Selected speed (when an information source is installed) 
50. Selected mach (when an information source is installed) 
51. Selected vertical speed (when an information source is installed) 
52. Selected heading (when an information source is installed) 
53. Selected flight path (when an information source is installed) 
54. Selected decision height (when an information source is installed) 
55. EFIS display format 
56. Multi-function/engine/alerts display format 
57. Thrust command (when an information source is installed) 
58. Thrust target (when an information source is installed) 
59. Fuel quantity in CG trim tank (when an information source is 
installed) 
60. Primary Navigation System Reference 
61. Icing (when an information source is installed) 
62. Engine warning each engine vibration (when an information source 
is installed) 
63. Engine warning each engine over temp. (when an information 
source is installed) 
64. Engine warning each engine oil pressure low (when an information 
source is installed) 
65. Engine warning each engine over speed (when an information 
source is installed) 
66. Yaw trim surface position 
67. Roll trim surface position 
68. Brake pressure (selected system) 
69. Brake pedal application (left and right) 
70. Yaw or sideslip angle (when an information source is installed) 
71. Engine bleed valve position (when an information source is 
installed) 
72. De-icing or anti-icing system selection (when an information source 
is installed) 
73. Computed center of gravity (when an information source is 
installed) 
74. AC electrical bus status 
75. DC electrical bus status 
76. APU bleed valve position (when an information source is installed) 
77. Hydraulic pressure (each system) 
78. Loss of cabin pressure 
79. Computer failure 
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80. Heads-up display (when an information source is installed) 
81. Para-visual display (when an information source is installed) 
82. Cockpit trim control input position -- pitch 
83. Cockpit trim control input position -- roll 
84. Cockpit trim control input position -- yaw 
85. Trailing edge flap and cockpit flap control position 
86. Leading edge flap and cockpit flap control position 
87. Ground spoiler position and speed brake selection 
88. All cockpit flight control input forces (control wheel, control 
column, rudder pedal) 
F. ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES IN ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
Various entities play a role in air crash accident investigation.  This section 
describes the organizational role of each of the major participants in the process. 
1. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
The FAA is an agency of the United States Department of Transportation 
(DOT).  It has regulatory oversight of all aviation activities within the jurisdiction 
of the United States. 
It is the FAA’s organizational role in air crash investigation to the specify 
equipment requirements pertaining to flight data recorders and the data 
handling requirements for the information recorded by them. 
One of the FAA’s primary concerns is the safety of flight.  The classic 
paradox facing the FAA is that its other primary concern is the promotion of 
aviation and air commerce.  These two primary concerns can be at odds.  For 
example, the crash of Valuejet 592 may have resulted from compromised safety 
practices in favor of continued air commerce.  But, it is generally such that safety 
wins every time there is a conflict.  Better safety translates directly to more 
aviation activity and healthier air commerce. 
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2. National Transportation Board (NTSB) 
The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal 
agency.  Congress gives it the authority and mission to investigate every civil 
aviation accident in the United States.  The NTSB is also concerned with 
significant accidents in the other modes of transportation, such as railroad, 
highway, marine and pipeline.  It issues safety recommendations aimed at 
preventing future accidents. 
The organizational role of the NTSB in air crash investigation is to actually 
conduct the crash investigation, to report the probable cause of the accident, and 
to make recommendations to the FAA for enhancing aviation safety.  The FAA 
receives the NTSB’s recommendations, but is not obligated to act upon them. 
The NTSB has field investigation teams that travel to the site of air crashes 
and collect all available information from the site.  To properly respond to more 
significant accidents, these “Go Teams” are on continuous call and can respond 
very quickly at any time. 
The NTSB maintains laboratories that analyze crash data collected from 
crash sites.  These laboratories examine flight recorder information. 
A key task of the NTSB is to determine “probable cause” for the accident.   
By analyzing many factors, including weather, flight crew actions, flight crew 
training, flight crew medical condition, maintenance status of the aircraft, air 
traffic control and more, the NTSB is nearly always able to determine sequence of 
events in the accident chain.  This process results in determination of probable 
cause. 
The availability of flight data, whether taken from flight recorders that 
were on board the accident aircraft or, in speculation, retrieved from a database 
on the ground where real-time flight data was transmitted, is a critical 
component of accident investigation.  Such data must be available in a timely 
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manner.  It must also be accurate, complete and un-compromised.  Accordingly, 
any system for real-time transmission of flight data must deliver timely, accurate 
and complete data to the NTSB. 
a) NTSB 830 
NTSB regulation 830 NOTIFICATION AND REPORTING OF 
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS OR INCIDENTS AND OVERDUE AIRCRAFT, AND 
PRESERVATION OF AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE, MAIL, CARGO, AND 
RECORDS sets forth the regulatory requirements for accident reporting. 
The most important feature of NTSB 830 as related to a real-time 
data transmission system is that it is referenced by FAR 121, which cites NTSB 
830 to require the release of flight data under certain circumstances, such as the 
termination of a flight due to significant property damage or loss of life.  This has 
direct implication on the characteristics of a database used to store flight data 
received from a real-time transmission system.  Such a system must be able to 
respond to the requirements of timely release of stored information, accuracy of 
the information, and length of time the data is stored. 
3. Operator (Airline) 
The organizational role of the operator is to cooperate with both the FAA 
and the NTSB in the crash investigation by releasing the flight recorder data from 
the accident flight.  They clearly have a vested interest in flight safety and will 
provide whatever support and assistance they can to help determine the 
probable cause of the accident, and will modify procedures and practices in the 
direction of enhanced flight safety. 
Operators have thousands of flights every day, all of which have flight 
recorders that collectively record a huge volume of flight data.  This data is the 
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property of the operator until it must be released in accordance with NTSB 830 
and 14 CFR. 
4. Equipment Manufacturer 
Equipment manufacturers, such as Boeing, Airbus, Dassault, Canadair, 
Embraer, Beechcraft, Cessna and others, are critically interested in flight safety 
and in building safe aircraft.  Their organizational role in accident investigation 
is such that they are often called upon to provide technical details about the 
accident aircraft, conduct engineering tests on recovered parts and components, 
or participate in technical discussions in an advisory capacity. 
During the design and manufacture of airframes, the equipment 
manufacturers provide for availability of placement of flight data sensors, a 
pathway from the sensors to the flight recorders, and a for a place for flight 
recorders to go on the aircraft.  None of the aircraft manufacturers makes flight 
recorders (see section II.J).  Flight recorders are purchased from a separate vendor 
and installed in the airframe.  Generally, aircraft manufacturers participate in the 
process by installing flight recorders required by the FAA and purchased by 
their customers, but they do not drive the nature of the recorders themselves or 
the data they must collect. 
G. CRASH STANDARDS FOR FLIGHT RECORDERS 
This section describes the minimum standards for survivability of flight 
data recorders and cockpit voice recorders.  Some flight recorder manufacturers 
choose to engineer their products to exceed the minimum standards.  The 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issues standards for recorder 
survivability.  The FAA issues regulations specifying how recorders are to be 
used, but not crash survivability standards. 
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1. Cockpit Voice Recorders 
Table 1 shows crash standards for cockpit voice recorders (CVR) [Ref: N03] . 
ITEM STANDARD 
Time recorded 30 minutes continuous 
2 hours for solid state digital units 
Number of channels 4 
Impact tolerance 3400 Gs / 6.5ms 
Fire resistance 1100ºC / 30 min 
Water pressure resistance Submerged 20,000 ft 
Underwater locator beacon 37.5 KHz 
Battery 6yr shelf life 
30-day operation 
Table 1. NTSB Cockpit Voice Recorder Standards 
2. Flight Data Recorders 
Table 2 shows crash standards for flight data recorders (FDR) [Ref: N03]. 
ITEM STANDARD 
Time recorded 25 hours continuous 
Number of parameters 5 to 300+ 
Impact tolerance 3400 Gs / 6.5ms 
Fire resistance 1100ºC / 30 min 
Water pressure resistance Submerged 20,000 ft 
Underwater locator beacon 37.5 KHz 
Battery 6yr shelf life 
30-day operation 
Table 2. NTSB Flight Data Recorder Standards 
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3. Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System 
A real-time remote flight data recording system will have different 
requirements than on-board flight recorders.  The real-time remote system will 
transmit flight data to the recording computer on a flight-by-flight basis.  No 
flight is more than about 15 hours, except military flights with air-to-air 
refueling.  Examples of the longest flights are those from the United States to 
Australia.  A flight from Sydney to Los Angeles usually takes approximately 12.5 
hours, whereas a flight from Los Angeles to Sydney lasts approximately 14 hours 
[Source: D01]. 
The design of a real-time remote flight data recording system should 
respect the “time recorded”, “number of channels”, and “number of parameters” 
standards.  The remainder of the standards do not apply because they exist to 
protect flight data contained within the on-board recording devices as 
tremendous impact forces destroy the aircraft carrying them.  These standards 
are not necessary for real-time remote recording because data is not stored in an 
on-board recording device. 
Table 3 provides a summary of proposed standards for a real-time flight 
data transmission system. 
REAL-TIME FLIGHT DATA TRANSMISSION SYSTEM 
ITEM STANDARD 
Time recorded 25 hours continuous flight data 
2 hours voice 
Number of parameters 5 to 300+ 
Number of voice channels 4 
Table 3. Recommended Standards For Real-Time Remote Flight Data Recording 
Systems 
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H. COMPUTER NETWORKS ABOARD AIRCRAFT 
It is not common to find a computer network aboard most aircraft.  There 
is no ethernet, token ring, AppleTalk® or other kind of packet-based network 
available, although some manufacturers (i.e. Boeing Aircraft Company) may 
include such a network on future generations of aircraft [Source: S02]. 
I. DIGITAL VERSUS ANALOG SENSORS 
This section describes which flight data and voice sensors are digital and 
which are analog. 
1. Digital Sensors 
In general, most flight data sensors produce digital output.  The value 
might be a numerical value, such as airspeed expressed in knots or mach, or a 
coded digital value, such as (for example) deflection of the aileron on a scale of 
0=none to 255=full. 
In the case of numerical value sensors, the nature of the value itself serves 
as its own reference.  For example, we know that airspeed is expressed in knots.  
The value reported and recorded is the value expressed directly.  There is no 
ambiguity. 
In the case of coded digital values, there is a need for reference data to be 
included as well as the data value itself.  The reference data gives the limits of 
possible data values or some other context in which to interpret the reported 
value. 
One of the problems that can significantly delay crash investigation is 
interpretation of data values recorded on the flight data recorder.  Without 
reference data, crash investigation may require tedious and exhausting 
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investigative work to positively determine the meaning of the information 
recorded on the FDR. 
As related to a real-time remote data transmission system, when 
considering data transmission media, the capacity of the required data network 
and the capabilities of the recording computer system, it is necessary to account 
for not only the data parameters themselves, but also the reference data that 
must be transmitted to give meaning to the data parameters [Ref: S02]. 
2. Analog Sensors 
In general, voice data is analog until it reaches the cockpit voice recorder.  
In the case of a solid-state, digital cockpit voice recorder, the voice stream is 
digitized and then recorded.  In the case of an analog tape recorder, it is simply 
recorded. 
J. MANUFACTURERS OF RECORDERS 
There are approximately 30 manufacturers of digital flight recorders.  
Aircraft manufacturers, such as Boeing and Airbus, install flight recorders on 
their airframes that are obtained from a recorder manufacturer.  Two prominent 
recorder manufacturers that supply their products for installation on Boeing 
aircraft are L3 Communications in Sarasota, Florida, and Honeywell Corporation 
in Renton, Washington [Source: S02]. 
K. SECURITY THREAT 
This section provides a security threat assessment and residual risk 
assessment of the present state-of-the-art of flight data recording. 
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1. Threat Assessment 
Even during the tragic events of September 11, 2001, there was no assault 
on the flight data of any of the flights that were involved in the attack.  This is 
perhaps the most extreme example of terrorist activity we have seen thus far and 
the flight data was not affected.  Although we did not recover all of the FDRs and 
CVRs, if we had, the data would have been accurate.  Although not supported by 
research, to the author’s knowledge there has not been a security compromise of 
flight data or cockpit voice information in any aviation disaster. 
In the air, there appears to be a very low threat against compromise of 
flight data and cockpit voice information.  Hijackers and terrorists have other 
things to worry about and are not very concerned with flight data.  If we ever see 
a situation where hijackers are concerned with what is being fed to the FDR and 
CVR, they will likely only be able to disrupt cockpit voice data by destroying the 
sensors — the headsets worn by the flight crew or, if they know the location of it, 
the cockpit area microphone.  Sensors for data going to the flight data recorder 
are inaccessible from the flight deck or passenger cabin. 
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2. Risk Assessment 
Present recording systems are entirely contained within the aircraft.  
Given that the threat is very low, there is little risk to the recorded flight data. 
Risks include: 
• Intentional vandalism of input devices used to collect cockpit voice 
information 
• Total electrical system failure 
• Intentional disruption of electrical power 
• Physical removal or destruction of the flight recorders from the 
accident site 
None of these risks are considered significant, thus the present flight data 
recording scheme is considered secure. 
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III. TRANSMISSION OF FLIGHT DATA OFF AIRCRAFT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses five presently available data transmission media 
that could be used, either singly or in combination, to implement a Real-Time 
Flight Data Transmission System. 
The term “data transmission medium” is used to refer to the radio 
transmission vehicle for the transmitted signal, including SATCOM, UHF, VHF, 
HF and Radar. 
B. TRANSMISSION MEDIUM CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 4 presents characteristics of the transmission media that are 
discussed in this chapter.  Particulars about the five transmission media are 
presented using this table as a template. 
The listed characteristics are important points to consider when 
evaluating transmission media.  On the basis of these factors, an assessment can 
be made about the suitability of the particular transmission medium for a given 
situation. 
The frequency at which the medium operates affects the bandwidth, 
which is the amount of data the medium can be expected to carry. 
The geographic coverage area is important when considering what 
medium to use in a particular area. 
Reliability, limitations, strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities are 
factors that affect the usability and assurance of the medium. 
Cost is obviously an important factor. 
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TRANSMISSION MEDIUM CHARACTERISTICS 
CHARACTERISTIC DISCUSSION 
Frequency Range Describe the range of frequencies on the radio 
spectrum in which the medium operates. 
Bandwidth (1) Describe the volume of information that can be 
transmitted using the medium. 
For digital signals, usually expressed in bits per 
second transmission rate. 
For analog systems, usually expressed in frequency 
width of the signal. 
(2) [Definition] The amount of data carrying 
capacity sold or used. 
Reliability Describe the degree of confidence that the medium 
can be relied upon to faithfully transmit data. 
Limitations Describe features about the medium that imposes 
boundaries on its use. 
Geographic Coverage 
Area 
One tenant of the Real-Time Flight Data 
Transmission System is that it should offer 
worldwide coverage.  Describe the area or areas of 
the world where the medium can be received. 
Strengths Describe features about the medium that enhances 
its utility. 
Weaknesses Describe features about the medium that detracts 
from its utility. 
Cost Describe the relative cost to use the medium.  
Consider cost of equipment, bandwidth and 
maintenance. 
Vulnerabilities Describe general types of vulnerabilities to which 
the signal is susceptible, including human threats 
and weather disruptions. 
Table 4. Discussion Points For Transmission Media 
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C. DATA TRANSMISSION MEDIA 
This section describes five presently available data transmission media 
(radio systems) that could be used, either singly or in combination, to implement 
a Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System. 
No single transmission medium is suitable for all situations.  Satellite 
communications provide clarity, reliability and worldwide signal coverage, but 
the cost is prohibitive and signal acquisition is questionable during the most 
critical moments of a crash sequence.  VHF radios are ubiquitous in aviation and 
cost effective, but they are ineffective over remote areas and oceans and have 
limited channel capacity.  HF is low cost and offers long-range propagation, but 
the bandwidth, susceptibility to interference and signal reliability is not good. 
To implement a Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System, combining 
several different transmission media is recommended to best handle different 
operating areas and flight conditions.  This provides the greatest chance for data 
to be transmitted and received during all phases and critical moments of flight. 
Table 5 presents the characteristics of Satellite (SATCOM) systems. 
Table 6 presents the characteristics of UHF systems. 
Table 7 presents the characteristics of VHF systems. 
Table 8 presents the characteristics of HF systems. 
Table 9 presents the characteristics of Radar (Transponder) systems. 
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1. SATCOM System 
CHARACTERISTIC DISCUSSION 
Frequency Range C–band (6 GHz transmit, 4 GHz receive), L–band 
(950-1535 MHz), Ka-band (30 GHz transmit, 20 GHz 
receive), Ku–band (14 GHz transmit, 12 GHz 
receive) [Ref: T02] 
Bandwidth Almost any bandwidth required by the Real-Time 
Flight Data Transmission System.  The limitation is 
cost. 
Reliability With good signal acquisition, reliability is high 
while transmitting.  Mobile transceiver systems 
exist for aircraft use.  They maintain signal 
acquisition as the aircraft makes normal maneuvers. 
Limitations Satellite acquisition must be maintained and can 
easily be lost. 
The number of available satellite communication 
channels and total available bandwidth is limited; 




Strengths High reliability, worldwide signal coverage, 
sufficient bandwidth for future volume of data 
expansion. 
Weaknesses High cost of bandwidth and equipment. 
Potential for loss of satellite acquisition during 
flight at unusual attitudes as may be experienced in 
a crash sequence. 
Cost Relatively high for both bandwidth and equipment. 
Vulnerabilities Relatively few.  The signal is a narrow beam and 
therefore not as easy to jam as other types of 
signals, however spoofing is possible if the attacker 
has SATCOM equipment and can generate signals 
that act like an aircraft in flight. 
Table 5. Characteristics Of SATCOM Systems 
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2. VHF Radios 
CHARACTERISTIC DISCUSSION 
Frequency Range 117-137 MHz (aviation use) 
Bandwidth Data rates up to 31.5 kbps [Ref: N06] 
Reliability Very reliable when properly implemented. 
Limitations Line-of-sight propagation. 
Useful range 100-120NM. 
Geographic Coverage 
Area 
Within relatively short distance of receiver; remote 
area and oceanic coverage not available using 
ground stations (none exist), but may be possible 
using air-to-air network. 
Strengths Low cost. 
Reliable. 
Uses commonly available equipment, both airborne 
and ground. 
Receiver network already exists in much (most) of 
the world. 
All aircraft have VHF radios installed, including 
antennae systems.  Using existing radios or adding 
a dedicated one for flight data transmission is 
relatively easy. 
Weaknesses Can suffer signal drop out. 
Coverage not available in remote areas or over 
oceans and in polar regions. 
Not directional. 
Limited channel capacity. 
Cost Relatively low. 
Vulnerabilities Easy to jam signal. 
Easy to spoof signal. 
Table 6. Characteristics Of VHF Communications 
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3. UHF Radios 
CHARACTERISTIC DISCUSSION 
Frequency Range 300 Mhz to 3 GHz 
Bandwidth Data rates up to 115.2 kbps [Ref: H02] 
Reliability Excellent. 
Limitations Line-of-sight propagation. 
Less forgiving of obstructions in signal path than 
VHF. 
Useful range 100-120NM. 
Geographic Coverage 
Area 
Within relatively short distance of receiver; remote 
area and oceanic coverage not available. 
Strengths Low cost. 
Reliable. 
High bandwidth. 
Weaknesses Not common in the civilian world. 
Adds another radio and antenna system to most (if 
not all) civil aircraft. 
Limited channel capacity. 
Cost Slightly higher than VHF, but not exceptionally 
high. 
Vulnerabilities Although equipment is less common than VHF 
equipment, the vulnerabilities are essentially the 
same. 
Easy to jam signal. 
Easy to spoof signal. 
Table 7. Characteristics Of UHF Communications 
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4. HF Radios 
CHARACTERISTIC DISCUSSION 
Frequency Range 3 MHz to 30 MHz 
Bandwidth Relatively low due to the low frequency of the 
carrier. 
Reliability Highly susceptible to atmospheric interference, 
skip, signal collision. 
Signal routinely drops out with changing 
ionosphere conditions. 
Lots of noise even on a “clear” signal making digital 
transmission questionable if not nearly impossible. 
Limitations Not suitable for data transmission use in bad 




Wide.  Oceanic and remote area coverage is 
available. 
Strengths Good signal coverage.  HF is used for transoceanic 
communication and was the standard before the 
advent of satellite communications.  It is still in 
widespread use and is required equipment for 
transoceanic flights. 
Weaknesses Reliability and bandwidth are low. 
Cost Medium.  A large percentage of civil aircraft do not 
have HF equipment, especially those aircraft used 
for domestic routes.  It would have to be installed to 
be part of a data transmission system.  Long haul 
aircraft have HF radios and antenna systems. 
Vulnerabilities HF is highly susceptible to atmospheric disturbance 
that causes significant signal degradation, fading 
and drop out. 
Easy to jam signal. 
Easy to spoof signal. 
Table 8. Characteristics Of HF Communications 
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5. Radar (Transponder) 
CHARACTERISTIC DISCUSSION 
Frequency Range L–band (950-1535 MHz). 
Bandwidth Expect >115.2 kbps data rate. 
Reliability Relatively high. 
Limitations Exceptionally line-of-sight coverage. 
One frequency per radar system split between all 
aircraft served at any given time significantly limits 
data bandwidth available to each aircraft. 
Geographic Coverage 
Area 
Most of the United States is covered by radar, 
although large areas of the Western U.S. are outside 
radar coverage or require the aircraft to be at higher 
altitudes to be “seen”.  Alaska has vast areas that 
are non-radar.  Oceans are not covered by radar. 
Strengths Good signal quality. 
Weaknesses Burst transmissions required. 
Can only transmit when the radar antenna sweeps 
through the position of the aircraft. 
Cost If currently installed transponders could be used to 
transmit data, cost is low because every aircraft 
seeking to use a Real-Time Flight Data 
Transmission System has at least one transponder. 
Vulnerabilities Requires relatively uncommon equipment to jam 
the radar signal. 
Not as easy to spoof as other signals due to the very 
directional nature of the radar signal. 
Table 9. Characteristics Of Radar/Transponder Communications 
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D. DATA TRANSMISSION METHODS 
This section discusses several methods that could be used to transmit the 
data including continuous broadcast, burst, broadcast when in trouble, and 
transmission to nearby aircraft.  The background knowledge is necessary when 
considering data link security. 
Flight data and cockpit voice audio streams are constantly generated 
during all phases of a flight.  Multiplied by all aircraft operating at any one time 
(approximately 4-5,000 over the United States), there is a significant amount of 
data to be moved (see also chapter V, section B.1). 
Most flights are routine and do not end in an accident requiring flight data 
analysis.  Therefore, the flight data generated by most flights is of little or no use 
from an accident investigation point of view.  If there is no purpose for 
transmitting flight data other than to have it available in the event of an accident, 
then there is the potential to transmit a huge volume of information that will 
never be used. 
Examining methods aimed at reducing the amount of transmitted flight 
data is an important factor that should be considered when designing the data 
transmission network. 
1. Continuous Broadcast 
Continuous broadcast refers to continuously transmitting flight data and 
cockpit voice streams as they are created. 
According to Frank Doran, Senior Engineer for L3 Communications, a 
major manufacturer of flight data recorders, the bandwidth required per second 
is 120Kbps for cockpit voice and 3Kbps for flight data, or a total of 123Kbps.  
With cockpit video included, this adds another 1.6Mbps, for a total of 1.723Mbps 
[Ref: D03]. 
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VHF and UHF data links offer about 115Kbps bandwidth, which nearly 
covers the requirement for cockpit voice and flight data, but does not account for 
cockpit video.  To transmit voice, data and video, SATCOM links would be 
required or multiple VHF or UHF links could be used.  SATCOM links, one per 
flight, is an expensive proposition.  Multiple VHF/UHF links is a tricky problem 
in data splitting and recombination.  
2. Broadcast When In Trouble (Intelligent Aircraft) 
Noting that most flight data comes from routine flights that require no 
accident investigation, an idea to reduce the amount of flight data system-wide is 
to only transmit when a flight is experiencing unusual flight conditions. 
The regime of normal flight is well understood.  The Real-Time Flight 
Data Transmission System could incorporate a flight-monitoring computer that 
continuously compares the present flight condition with a definition of 
“normal”.  If the computer determines that flight conditions are not normal, it 
could then instruct the real-time system to transmit an appropriate amount of 
stored flight data (whatever is available in the flight recorders) and begin 
continuous broadcast of flight data.  Once the computer determines the flight is 
not normal at any point, the system should not revert to not transmitting data 
until the flight is recovered (lands) and the system is reset. 
“Broadcast when in trouble” has advantages in that the amount of 
transmitted flight data system-wide would decrease dramatically, saving costs, 
bandwidth and data exposure. 
“Broadcast when in trouble” has disadvantages in that when the 
determination is made that the flight is not normal, the flight may abnormally 
terminate (crash) before there is adequate time to transmit the necessary volume 
of stored flight data. 
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3. Transmission To Other Nearby Aircraft 
SATCOM appears to be a viable answer to the question of which 
transmission medium to use because of its ubiquitous, global coverage and 
excellent signal characteristics.  But, it is expensive and difficult to maintain 
signal acquisition when the aircraft is flying in unusual flight attitudes — such as 
in the last few moments before the crash when the investigators really need the 
flight data.  Sufficient channel availability is questionable if a large number of 
aircraft require the use of SATCOM at the same time. 
To make use of more economical transmission means, nearby aircraft can 
be used as receivers.  Almost always, every flight is in the vicinity of at least one 
other flight.  “Vicinity” such that it is possible to transmit a VHF or UHF signal 
to that aircraft.  Making use of this notion, the transmitting flight could transmit 
to another aircraft — using either the continuous or broadcast-when-in-trouble 
methods — that would then re-transmit the data to the ground or store it in on-
board systems for later retrieval and analysis.  Both aircraft would be 
transmitting to each other.  The probability that both aircraft would crash is 
considerably lower than the probability that either aircraft might crash. 
The most complex problem of the transmission-to-nearby-aircraft method 
is data reassembly.  This can be addressed by proper data tagging and eventual 
re-transmission to a recording computer on the ground, which would then have 
the task of storing this data with other data from the accident flight. 
4. Burst Transmission 
Burst transmission involves saving data as it is generated, compressing it 
and transmitting all the saved data at once.  There are relatively long periods of 
radio silence followed by relatively short periods of transmission.  This method 
of transmission requires a computer to store the information before it is 
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transmitted because present flight data recorders do not have the ability to 
simultaneously read and write data [Ref: D03]. 
The system is composed of an on-board computer that receives data 
headed for the flight recorders, storing it and then releasing it to be transmitted 
at some interval.  The interval could be regular (e.g. once per hour, minute, or 
second) or triggered by some event (e.g. abnormal flight condition or availability 
of data link lock). 
A cornerstone of burst transmission is compression of the data.  A 
computer on-board the aircraft would store and compress the flight data until it 
is time to transmit.  By offering long intervals of inactivity followed by short 
intervals of data transmission, the problems of frequency congestion and 
inadequate channel capacity are mitigated. 
But the main problem with burst transmission is what happens if the aircraft 
crashes between bursts?  The last few seconds of the crash sequence are of 
particular interest to crash investigators. 
E. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This section explains some technical considerations about data 
transmission, including the equipment necessary to transmit the various types of 
signals, signal acquisition issues and issues on board the aircraft concerning 
connection with the data network (see next chapter) that carries the data to the 
ground computer, including the information assurance aspect of encryption key 
management. 
1. Necessary Equipment 
This section describes the equipment necessary to collect flight data and 
transmit it off the aircraft. 
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a) Data Collection And Storage Equipment 
Digital Flight Data Recorders (DFDRs) have digital memory 
capable of storing the FAA-mandated 25 hours of flight data and 30 minutes of 
cockpit voice data (most actually store 2 hours of cockpit voice data).  The 
memory is a circular buffer.  The memory is always full and the oldest data is 
overwritten as new data comes in.  Note: equipment manufacturers do not state 
the size of recorder memory in MB but rather in terms of time, since this is the 
measure used by the FAA in determining whether or not the recorder complies 
with regulations. 
Because the recorder is always recording, it is not possible to also 
read from it at the same time.  Therefore, it is not possible to use the flight 
recorders as the buffer if burst transmission is used [Ref: D03]. 
Flight data generated by the sensors around the aircraft is not 
necessarily in a transmittable format.  Cockpit voice arrives at the flight recorders 
as an analog signal.  Both flight data and cockpit voice audio needs processing 
for it to be in a transmittable format.  A dedicated computer is therefore 
necessary to receive data from the aircraft as do the flight recorders, digitize it or 
reformat it into a transmittable data item according to the transmission protocol 
in use (possibly TCP/IP), and deliver it to the radio system that transmits it off 
the aircraft.  This computer can be programmed to operate in continuous or burst 
mode, and to respect regular burst intervals or irregular intervals stimulated by 
an outside event. 
Figure 8 shows the on-board components of the Real-Time Flight 
Data Transmission System.  RTFDTS components are shown inside the hashed 
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Figure 8. On-Board Real-Time Transmission System Components 
b) Transmitters And Antenna Systems 
According to Timothy Ridgely of Boeing Aircraft Company, one 
can assume a new Boeing aircraft will have two VHF transceivers.  Most aircraft 
have more equipment than this, but that is the baseline [Ref: R01,S02].  Civil aircraft 
do not have UHF radios.  When used on transoceanic routes, aircraft will have 
HF radios and SATCOM may also be installed. 
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Table 10 shows what radios will be available for various aircraft 
configurations. 
AVAILABLE RADIOS FOR VARIOUS CONFIGURATIONS 
CONFIGURATION EQUIPMENT 
Baseline -Two VHF radios.  These are already allocated for 
ATC and company communications and thus are not 
available for data link use. 
-At least one transponder. 
-Civil aircraft do not have UHF, HF or SATCOM 
equipment in the baseline. 
Operator Dependent Discretion to add any number of radios.  Most equip 
their aircraft with more than the baseline of two VHF 
radios, but again all presently installed additional 
radios are allocated to some purpose and are almost 
surely not available for data link use. 
With ACARS System Adds one VHF radio. 
Military Adds UHF radio(s). 
Transoceanic Adds HF and may add SATCOM. 
Table 10. Available Radios For Various Configurations 
The conclusion is that to install a real-time flight data transmission 
link, for a typical aircraft in the civil fleet it cannot be assumed there are available 
transmitters of any type waiting to be dedicated to or shared with the system.  
For the real-time transmission system, additional transmitters must be installed, 
including their appropriate antenna systems. 
2. Signal Acquisition And Availability 
When a new receiver is selected, the aircraft must “connect” to the 
receiver by way of signal acquisition. 
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a) SATCOM 
In the case of SATCOM, signal acquisition is the process of linking 
up the satellite with the “earth station” (the aircraft).  This requires precise 
alignment of the antenna with the satellite, but normal maneuvering of the 
aircraft is not a problem for present SATCOM systems. 
The big problem anticipated with SATCOM is loss of signal (loss of 
data) during critical phases of flight involving unusual flight attitudes.  Consider 
the final flight path of Alaska Airlines flight 261, which crashed into the Pacific 
Ocean off the Southern California coast on January 31, 2000.  In this example, the 
aircraft is noted on the CVR transcript to be inverted as well as flying in other 
unusual flight attitudes [Ref: N04].  In fact, the aircraft plunged into the ocean while 
following a corkscrew flight pattern involving extreme angles of pitch, roll and 
yaw.  Almost certainly, any SATCOM signal emanating from an aircraft 
following this type of flight pattern would be lost.  But, those are the critical 
moments of flight that are of particular interest to crash investigators. 
b) VHF/UHF 
VHF and UHF signals are not particularly difficult to acquire, 
although they have line-of-sight characteristics.  Therefore, VHF/UHF signals 
are susceptible to attenuation, either partial or full, when objects intervene 
between the antenna and the receiver.  It is possible that unusual flight attitudes 
could induce signal attenuation sufficient to prevent data transmission for brief 
or longer periods, causing loss of reception of flight data.  This may happen as 
aircraft parts move into position and shield the signal from the ground receiver. 
It is widely known that there is a reception pattern associated with 
VHF/UHF receivers.  Mountains, buildings or other obstructions create these 
patterns by shielding the receiver from view of certain areas of the airspace.  It is 
particularly critical to know the reception pattern for receivers used as part of the 
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system and consider this information when designing preferred signal patterns 
for use by the Transmission Control Computer. 
To acquire a signal, the aircraft transmitter requires a receiver on 
the ground or another aircraft in the vicinity to which it can connect and there 
must be a clear radio frequency on which to transmit. 
Aviation communications traditionally use a single frequency to 
serve a number of aircraft, similar to a telephone party line.  Exactly one aircraft 
(or the ground controller) can talk on the frequency at any one time.  It is 
unfortunately common for two pilots to “step on” each other, which is the 
situation when two pilots attempt transmit at once.  To help alleviate this 
problem, pilots are taught to LISTEN on frequency to be sure it is clear before 
keying up to transmit. 
The “party line” idea has served well for many years for aviation 
voice communications, but it is based upon each pilot transmitting for a 
relatively short period of time and then releasing the frequency for another 
pilot’s use.  The RTFDTS has the need to continuously broadcast data. 
There is limited channel capacity in the aircraft VHF and UHF 
frequency spectrum.  Channels could be allocated for continuous broadcast of 
flight data, but this will likely lead quickly to exhaustion of available data link 
channels.  Using techniques such as compression of data, transmitting in short 
bursts, and time-division of the frequency, the problem of frequency congestion 
could be reduced or eliminated.  RTFDTS communications could probably be 
accomplished with fewer frequencies allocated to the system. 
Alternately, the aircraft could simply hold the data for later 
transmission as in the burst transmission method, but it is possible that the 
aircraft might crash before it can acquire a data link, leading to loss of data 
available to crash investigators. 
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F. INFORMATION ASSURANCE ISSUES 
This section discusses the information assurance issues on the aircraft 
from the point the data is generated to the point it leaves the aircraft. 
This discussion includes the sensor or microphone, the data pathways 
around the aircraft, the flight recorders and the radios used to transmit the data 
off the aircraft.  For each part, the basic information assurance concerns of 
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability are discussed. 
1. Flight Data Sources 
Flight data is generated either by sensors located at various points around 
the aircraft or by the flight management computers.  It is impossible or highly 
problematic to access the data sources while in flight.  On the ground, sensors 
can be accessed and could be subject to tampering.  In flight or on the ground, 
there are no controls that would allow anyone to alter what the flight 
management computers report to the flight recorders. 
Except as noted below, because of the physically isolated nature of flight 
sensors from the passenger and crew areas of the aircraft, there are no significant 
issues affecting confidentiality, integrity, authenticity or availability of the data 
generated by flight data sensors. 
An attacker could adversely affect the availability of flight data reported 
by the flight management computer by switching off the computer.  However, 
this may have the added effect of causing the aircraft to crash, since in some 
cases the flight computer actually flies the aircraft (fly-by-wire designs) using 
inputs from the pilots and other sources. 
An attacker could also inhibit the availability of data by physically 
destroying flight instruments or reaching behind the panel and disconnecting 
them.  There is, after all, a required crash axe in the cockpit (FAR 121.309e). 
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2. Cockpit Voice And Other Audio Sources 
Audio, including cockpit voice and cabin audio, is generated by devices 
that are accessible to persons in the cockpit or cabin. 
An attacker could disable these devices to prevent recording, thus 
adversely affecting the availability of the information, by physically destroying 
them, unplugging headsets or covering microphones with sound muffling 
material.  Also, if attackers communicate by whispering or using hand gestures, 
this circumvents the recording of their communication and is, in a sense, an 
adverse affect on the availability of audio information. 
If an attacker physically tampers with or vandalizes a microphone, but the 
microphone still partially works, this straddles the line between adversely 
affecting the availability of the audio stream and the integrity of the information 
it produces. 
There are no issues of confidentiality or authenticity associated with 
cockpit voice or cabin area audio. 
3. Pathway Between Sensor Or Microphone And Recorder 
There are a large number of cables and wires that connect the cockpit to 
the rest of the aircraft.  Some of these are used to carry information from data 
sensors or microphones to the flight recorders located at the rear of the aircraft. 
In flight, these pathways are virtually inaccessible.  On the ground, a 
determined attacker could infiltrate the aircraft and tamper with them.  This 
requires breach of physical security and extensive knowledge about the design of 
the aircraft. 
Any attack on the information pathways, whether in flight or on the 
ground, would have to be carried out by a very determined attacker.  It is likely 
that attacking these pathways would affect many other aircraft systems, 
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including fuel lines, hydraulic lines and flight control cables.  The effect of such 
an attack carries a high probability that it would disable or destroy the aircraft.  
Doing this when the attacker only means to disrupt forensic flight data seems 
quite unlikely. 
The pathways between sensors and recorders are not tested except when 
the system is certified or re-certified.  Most flight recorder systems do not report 
missing or corrupted sensor inputs. 
If the recorder itself is not working, the crew is made aware of this 
condition.  Either the FDR or the CVR may be malfunctioning, but if both are not 
available the flight may not be dispatched. 
Because of the inaccessibility of the information pathways between the 
sensor and microphone sources and the flight recorders, there are essentially no 
issues of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability of the 
information on these pathways. 
4. Flight Recorders 
The flight recorders are located in a compartment located at the rear of the 
aircraft.  Direct physical tampering with them while in flight is virtually 
impossible.  On the ground, tampering with the recorders requires breach of 
physical security and extensive knowledge of the design of the aircraft. 
Physical tampering or destruction of flight recorders seems very unlikely.  
By definition, the recorders are designed to withstand the forces of an air crash.  
However, tampering with the electrical connections while leaving the recorders 
themselves intact is a possibility.  This also seems unlikely.  If the recorder is 
disconnected prior to flight, it will not report ready status to the flight crew and 
the flight will not depart.  Altering the connection so the recorder reports ready 
yet the data does not properly enter the recorder is a theoretical but remote 
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possibility.  The gain to the attacker is so insignificant that the probability of this 
sort of attack on the system is low. 
Because of the inaccessibility of the flight data recorders and their 
hardened cases, there are essentially no issues of confidentiality, integrity, 
authenticity, availability, likelihood of spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks 
associated with the recorders. 
5. Flight Data Collection Computer 
The flight data collection computer would collect and process flight data 
and cockpit voice before sending it to the radios to be transmitted.  This 
computer is proposed as part of the design of the Real-Time Flight Data 
Transmission System and does not currently exist.  The computer would 
probably be physically located in the avionics bay, which is usually near the 
cockpit at the front of the aircraft.  Data on its way to the flight recorders at the 
rear of the aircraft would have to be channeled not only to the flight recorders 
but also to the flight data collection computer. 
The avionics bay may or may not be accessible while the aircraft is in 
flight.  This depends on the type of aircraft (e.g. B747, B767/757, A320, EMB-120).  
In flight, an attacker with physical control of the aircraft may have access to the 
avionics bay.  On the ground, access to the avionics bay by an attacker requires 
breach of physical security and extensive knowledge about the aircraft design. 
Because of the inaccessibility of the flight data collection computer, there 
are essentially no issues of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability 
associated with it. 
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6. Pathway Between Flight Data Collection Computer And Radios 
The proposed flight data collection computer and the existing radios are 
located in the avionics bay.  The pathway between the computer and the radios is 
also contained in the avionics bay and does not travel the length of the aircraft, as 
do the pathways to the aft-located flight recorders. 
As described in the previous section, access to the avionics bay is difficult 
or impossible.  Because of the inaccessibility of the avionics bay, there are 
essentially no issues of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity or availability 
associated with the pathway between the flight data collection computer and the 
radios. 
7. Software 
The Flight Data Collection Computer (FDDC) and Transmission Control 
Computer (TCC) have software that potentially could be subject to attack.  In-
flight, there is essentially no vulnerability to attack because of the physical 
isolation of the computers from the passenger and crew areas.  On the ground, 
however, unauthorized access could occur if an attacker breaches physical 
security. 
8. Radios 
Radios used to transmit real-time flight data are located in the avionics 
bay.  As described in the previous two sections, access to the avionics bay is 
difficult or impossible.  Because of the inaccessibility of the avionics bay, there 
are essentially no issues of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity or availability 
associated with the radios that transmit real-time flight data. 
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9. Antenna Systems 
The antennae associated with the radio systems are mounted on the 
exterior of the aircraft.  These are inaccessible while in flight, but while the 
aircraft is on the ground they could be subject to tampering relatively easily.  
This would adversely affect the availability of the data and could affect the 
integrity of the data.  There are no issues of confidentiality or authenticity of the 
data arising from attacks on the antenna systems. 
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IV. DATA NETWORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The data network associated with the real-time transmission flight data 
recording system moves data from radio feeds emanating from aircraft in flight 
to a computer system on the ground that receives and records the data.  In this 
chapter, the design of the proposed data network is discussed as well as the 
security of the information flowing on the network.  The security focus is upon 
the basic Information Assurance issues of confidentiality, integrity, availability and 
authenticity. 
Aircraft in flight are somewhat analogous to cell phones. The aircraft 
changes its position as it moves along its route of flight just as a cell phone 
changes its position when its user walks or rides in a car.  Like a cell phone, an 
aircraft is a mobile device that seeks to transmit information away from itself and 
it must receive information from the ground to maintain secure communication. 
Communication issues found in cellular telephone technology are also 
present in a Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System.  Cell phones must 
switch between cell sites just as an aircraft must switch from one ground station 
to another as it moves along its route of flight.  Additionally, the Real-Time 
Flight Data Transmission System has the requirement to establish a secure, 
authenticated session between the ground and the aircraft, and maintain the 
secure communication session during the switch. 
B. MAJOR FEATURES OF THE DATA NETWORK 
This section presents the major components of a proposed design of the 
data network used to move flight data from the aircraft to the data warehouse.  
Figure 9 presents a functional diagram of the data network. 
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Figure 9. Functional Diagram: Data Network 
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1. All Aircraft In Flight 
Aircraft flying above the surface of the earth and those beginning and 
ending their flight whilst taxiing on the surface of an aerodrome provide the 
input into the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System. 
a) Transmission Control Computer 
Aboard each aircraft, it is proposed that a Transmission Control 
Computer (TCC) be a computer system dedicated to the management of the 
communications process used to transmit data off the aircraft. 
The functions performed by the Transmission Control Computer 
include the following. 
• Receipt of data from the Flight Data Collection Computer 
(see section III.F.5). 
• Selection and management of the transmission medium (see 
sections III.A-C) to use for broadcast of the data. 
• Routing of flight data to the radio systems for transmission. 
• Serve as endpoint for the secure communications channel 
with the Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer system. 
2. Satellites 
Communications satellites are a part of the data network used by 
SATCOM systems.  The secure, two-way communications channel between the 
Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer system (see Chapter V) and the aircraft 
passes through a channel between the aircraft and a satellite, from the satellite to 
a ground receiver that is part of the Communications Receiver Array (see below), 
and from the ground receiver to the FDW via the Internet. 
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3. Communications Receiver Array 
A radio system that is part of the Communication Receiver Array receives 
the flight data over the transmission medium in use (UHF, VHF, HF, Radar, 
SATCOM) and passes the data on to the Data Network (Internet). 
4. Data Network (Internet) 
The Data Network routes the data to the Flight Data Warehouse (see 
below). 
5. Flight Data Warehouse 
The Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer system (see Chapter V) 
receives and stores flight data from the Data Network (Internet).  The FDW 
serves as the endpoint for the VPN or secure channel from the aircraft. 
C. COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES 
This section discusses some issues surrounding the communication of 
data off the aircraft.  These issues affect the implementation of a secure 
communications channel from the aircraft to the Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) 
computer system. 
1. Secure Communications Channel 
To protect the integrity and confidentiality of the information flowing 
along it, the communications channel must be secured.  To accomplish this, a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) is suggested.  Following is a brief discussion of 
VPNs [Ref: B01,S04]. 
A VPN is a secure “tunnel” traversing the Internet through which 
encrypted traffic flows from a secured source computer to a secured destination 
computer. 
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A VPN has gateways on both the source and destination ends of the 
tunnel that are the endpoints of the encrypted channel.  The source and 
destination computer networks can be considered logically part of the same 
network even though they are physically located far away from each other.   
Computers on both ends of the VPN tunnel send packets to computers on the 
other end of the VPN tunnel as if they were on the same local area network. 






























Figure 10. Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
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The sender’s VPN gateway encrypts each packet as it enters the VPN 
tunnel, including the source and destination IP addresses and the data within it.  
This encrypted packet becomes the data inside another packet, which carries a 
source IP address of the sender’s VPN gateway and a destination IP address of 
the receiver’s VPN gateway.  Therefore, as the packet traverses the insecure 
Internet, an attacker only sees the IP addresses of the VPN gateways and some 
encrypted data, thus keeping everything about the true source and destination 
computers completely hidden. 
To build a VPN connection, the two ends communicate their identity to 
each other using public key cryptography.  Each end authenticates to the other 
by encrypting its identification using the other end’s public key.  The receiving 
end decrypts the identification using its private key, which is a closely held 
secret and the only key that will decrypt the message sent to it by the other end.  
Once authentication succeeds, a secure trusted path exists between the two ends 
based on public key cryptography. 
Because public key cryptography involves a relatively slow computation, 
in the interest of better performance the two ends use the trusted path they have 
established between them to exchange a shared crypto key, called a session key.  
A relatively fast encryption algorithm uses the session key for subsequent VPN 
communications. 
VPNs are implemented using IPsec, which adds encryption to TCP/IP at 
layer 2. 
2. Aircraft IP Address 
To access the Internet for data transmission, each aircraft must have an IP 
address.  This is a unique computer address that the Internet uses in much the 
same way that the telephone system uses a telephone number. 
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The Transmission Control Computer (TCC) on board each aircraft receives 
its IP address using one of two methods described below and uses it to build a 
secure VPN channel, which serves as a trusted path between the aircraft and the 
ground. 
a) Static IP Address 
One method of assigning an IP address to the aircraft is by giving it 
a permanent (static) address when the airborne components of the Real-Time 
Flight Data Collection System are installed on board the aircraft.  To implement 
this method of IP address assignment, there would need to be an IP address 
assigning authority, perhaps the FAA, that has a pool of available IP addresses 
and assigns one to an aircraft when its RTFDCS equipment is installed.  That 
particular aircraft would then “own” that IP address throughout its lifetime and 
use it to transmit every packet of data originating from the aircraft. 
As relates to the Real-Time Flight Data Collection System, the 
process of using a static IP address is as follows.  First, the proposed TCC aboard 
the aircraft selects and opens a radio frequency with a remote communications 
receiver that is connected to the Internet.  This is analogous to a desktop 
computer attaching a network cable to a nearby network jack.  Second, the TCC 
uses the radio communications channel and its previously assigned static IP 
address to initiate a secure (VPN) communications channel with the Flight Data 
Warehouse (FDW) computer system. 
b) Dynamically Assigned IP Address 
A second method of assigning an IP address is to use Dynamic 
Host Control Protocol (DHCP), which is the standard method used to 
dynamically assign IP addresses to computer systems attaching to the Internet.  
DHCP involves a process in which the computer needing an IP address 
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communicates with a DHCP server and requests an IP address.  The server pulls 
from a pool of available IP addresses and assigns one to the computer requesting 
it.  When the computer using the dynamically assigned IP address no longer 
needs it, such as when it terminates its connection with the Internet or it 
disappears from the Internet with an open connection that is not used for some 
period of time, the DHCP server reclaims the IP address and can reassign it to 
another computer that connects to the Internet at a later time. 
As relates to the Real-Time Flight Data Collection System, the 
process of receiving and using a dynamically assigned IP address is as follows.  
First, the proposed TCC aboard the aircraft selects and opens a radio frequency 
with a remote communications receiver that is connected to the Internet.  This is 
analogous to a desktop computer attaching a network cable to a nearby network 
jack.   All that is known is that the computer has attached to the network, but not 
“who” that computer is.  Second, the TCC uses the radio frequency to 
communicate with a DHCP server on the Internet to request a dynamically 
assigned IP address.  The DHCP server responds with an IP address that is used 
by the TCC for further communication during that communications session. 
3. Unique Aircraft I.D. 
All data transmitted from a particular aircraft must have some unique 
identification associated with it.  In the event of a catastrophe involving the 
aircraft, there must be a way to retrieve all data associated with that aircraft — or 
at least from the accident flight — from the Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) 
computer system. 
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There are three pieces of information that might be used to uniquely 
identify data originating from a particular aircraft.  They are: 
• The Media Access Control (MAC) address of the communications 
Transmission Control Computer (TCC) hardware on board the 
aircraft 
• The aircraft’s static IP address (if one is assigned) 
• Some unique aircraft identifier that is assigned or associated with 
the aircraft 
The MAC address and static IP address do not change.  If used, each 
would have to be registered with some authority that maps the MAC or static IP 
address to a particular aircraft, so that if the aircraft is ever involved in an 
accident requiring access to its flight data, the address could be used to retrieve 
the data.  In this case, some other unique aircraft identifier is not necessary. 
If a dynamically assigned IP address is used and the MAC address is not 
chosen as the unique aircraft ID, then some unique aircraft identifier must be 
used to identify the data emanating from the aircraft.  This might be a 
combination of the date, flight number, route segment, operator’s name, etc. 
An advantage of using the MAC address or static IP address is that each is 
well known and assigned to the aircraft before it joins the Real-Time Flight Data 
Transmission System.  No other unique ID would need to be generated.  Upon 
receipt of communication, the Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer system 
would need to be informed of the MAC or IP address of the incoming data.  The 
MAC address is stripped off at OSI Layer 2 and the IP address is stripped off at 
OSI Layer 3, so neither is available to the data warehouse application without 
including it in the information carried by the packet.  Using the MAC address, 
which is 24-bits in length, this theoretically allows for 224 (16,777,216) unique 
identifiers.  Using the IP address, which is 32-bits in length, this theoretically 
allows for 232 (4,294,967,296) unique identifiers. 
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a) I.D. Spoofing 
Any of the identifiers (MAC address, IP address or Unique Aircraft 
ID) could theoretically be spoofed, leading to false communication with the 
Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer system in which false data could be 
given to the system.  However, the crypto certificates associated with the PKI key 
pairs that are used to form the secure communications channel (VPN), are 
digitally signed by the CA’s private key.  This private key would also have to be 
spoofed in order to subvert the VPN carrying the data, which is impossible or at 
least very unlikely. 
If a flight were hijacked and false data were to be injected into the 
RTFDTS in place of the actual data emanating from the aircraft, then the 
movements and circumstances aboard the hijacked aircraft might be hidden from 
investigators.  Such an attack would require a high degree of technical 
sophistication, including generating or having the false data available for 
injection into the system and subversion of the secure channel between the 
aircraft and the ground or establishment of a false channel. 
It is worth noting that the flight data recorders on board the aircraft 
would still be active, too, so either the circumstances of the event would have to 
be such that the recorders were made unavailable to investigators or data 
recorded by them would have to be subverted as well. 
It seems unlikely that an attacker would see the need to go to these 
extraordinary lengths to carry out an attack.  ID spoofing, therefore, while 
possible, is probably not of great concern with respect to the RTFDTS. 
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D. INFORMATION ASSURANCE ISSUES 
This section discusses some of the information assurance issues 
associated with data traveling through the data network from an aircraft to the 
Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer system. 
1. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality of the transmitted flight data means that only the intended 
recipient of the data is able to understand it.  The encrypted Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) data channel ensures confidentiality of flight data in transit 
across the data network. 
As packets arrive at the receiver’s VPN gateway they are 
decrypted.  Unless the flight data carried in the packets is encrypted on the 
aircraft before it is transmitted, it will no longer be encrypted as it traverses the 
Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer system.  Chapter V discusses ways to 
securely store flight data in the FDW to maintain its confidentiality. 
2. Integrity 
Integrity of transmitted flight data means that what is received is actually 
what was sent. 
Using a VPN channel gives integrity on a packet-by-packet basis through 
the strength of the VPN’s cryptography.  The receiving VPN gateway decrypts 
each packet it receives through the VPN, giving the actual packet that was sent 
from the source.  It is only able to deliver this packet to the intended destination 
after successful decryption of the received VPN packet that contained it.  If the 
packet cannot be successfully decrypted, perhaps it was altered or attacked in 
transit.  In this situation, the packet is discarded.  Successful decryption can only 
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occur using the correct key (session key; see section 1), which is only known to the 
VPN gateways. 
Ensuring the integrity of each packet isn’t necessarily enough.  Once all 
packets containing a logical unit of flight data are received, a further integrity 
check can be accomplished using a hash of the data. 
A hash of any message is the result of some computation performed on 
the message that reduces the message from its original state to some smaller 
representation of itself.  Hashes are one-way, meaning that while the hash is 
derived from the original message, the original message cannot be derived from 
the hash. 
The sender hashes the message and transmits the hash value along with 
the message.  The receiver hashes the received message generating a second hash 
value.  The receiver compares the two hash values.  If they are the same, 
assuming the sender’s hash value was not altered, then the received message is 
actually what was sent. 
To ensure the sender’s hash value is not altered, the sender encrypts the 
hash value before it is transmitted along with the data it represents.  With respect 
to the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System, the key used for this purpose 
should be the sender’s private key.  Later, should it become necessary to verify 
the integrity of the data, the sender’s public key can be used to decrypt the hash 
generated by the originator of the hash, which was the aircraft that transmitted 
the hash and the associated flight data. 
3. Authenticity 
Authenticity is the property of information that assures the receiver that 
the data was actually sent by the source believed to have sent it. 
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Receiving data through a secure, public key cryptography-based VPN 
communications channel assures the data is authentic at the moment it is 
received by the Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer system.  The VPN 
guarantees authenticity of the data traversing it by the nature of the connection.  
The VPN tunnel is constructed using public key/private key pairs.  The keys are 
obtained from a valid Certificate Authority (CA) using a mechanism signed by 
the CA’s private key.  Once the connection is established, a session key is 
exchanged behind the encryption of the public/private keys.  The session key is 
then used to encrypt the channel.  All data successfully passing through the 
receiver’s VPN gateway is therefore authentic, at least as far as being able to say 
that it originated from the particular aircraft that authenticated itself at the other 
end of the VPN channel. 
Please see Chapter V for a discussion of the assurance of flight data 
authenticity when it is retrieved from the database. 
4. Availability  
Because the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System is based upon a 
network of radio transmission media of different types, and some of these media 
are susceptible to radio interference or jamming, availability could be 
compromised either naturally or by a malicious attacker. 
The best assurance of availability is to employ top quality radio 
equipment, develop a reliable frequency-switching algorithm, and build a 
network of redundant receivers that provides adequate signal coverage over a 
wide geographic area. 
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V. GROUND CAPTURE AND STORAGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section describes the ground capture and storage components of the 
Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System (RTFDTS).  Figure 11 shows the 
















































Figure 11. Removable Media 
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Following transmission of flight data from the aircraft through the data 
network, a computer system on the ground captures the data in a data 
warehouse.  This proposed component of the Real-Time Flight Data 
Transmission System is herein referred to as the Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) 
computer system. 
The FDW handles secure storage and archival of flight data.  It allows 
access to the data only by the originator of the data (aircraft operator) or to the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in cases where NTSB Regulation 
830 in combination with applicable Federal Air Regulations (FAR Parts 91, 135, 
121) or military directive requires its release. 
Great care is placed on assuring confidentiality and integrity of the data as 
it is in transit across the data network.  In order to assure the continued 
confidentiality and integrity of the data, storage and access to stored flight data 
requires a similar degree of care. 
B. SECURE COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL (VPN) GATEWAY 
1. Flight Data Warehouse Gateway 
The termination of the secure data channel between the FDW and the 
aircraft in flight is the secure communications channel (VPN) gateway.  Flight 
data arrives from the aircraft at this point through an encrypted data channel.  It 
is routed via an internal network or data path to the Flight Data Warehouse 
(FDW) computer system for processing and storage. 
The gateway also serves as the endpoint of a secure data channel between 
the Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) and the Flight Data Examination System 
(FDES).  This channel is used to transfer data from the FDW to the FDES after an 
air crash.  A secure channel is necessary to protect confidentiality of the data as it 
passes through the insecure data network (Internet). 
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2. Flight Data Examination System Gateway 
The secure data channel (VPN) gateway associated with the Flight Data 
Examination System (FDES) is the endpoint of the channel between the FDES 
and the Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer system, which is used for 
transferring flight data pertaining to an accident flight to the NTSB. 
C. FLIGHT DATA WAREHOUSE (FDW) COMPUTER SYSTEM 
The FDW computer system is the heart of the proposed ground data 
capture and storage machinery.  This computer system receives data that has 
been transmitted from aircraft in flight through the data network secure data 
communications channel (VPN).  The FDW stores data in a database for retrieval 
in the aftermath of an air crash by receiving valid requests for information from 
an NTSB Flight Data Examination System (FDES).  Finally, the FDW off-loads 
“current” data into the data Archive. 
1. Storage Rules 
The present system of flight recorders includes rules about how long data 
must be stored before it is discarded or overwritten.  A FDR stores 25 hours of 
flight data and a CVR stores 30 minutes (soon will be two hours) of cockpit voice 
data.  There will be a requirement for similar rules specifying the storage 
requirements for the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System. 
The 25-hour FDR and 30-minute CVR rules are in place because they 
mirror how flight recorders have historically worked.  Essentially, the recorder 
can be thought of as a loop of tape of some length — 25 hours or 30 minutes — 
that is continually overwritten.  In fact, before solid-state devices were used, this 
was the exact nature of foil FDR and magnetic tape CVR devices. 
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Because of the proposed design of the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission 
System, flight data can be thought of as blocks of data that encompass an entire 
flight from start to finish.  From the point of view of a computer recording this 
data, it makes more sense to tie the recording rules to entire flights rather than a 
certain amount of recorder time. 
The FAA will have to examine this change of thinking and issue rule-
making to reflect it.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to state what these rules 
might be, although it might be recommended to keep flight data only as long as a 
flight is in the air and then discard it once the flight is successfully recovered (has 
landed safely). 
An Archive mechanism is described in this thesis, but the need for this is 
actually a reflection of the storage rules that are ultimately adopted.  If there is no 
interest in keeping flight data after a flight is successfully recovered, then there is 
no need for an archive.  Or, the Archive might receive flight data from a 
successfully recovered flight and store it for some specified period of time.  Even 
though the flight landed safely, this data may be very useful if the aircraft is lost 
on the next flight. 
2. Storage Methods 
Presently, flight data is recorded in on-board flight recorders.  The data is 
physically confined to devices aboard the aircraft that recorded it, resulting in 
relatively good assurance that the data will remain private. 
The issue of confidentiality to ensure privacy has been addressed 
throughout the sensor data acquisition and data transmission portions of the 
proposed Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System.  Now that the data has 
arrived on the ground and is to be stored in the FDW, the requirement is strong 
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to restrict access to the flight data only to its owner (the flight’s operator) or, in 
the aftermath of an air crash, to the NTSB. 
Two methods of assuring privacy are proposed.  They are MLS and 
encrypted data storage. 
a) Multi-Level Security (MLS) Design 
Multi-Level Security is usually used in environments such as the 
Department of Defense (DoD) where there is a need to separate Top Secret, 
Secret, Confidential and Unclassified data.  A feature of the DoD classification 
system is that these classifications are further divided into compartments.  An 
individual may be cleared to access Top Secret – Special Compartment 
Information (TS-SCI), but will only have access to certain Top Secret 
compartments on a need-to-know basis. 
An MLS design could be used to address the privacy concerns 
associated with the FDW.  An MLS is attractive for use on a centralized Flight 
Data Warehouse computer system, since on such a system flight data from many 
operators would be stored and there would be a need to separate the data into 
secure compartments. 
The attractive feature of MLS is compartments.  The model that 
seems most appropriate to the FDW is to consider each operator a separate 
compartment, such that only that operator has need-to-know for the data stored 
in the compartment. 
When NTSB notification is required per NTSB Regulation 830, 
applicable FAR 91/121/135 rules, or military regulations require release of flight 
data, then the operator would read data in its compartment and forward it on to 
the NTSB, similar to what the operator does now in the case of data contained in 
a flight recorder of an accident flight. 
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This storage design integrates well with data arriving through a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN).  Such data does not need to be encrypted prior 
to entering the VPN channel to ensure its confidentiality whilst in transit because 
the secure data channel is encrypted.  Data comes out of the VPN exactly as it 
entered — unencrypted.  A label can be attached to the unencrypted data, which 
as noted earlier would be the identification of the operator that owns the data, 
and the data can then be stored directly in that form by the MLS storage system.  
Privacy of the data is assured because of the need-to-know associated with the 
compartment assigned to the operator of the flight originating the data. 
An advantage to using MLS is that there is a minimum of 
encryption involved in the process, which can be expensive in terms of 
computing complexity and time.  Data is encrypted only once as it is carried by 
the VPN. 
A disadvantage of MLS from the point of view of the operator 
might be that the data exists in unencrypted form while it is out of the direct 
control of the operator.  This presents the possibility of a perceived security 
vulnerability that may be of concern to the operator, although if the MLS 
operating on the FDW does exactly what it is designed to do and nothing more 
then the data will remain private.  It could be that lack of confidence in this 
process might be perceived as an unacceptable risk for some operators. 
b) Encrypted Storage Design 
A way to assure the privacy of data stored in a centralized FDW is 
to store it in encrypted form. 
If flight data is encrypted using the operator’s public key before it 
leaves the aircraft, it can only be decrypted later using the operator’s private key.  
The operator would only decrypt stored flight data for its own purposes or in 
cases where release of crash data to the NTSB is required. 
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Data generated aboard the aircraft could be encrypted with the 
operator’s public key and then given to the secure data channel (VPN) for 
transmission to the FDW.  When the data emerges from the VPN it is still 
encrypted with the operator’s public key and ready to be stored. 
If flight data is not encrypted aboard the aircraft, it emerges from 
the VPN not encrypted.  The FDW would then have to apply the operator’s 
public key prior to storing the data, which means the FDW would have to store 
the public key of each operator for which it handles data.  These public keys 
would have to be obtained from a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) using a 
mechanism digitally signed by the CA’s public key. 
Regardless of where the data is encrypted, double encryption is a 
part of this storage design.  One encryption is conducted either on board the 
aircraft or by the FDW after the data is received through the VPN.  The other 
encryption is conducted by the VPN as a part of its normal secure operation. 
Double encryption consumes more processing power and time than 
if the data is encrypted only once.  It could introduce performance issues.  It may 
be that encrypting data aboard the aircraft is more efficient than tasking a central 
FDW with encrypting the data prior to storage, or such encryption on board the 
aircraft is too time and processor consuming and must be done on the ground.  
This issue will require further investigation and is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
3. Archive Data 
As noted previously, the need for Archive is a result of the rules that are 
established by the FAA for flight data handled by the Real-Time Flight Data 
Transmission System.  In the event such rules include Archive, this discussion is 
presented. 
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Figure 11 shows the overall design of the ground capture and collection 
portion of the RTFDTS.  The Archive is shown as being fed from the FDW via a 
direct connection.  However, the Archive may not be co-located with the FDW 
and instead is accessed via a company local area network or the Internet.  In this 
case, the connection between the FDW and the Archive might include a VPN. 
When it is determined flight data is to be archived, the FDW sends the 
data to the Archive and deletes it from “current” storage held by the FDW.  
Flight data remains in Archive for the period of time specified by the rules 
governing such storage. 
Archived data could be stored on off-line media or it may be stored in an 
online database, or it might be passed on to the operator for disposition in 
accordance with the operator’s rules, or FAA and NTSB’s regulatory 
requirements. 
D. FLIGHT DATA EXAMINATION SYSTEM (FDES) 
This proposed part of the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System is 
used when the need to examine flight data exists after a crash.  The NTSB would 
own and operate a single FDES or multiple FDES systems.  The essential function 
of the FDES is to receive flight data from a Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) 
computer system.  Exactly what the FDES does with the data from that point is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  It might forward it on to other NTSB systems or 
perform some kind of processing of the flight data. 
Figure 11 shows four suggested methods of transferring data from the 
FDW and/or Archive to the FDES.  The paragraph numbers following (1, 2, 3, 4) 
correspond to the numbers c, d, e and f on figure 11. 
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1. Removable Media 
The FDW could copy flight data to a removable medium, such as a floppy 
disk, removable hard disk, USB “thumb drive”, punched paper tape, disk pack, 
magnetic tape, etc.  This would then be physically transported to the FDES and 
loaded onto the FDES for processing. 
2. Dial-In Remote Access System (RAS) 
Without using the Internet, the FDES could use either a dial-in or 
dedicated (a.k.a. “leased”) line to access the FDW.  Such lines can be encrypted to 
address confidentiality. 
3. Direct Connection 
If the FDES is co-located with the FDW, the FDES could access the FDW 
directly through a direct connection.  In this case, it would not be necessary to 
encrypt the connection on the assumption that the entire computer system is 
physically secured. 
4. Secure Communications Channel (VPN) 
If the FDES accesses the FDW through the Internet, it could do so through 
a secure data channel (VPN).  This provides a secure, encrypted channel through 
which unencrypted flight data can securely pass through the un-trusted Internet 
environment. 
E. CENTRALIZED VERSUS DISTRIBUTED 
The components of the ground capture system could be either centralized 
or distributed.  There could be one large Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer 
system, one Flight Data Examination System (FDES) and one Archive.  Or, each 
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of these components could be duplicated any number of times and distributed 
over a wide area. 
1. Centralized 
If there is one Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer system, one Flight 
Data Examination System (FDES) and one Archive, there are a number of issues 
to consider pertaining to this design. 
Concept — This design requires that some entity, perhaps the FAA, 
maintain one large FDW in which all flight data is stored.  When the NTSB has 
the need to access the data, it has one source to which it would go to retrieve it. 
Cost — The question is who pays for the storage computer?  Data from all 
operators would be stored on one computer system.  The government, aircraft 
operators, or a combination of the two might fund the system. 
Control — The question is who has control of the data stored in the computer 
system?  The operator of the flight owns the data, but another entity would 
provide and maintain the computer that stores it. 
The data must remain private to the operator until such time as it is 
required to be released by regulation in response to an accident. 
A multi-level security (MLS) system would address the requirement for 
privacy as would storing the flight data encrypted with the operator’s public key. 
All The Eggs Are In One Basket — One central data warehouse system 
exposes the RTFDTS to possible loss of service should the system suddenly 
become unavailable for any reason.  For fault tolerance, a backup system should 




If there are several Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer systems, 
Flight Data Examination Systems (FDES), and Archive locations, the associated 
design and operation issues are different from those related to a single, large data 
warehouse computer. 
Concept — This distribution of assets allows individual operators to own 
and operate their own FDW, or a series of FDW systems, in a manner and at 
locations of their choosing.  When the NTSB has the need to access the data, it 
would have to request the information from the operator, who would then 
inform the NTSB of the specific FDW to which it must connect to retrieve the 
data. 
Cost — Cost would be distributed among the operators.  This is similar to 
the concept of each operator equipping its fleet of aircraft with flight recorders.  
Perhaps the operator would not bear the entire cost of purchasing and 
maintaining the systems if government were willing to provide some form of 
subsidy or other assistance. 
Control — If each operator has its own FDW or series of FDW’s, the 
operator would have absolute control of its flight data as it does now with data 
stored in flight recorders.  Access to the data would be easy to control and 
provide to the NTSB after a crash.  Techniques to ensure fault tolerance would be 
required for each local system, such as multiple redundant systems, mirrored 
disk drives and sound backup policy. 
F. INFORMATION ASSURANCE ISSUES 
This section discusses or summarizes the information assurance issues 




Confidentiality is addressed through the use of either a MLS storage 
design or an encrypted data storage design.  
a) MLS Storage Design 
Using compartments within an MLS storage system assures 
confidentiality of the data.  An MLS design lends itself to storing data in an 
unencrypted form, but this brings into question the data before it is 
compartmentalized.  The data would probably be handled by the FDW in 
unencrypted form before it is compartmentalized, which results in a concern for 
its privacy should the FDW not handle the data correctly.  There is also the 
possibility of a disclosure attack as the data is handled before being 
compartmentalized, although a high assurance system with trusted mechanisms 
for compartmentalizing data could address this concern. 
b) Encrypted Storage Design 
Reliance upon public key cryptography is used to assure 
confidentiality of stored data.  This is a good assumption if the encryption 
algorithm is sufficiently robust, such as is the case with 3DES or AES.  Only the 
operator can decrypt the data because only the operator possesses the private 
key that corresponds with the public key used to encrypt the data. 
Using the encrypted storage design, flight data never exists in 
unencrypted form while out of the direct control of the operator, which should 
give operators good assurance of the confidentiality and privacy of their data. 
The operator should never release its private key.  When it is 
required for the decryption of flight data stored within the FDW and/or Archive, 
the operator must interact with the FDW system in a secure manner.  This could 
be done using smart cards or other mechanisms designed to make use of the 
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operator’s private key for decryption.  Alternatively, if the FDW is not owned 
and operated by the operator, data might be routed from the FDW to the 
operator, decrypted by the operator using its private key, then sent on to the 
FDES for processing. 
Encrypted flight data stored in the FDW and Archive databases 
would need to be stored along with an unencrypted identifier.  The identifier 
should consist of that which is necessary to identify a particular flight.  For 
example, it could be a combination of operator ID, date and flight number.  To 
ensure integrity, the identifier might be bound to the encrypted data using a 
crypto seal. 
2. Integrity 
Integrity of stored data means that when retrieved, there is assurance that 
the data is as it was originally stored.  Reliance upon the underlying operating 
system of the FDW and Archive systems provides sufficient assurance of this 
property. 
To enhance integrity assurance, data could be hashed and the hash stored 
along with the data.  When retrieved, the data would be re-hashed and the stored 
hash compared with the new hash.  If they are equal, the data is as it was stored 
and integrity is assured.  If they are not equal, there is an error somewhere in the 
process and integrity is not assured.  Because the FDW has system access 
security, it is probably not necessary to encrypt this hash.  System Access 
Security is meant to include all the measures employed to secure the computer 
system, such as  including a guard at the gate to the facility housing the system, a 
cipher lock on the door to the computer room, the user name and password 
combination required to log on to the system, and anything else that contributes 
to the security of the system. 
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3. Authenticity 
Authenticity is the property of data that means the receiver of the data is 
assured that the data actually originated from the source it is believed to have 
originated from.  When examining crash data, the NTSB needs the assurance that 
the data with which they are working actually originated on the accident flight. 
Flight data consists of two parts.  The first part is data identification 
information, such as the identity of the operator, the aircraft number, the flight 
number, the date, and so on.  The second part is the data itself. 
When flight data arrives at the FDW and is stored in the flight database, it 
has already passed through various assurance mechanisms such that at that 
moment it is known to be authentic (see chapter IV.D.3).  The flight data and its 
accompanying identifying information are stored in the flight database by the 
FDW.  The FDW should be a secure computer system with access control such 
that information in the database cannot be maliciously altered. 
Because the data was authentic when it was stored and the database is 
secure, if the data along with its identifying information were later given to a 
Flight Data Examination System (FDES) for processing after an accident, the 
NTSB would be assured that the data is authentic. 
4. Availability 
There are two availability issues associated with the FDW. 
a) Receiver 
First, the system must be available to act as a receiver.  There would 
never be a time when flights would not be in the air transmitting flight data.  
Therefore, the FDW must always be available to receive and record the data.  
Measures should be taken to assure this, such as using backup power sources, 
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multiple locations and multiple FDW’s, and Archive located remotely from the 
FDW. 
b) Post-Crash Availability 
Second, flight data must be available to crash investigators 
following an air crash.  The necessity to have instant access to stored flight data 
might be questioned if one considers the present system.  Presently, it may take 
days to locate the flight recorders and this seems to be acceptable to the NTSB.  
Although it is certainly best to have all flight data available immediately 
following a crash, it is probably not absolutely necessary.  But, reliable and 
complete storage of all data associated with a flight should be assured to provide 
access to flight data within a reasonable time following a crash. 
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VI. PRACTICAL AVIATION CONCERNS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System is an idea that exists to 
serve the air safety interests of the flying public, the aviation community, and to 
promote flight safety by enhancing the effectiveness of air crash investigation. 
It is a large, complex system that handles a great quantity of information.  
The aviation world is even larger and more complex. 
The Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System must fit into the complex 
world of aviation in a practical way.  It is useful to acknowledge some of the 
practical aviation concerns pertaining to such a system. 
This chapter discusses some of the practical concerns about the system. 
B. FAIR USE, PRIVACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
This section discusses some of the concerns of fair use, privacy and 
national security as they relate to the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission 
System. 
1. Fair Use 
The very existence of flight data begs the question, “How should we use 
this information?”  The essence of crash investigation is to determine the 
probable cause of the crash and to use this knowledge to help prevent similar 
disasters in the future. 
Discovering that a certain part is at fault is useful — for example, the 
elevator jackscrew malfunctioned on Alaska flight 261 and caused the aircraft to 
crash into the Pacific Ocean.  We need to know this to better the design and 
maintain jackscrews, so they don’t cause future crashes.  But, the maker of the 
 91 
part and the maintenance personnel who are charged with keeping it functioning 
properly feel the finger of blame pointed at them. 
Discovering that the flight crew failed to properly execute some procedure 
is useful — for example, the flaps were not set to takeoff position in Detroit and a 
Northwest Airlines flight crashed into a parking lot.  We can use this kind of 
information to improve cockpit checklists and procedures.  But, the families of 
the crew may feel the airline put their loved ones in a situation with defective 
procedures that allowed competent pilots to make mistakes, and the airline may 
feel the highly-trained, experienced flight crew failed to properly follow 
procedures. 
Fair use of the crash data is an important and emotionally volatile issue.  
Crash investigators must properly use the data to make reasonable judgments 
about probable cause and not maliciously point the finger of blame.  Present 
procedures and policies for handling of crash data respect this concern.  Those 
developed for handling of data by the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission 
System also must respect this concern. 
2. Privacy 
At first glance, the availability of flight data that shows precisely what 
happened leading up to an air crash would seem to be a very good thing for all 
concerned.  But, throughout this thesis the idea of confidentiality is discussed, 
including a technical description of the means necessary to assure confidentiality 
at every step along the way.  Using means intended to ensure the confidentiality 
of the flight data handled by the system, the first step toward privacy is 
achieved: the data is not subject to unwanted disclosure.  Privacy continues 
beyond data confidentiality. 
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Achieving privacy starts by strictly controlling who has access to crash 
data.  Everyone involved in aviation has privacy concerns — families of crash 
victims, airlines, manufacturers of parts, labor unions, maintenance personnel 
and air traffic controllers. 
The concern about a real-time transmission system is that flight data 
instantly acquires greater potential for exposure.  Everyone concerned with data 
privacy should have this concern.  With proper design and implementation, the 
real-time system can be no more exposed than the present system of flight 
recorders on board the aircraft. 
The computers and radios used to transmit the data are analogous to the 
wires that presently connect sensors to the flight recorders.  The FDW is 
analogous to flight recorders.  Privacy is achieved by implementing methods that 
assure confidentiality of transmitted flight data, as well as physical security and 
access control of the data warehouse computers comprising the FDW.  
Therefore, by complete and thorough implementation of sound 
information assurance practices, the aviation community must be convinced the 
data really is confidential and that effective safeguards are in force to prevent 
unwanted disclosure of flight data. 
3. National Security 
One reason governments are in charge of regulating aviation is to protect 
national security.  The events of September 11, 2001, perfectly illustrate this 
point.  To ensure the safety of the rest of the nation, the FAA immediately 
grounded all flights when the WTC was attacked. 
An aircraft involved in a situation with national security implications may 
produce sensitive or even classified flight data.  Information contained in flight 
data, most notably cockpit voice recordings, could expose sensitive military or 
 93 
other procedures and practices either on board the aircraft or in its operational 
environment. 
Therefore, by complete and thorough implementation of sound 
information assurance practices, the government must be convinced the data 
really is confidential and the system will protect national security when the need 
arises. 
C. OLDER AND SMALLER AIRCRAFT 
Aviation does not consist entirely of large airline fleets of modern jetliners.  
There are many operators that fly older and smaller aircraft. 
There are technical aviation concerns about adding equipment to certain 
aircraft.  The added weight of a few radios and antennae probably has no 
adverse impact on the weight-and-balance situation of a Boeing 747, but it may 
significantly affect a Cessna 402 — an un-pressurized, six- to ten-passenger 
piston engine twin — such as that used by Pacific Wings, an airline based on 
Maui that flies Hawaiian inter-island flights. 
Space and power are other concerns.  There may be no available space in 
the avionics bay or compartment in which to place the additional equipment.  
Some older and smaller aircraft are very limited in their capacity to add this type 
of equipment.  Also, there may be inadequate electrical power available to 
handle the added equipment. 
For these reasons and others, it may not be possible to equip older and 
smaller aircraft with the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System.  This is a 
point to consider when drafting regulatory changes pertaining to a real-time 
system. 
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D. TECHNICAL STANDARD ORDER (TSO) AVIATION EQUIPMENT 
VERSUS NON-AVIATION COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS) 
PRODUCTS 
This section discusses some of the reasons that it is difficult to envision the 
use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products in building the Real-Time Flight 
Data Transmission System. 
Data communication and computer networking are well known 
disciplines.  There is a wealth of available expertise and equipment that can 
handle these functions.  But, for several reasons this familiar and inexpensive 
COTS equipment may not be suitable for airborne use. 
1. Reliability / TSO 
Because reliability of equipment is a different issue in the air than it is on 
the ground, there has long been a system in aviation for specifying exacting, 
aviation-suitable technical specifications for aircraft equipment. 
The Technical Standard Order (TSO) is the instrument by which technical 
aviation standards for equipment are communicated.  Equipment meeting TSO 
specification often requires specialized or at least additional manufacturing work 
as compared to the same equipment not conforming to the TSO. 
Simply certifying that equipment meets the specifications of a certain TSO 
— even if it is exactly the same as equipment that is not certified to the TSO — 
involves time and effort on the part of the certifier, and thus added cost. 
The bottom line about TSO is that TSO’d equipment is almost always 
more expensive than non-TSO’d equipment, sometimes significantly more.  It 
may seem attractive to design the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System 
using inexpensive COTS products, but in aviation use of this kind of equipment 
simply does not happen. 
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2. 400Hz Power 
Another reason non-aviation COTS products may not be suitable for the 
Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System without modification is that many 
aircraft power systems operate at 400Hz, not at the 50Hz (international standard) 
or 60Hz (United States) with which we are familiar. 
Modifications would be required to allow COTS devices to accept 400Hz 
power. 
E. TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT, CERTIFICATION AND 
ACCREDITATION, MAINTENANCE 
This section describes some of the necessary steps toward implementing 
the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System, including testing and 
development, certification and accreditation (C&A) and maintenance. 
1. Testing And Development 
NASA has developed and flown a prototype demonstration of a real-time 
flight data transmission system.  Equipment was placed aboard two aircraft — a 
Boeing 757 and a Learjet 25.  The system successfully transmitted flight data from 
both aircraft in real-time to a ground receiver station.  Although it has been 
dismantled, NASA proved that it is possible to transmit flight data in real-time 
from an aircraft to the ground [Source: N01]. 
NASA’s test showed the system is possible, but further testing and 
development is required in various aspects of the system, such as: 
• Data link hand-off 
• Flight Data Collection Computer (FDCC) 
• Transmission Control Computer (TCC) 
• Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer system 
• Data Examination Subsystem (FDES) 
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2. Certification And Accreditation (C&A) 
This section describes two certification and accreditation aspects 
important to the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System. 
a) NIACAP C&A 
As the real-time system is designed and implemented, since all or 
part of it will undoubtedly be a U. S. Government computer system, it will 
require formal security certification and accreditation to comply with United 
States law and Presidential Decision Directives. 
Certification and accreditation will follow the National Information 
Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (NIACAP) or other similarly 
applicable program. 
The NIACAP is an extensive four-phase process that focuses upon 
the information assurance aspects of a computer system.  Phase one (Definition) 
involves an initial specification of the security features of the system.  Phase two 
(Verification) involves certification testing and evaluation to verify the design.  
Phase three (Validation) involves security testing and evaluation to validate the 
design and official accreditation of the system.  Phase four (Post Accreditation) 
involves post-accreditation tasks and continued maintenance until the next 
required certification review [Source: N02]. 
b) FAA Certification 
As specified in 14 CFR Parts 91, 121 and 135, flight recorder 
systems are subject to performance standards and periodic inspection and re-
certification.  The FAA will need to create regulatory rule changes that 
incorporate the performance standards and inspection requirements of the real-
time transmission system. 
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3. Minimum Equipment List (MEL) / Dispatch 
The Minimum Equipment List (MEL) is a sort of checklist that specifies 
whether an aircraft may be dispatched when equipment is missing or 
inoperative, and dispatch restrictions based on inoperative equipment. 
The FAA will need to create regulatory rule changes concerning MEL 
dispatch requirements for the airborne components of the Real-Time Flight Data 
Transmission System. 
The flight dispatcher and captain must both know whether or not the 
flight may be dispatched if a component of the real-time transmission system is 
inoperative, and the restrictions that places on the flight operation. 
4. Maintenance 
The Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System requires maintenance of 
its components to ensure they operate correctly within specification limits.  This 
includes the airborne components of the system, the radio systems and Internet 
connections, and the Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer system. 
Maintenance is an important cost consideration for development and 
implementation of the real-time transmission system. 
F. ENHANCING THE STATE-OF-THE-ART OF CRASH 
INVESTIGATION 
Perhaps the basic question is, “Why should we develop a system to 
transmit flight data in real time from an aircraft to the ground?”  The answer is 
that this system seeks to improve flight safety by extending the state-of-the-art of 
air crash investigation. 
There is a present state-of-the-art of air crash investigation.  It involves 
extensive resources available to the National Transportation Safety Board, the 
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Federal Aviation Administration, operators and companies that produce flight 
recorders.  It also involves the sum total of government regulation of the aviation 
industry by the FAA and NTSB. 
Enhancing crash investigation effectiveness and technology can be 
accomplished in a number of ways, but is the creation of the Real-Time Flight 
Data Transmission System the way that should be pursued next?  Is it the “low 
hanging fruit” that we should pick? 
There are other concerns that appear to be of more immediate concern 
than this system.  For example, the present rule requires recording of 30 minutes 
of cockpit voice.  The NTSB has found that in some cases this is not enough data 
and important clues to the probable cause of the crash are lost beyond the 30-
minute time limit.  The FAA and NTSB are working on extending the time 
required for CVR data from 30 minutes to 2 hours.  This is a relatively easy 
change to make in the state-of-the-art, since virtually all modern digital flight 
recorders record this much information, yet it has taken several years to make 
this change because, in large part, of the burden of compliance (financial and 
otherwise) on the part of the operators [Source: S02,S03]. 
While the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System may not be the next 
step in advancing the art of crash investigation, it is certainly attracting 
widespread interest in the aviation community.  Its design and implementation is 
worth serious consideration. 
G. ECONOMY 
The state of the economy has a lot to do with whether there is an 
implementation of the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System.  Such a 
system is complex and expensive.  Funding must be available for research, 
design, testing, certification, deployment and continued maintenance. 
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After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the global airline industry 
suffered grave financial crisis.  It continues to suffer.  Airlines failed around the 
globe, for example the once proud Swissair is no longer with us.  With few 
exceptions — Southwest Airlines is one — the remaining airlines continue to 
suffer difficult financial times and report losing money quarter after quarter. 
The manufacturers of aircraft, such as Boeing Aircraft Company, certainly 
seek to produce the safest possible products [Source: S02].  The regulators of the 
industry, such as the Federal Aviation Administration, certainly seek to create 
rules and practices that promote the highest possible level of safety [Source: S03]. 
Since there will be a significant financial burden on the airline industry 
when a real-time flight data transmission system is created, the FAA is 
proceeding very cautiously on this issue.  These may not be the right economic 
times in which to mandate this particular financial burden upon the industry. 
A real-time transmission system could be an optional expense for the 
industry if a developer were to create such a system without a government 
mandate requiring it.  The developer would do so in the hopes of making a profit 
selling the system.  It is outside the scope of this thesis to make the judgment of 
whether developing a real-time transmission system is a sound business 
decision. 
The cost of a real-time transmission system could be a mandated expense 
if the FAA and NTSB decided the system is necessary and went about creating 
new regulation requiring it.  But, the NTSB is not clamoring to replace or extend 
the present flight recorders because they aren’t giving them the information they 
need.  The FAA sees no pressing concern that the system would address and 
does not want to burden the industry with the added systems and expense 
[Source: S03]. 
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter provides a summary of the Real-Time Flight Data 
Transmission System.  It summarizes the benefits and overall design of the 
system, presents conclusions and offers topics for future work. 
A. SUMMARY 
1. Benefits 
A Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System would benefit the aviation 
community and the general public by enhancing flight safety.  It would provide 
post-crash investigators with flight data more quickly and easily than it is 
available today and in situations where it would otherwise be unavailable.   
Situations in which the information may be unavailable include those 
when the FDR and/or CVR are severely damaged and data is unusable, or when 
the flight recorders are irretrievable.  Examples include severe and violent 
crashes featuring extreme forces exceeding design limitations of the recording 
devices sufficient to destroy them, extremely hot fires, aircraft lost in extremely 
remote locations such as far out to sea, or airborne recorder failure. 
Regardless of the recovery status of the FDR and CVR, the real-time 
transmission system will enhance post-crash investigation by providing very 
timely or instant access to flight data. 
2. Design 
Figure 12 shows a graphical overview of the design of the Real-Time 

























































Figure 12. Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System Overall Design 
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Information flows within the system from the aircraft in flight, through 
satellites and communications receivers, the Internet, and toward the Data 
Warehouse + Archive computer systems.  Flight Data Examination Systems 
(FDES) interact with the Flight Data Warehouse (FDW) computer systems after 
disasters occur to retrieve and process flight data from accident flights. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis was to ask and answer the following questions. 
• Is it feasible to build a system that has the capability of transmitting 
flight data in real-time from commercial and military aircraft to a 
ground recording station? 
• What are the technical characteristics of such a system? 
• What are the information assurance characteristics of such a 
system? 
1. Feasibility 
It is unlikely that the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System will be 
implemented any time soon.  Perhaps Tim Ridgely of Boeing said it best when he 
observed, “I think the characterization that this would be pretty far out on the upper 
part of the tree, not low hanging fruit, is probably true” [Ref: S02]. 
Implementation of the Real-Time Flight Data Transmission System will 
require development of airborne collection computers, additional aircraft 
systems to route sensor data to the computers, very possibly additional radios, a 
sophisticated data network with large capacity, large data warehouse computer 
systems and a system for the NTSB to examine the stored data. 
The main reason the system seems unlikely any time soon is that there is 
insufficient perceived benefit to offset the high cost of development and 
implementation.  Both government and industry feel they have better things on 
which to spend their time, money and effort. 
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The prime issue of any capability that examines aircraft crash data is to 
improve understanding of accidents in the hopes of preventing them in the 
future.  The “low hanging fruit” that Mr. Ridgely [Ref: S02] spoke of consist of 
issues such as increasing the requirement for recorded cockpit voice data from 30 
minutes to two hours.  The NTSB feels this change to the present methodology of 
crash data collection would greatly enhance their analysis capabilities, but even 
this seemingly simple change takes a lot of energy.  Aboard many aircraft it 
requires different recorders, which is an expense to the operator of the aircraft.  It 
requires FAA regulatory action.  It has implications on certification and re-
certification of the recorders, and on dispatch. 
Other reasons the system seems unlikely are limited communications data 
link capacity of the VHF and UHF frequency spectrum, limited availability of 
SATCOM channels, perceived excessive regulatory burden on operators and no 
expected significant gain in recovery rates of flight data after air crashes. 
Thus, it appears that a large, expensive, complicated system such as 
RTFDTS is not generally viewed as necessary or feasible at this time. 
2. Technical Conclusions 
It is possible to design, construct and mandate the system given today’s 
technology, although there are aspects of the system that require further research 
and development, most notably a smooth data link hand-off that preserves the 
secure channel connection between the aircraft and the FDW across different 
communications media (i.e. SATCOM changing to VHF, VHF changing to UHF, 
VHF changing to SATCOM, etc.) 
No unusual methods are required to develop any of the computer 
systems.  It should be a fairly straightforward matter of system development. 
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3. Information Assurance Conclusions 
There are no information assurance issues that are beyond the scope of 
present security technology. 
a) Confidentiality. 
To ensure confidentiality and privacy, secure communication 
channels, such as Virtual Private Networks, are recommended.  Data warehouse 
systems should employ restricted access mechanisms and/or data encryption, 
such as multi-level systems and asymmetric key encryption. 
b) Integrity 
Integrity of transmitted data can be assured through the use of 
hashes and encryption techniques. 
c) Authenticity 
Assurance of the authenticity of transmitted data can be 
accomplished using features of the secure communications channel in 
combination with hashes and unique aircraft identification tokens. 
d) Availability 
Assurance of the availability of transmitted data can be aided 
greatly by development of a reliable communications data network with 
multiple available pathways for information flow from the air to the ground.  
Availability of stored data can be assured through a combination of reliance 
upon the operating system of the data warehouse, uninterruptible power devices 
and redundant systems. 
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C. FUTURE WORK OPPORTUNITIES 
Areas for future work and research and development are: 
• A method of smooth data link hand-off that preserves the IPsec  (or 
other secure) connection between the aircraft and the FDW across 
different communications media (i.e. SATCOM changing to VHF, 
VHF changing to UHF, VHF changing to SATCOM, etc.) 
• Development of frequency sharing or time division broadcast to 
help relieve the problem of limited SATCOM channels and VHF 
and UHF frequency availability. 
• Regulatory changes with respect to requirements and Minimum 
Equipment List (MEL) concerns. 
• TSO specifications for system components. 
• Software and hardware development of the Flight Data Collection 
Computer (FDCC), Transmission Control Computer (TCC), Flight 
Data Warehouse  (FDW) computer system and Flight Data 
Examination System (FDES). 
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APPENDIX A — ACRONYMS 
14 CFR...........Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations 
ACARS..........Aircraft Communications Addressing And Reporting System 
AGL...............Above Ground Level 
AIM ...............Aeronautical Information Manual 
ALPA ............Airline Pilot’s Association 
AOA ..............Angle Of Attack 
ATC ...............Air Traffic Control 
C&A ..............Certification and Accreditation 
CAM..............Cockpit Area Microphone 
CFR................Code of Federal Regulations 
COTS.............Commercial Off-The-Shelf (equipment or software) 
CVR ...............Cockpit Voice Recorder 
DFDR ............Digital Flight Data Recorder 
DHCP............Dynamic Host Control Protocol 
DOT...............Department of Transportation 
FAA ...............Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR ...............Federal Air Regulation; Federal Aviation Regulation 
FDES..............Flight Data Examination Subsystem 
FDR................Flight Data Recorder 
FDW ..............Flight Data Warehouse computer system 
FL...................Flight Level 
FO ..................First Officer 
HF..................High Frequency 
HTTPS...........Hyper-text Transfer Protocol (Secure) 
IA ...................Information Assurance 
IAS.................Indicated Airspeed 
IP....................Internet Protocol 
IPsec ..............Internet Protocol (Secure) 
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LF...................Low Frequency 
MAC..............Media Access Control 
MC.................Magnetic Course 
MEL...............Minimum Equipment List 
MF..................Medium Frequency 
MH ................Magnetic Heading 
MSL ...............Mean Sea Level 
NAVAID.......Navigation(al) Aid 
NIACAP .......National Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation 
Process 
NM ................Nautical Mile 
NSA...............National Security Agency 
NSTISSI.........National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems 
Security Instruction 
NSTISSC .......National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems 
Security Committee 
NTSB .............National Transportation Safety Board 
RAS................Remote Access System 
SATCOM ......Satellite Communications 
SSL.................Secure Socket Layer 
TAS................True Airspeed 
TC ..................True Course 
TCP................Transmission Control Protocol 
TCP/IP..........Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
TH..................True Heading 
TSO................Technical Standard Order 
UHF...............Ultra High Frequency 
VHF ...............Very High Frequency 
VPN...............Virtual Private Network 
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APPENDIX B — TERMS & CONCEPTS 
14 CFR — Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, covers aviation.  It is the 
regulatory authority for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 
14 CFR PART 91 — The portion of 14 CFR containing regulations pertaining to 
all aviation operations regardless of type, and specifically to general aviation. 
14 CFR PART 121 — The portion of 14 CFR containing regulations pertaining to 
air taxi operations. 
14 CFR PART 135 — The portion of 14 CFR containing regulations pertaining to 
air carrier operations. 
ABOVE GROUND LEVEL (AGL) — The distance between the aircraft and the 
ground (or water) beneath it. 
AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL (AIM) — An FAA publication 
containing a wealth of information about basic flight information and ATC 
procedures. 
AILERON — A flight control surface located on the trailing edge of each wing.  
The ailerons are used to bank the aircraft, which turns the aircraft to a 
different heading. 
AIRFOIL — A surface having some curve to it with the property that when 
moved through air it produces lift.  Examples include a wing, rudder, aileron, 
and propeller or fan blade. 
AIR CARRIER — An operator of aircraft that provides scheduled service, which 
could be passengers or freight.  Examples include Untied Airlines, British 
Airlines, FedEx, United Parcel Service, and SkyWest Airlines. 
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL (ATC) — The system and personnel that deliver air 
traffic control services.  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) handles 
ATC services in the United States.  ATC services include collision avoidance, 
traffic separation, efficient traffic flow management and emergency authority 
in national security situations. 
AIRCRAFT COMMUNICATIONS ADDRESSING AND REPORTING SYSTEM 
(ACARS) — A radio communication system that is used to transmit data to 
and from an aircraft in flight. 
AIRLINE — See “Air Carrier”. 
AIRLINE PILOT’S ASSOCIATION (ALPA) — A labor union of professional 
pilots that is concerned with promoting and protecting issues of interest to 
pilots. 
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AIRSPEED — A measurement of how fast the aircraft is moving with respect to 
the air mass in which it is flying. 
See also “Indicated Airspeed”, “True Airspeed”. 
ALTITUDE — A measurement of how high the aircraft is above a certain datum. 
See also “Above Ground Level”, “Mean Sea Level”, “Pressure Altitude”, “Flight Level”. 
ANALOG — With respect to an electrical signal, a signal that varies 
continuously by some measure of strength (weak to strong). 
ANGLE OF ATTACK (AOA) — The angle between the chord line of the airfoil 
(wing) and the relative wind. 
See also “Chord Line”, “Airfoil”, “Relative Wind”. 
AUTHENTICITY — With respect to information assurance, a property of 
information such that the receiver has assurance that the sender is who/what 
(s)he/it thinks it is. 
AVAILABILITY — With respect to information assurance, a property of 
information that guarantees the information is accessible (available) when it 
is sought. 
BANDWIDTH — With respect to data transmission signals, a property of the 
transmission expressing the maximum amount of data that can be 
transmitted using the signal. 
CAPTAIN — A required crewmember of an aircraft designated as being in 
command of the flight.  The captain may or may not actually be manipulating 
the controls of (flying) the aircraft.  Other crewmembers [i.e. the First Officer] 
may be manipulating the controls at a certain point in time. 
CERTIFICATION — With respect to individual pieces of equipment or entire 
systems, an official statement by the FAA that the equipment may be used for 
aviation purposes. 
See also “TSO”. 
CHORD LINE — The straight line between the front of the leading edge and rear 
of the trailing edge of an airfoil. 
COCKPIT AREA MICROPHONE (CAM) — A microphone installed in the 
cockpit of an aircraft that is used to detect general sounds within the cockpit.  
It is one of the sensors used to collect information that is fed to the cockpit 
voice recorder. 
COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER (CVR) — A flight data recorder that records voice 
communications, including those from the captain, first officer, second officer, 
cockpit area microphone, chief flight attendant, and passenger cabin (not all 
may be available on all aircraft). 
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CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR) — The collection of directives 
established by Congress that govern a variety of activities in the United 
States, including aviation. 
CONFIDENTIALITY — With respect to information assurance, a property of 
information that guarantees only the parties that should be able to 
understand the information actually do understand the information. 
COURSE — The direction of flight with respect to a fixed reference, such as true 
north (for true course [TC]) or magnetic north (for magnetic course [MC]). 
CRASH DATA — Flight data from an aircraft that crashed. 
DIGITAL — With respect to an electrical signal, one that consists entirely of 
pulses of energy that are interpreted as either “0” or “1”, that when 
interpreted singly or in combination form a meaningful piece of information. 
DIGITAL FLIGHT DATA RECORDER — A flight recorder that records flight 
data in a digital format. 
See also “Flight Data Recorder”. 
DISPATCH — The part of flight operations that is concerned with ensuring each 
flight has been properly flight planned.  Flight dispatch carries equal 
responsibility for the safety of the flight along with the captain on board the 
aircraft. 
Also known as “Flight Dispatch”. 
DYNAMIC HOST CONTROL PROTOCOL (DHCP) — A method used to assign 
dynamic IP addresses to new devices connecting to a computer network. 
ELEVATOR — A flight control surface that allows the pilot to control pitch, 
which is the “up and down” motion of the nose of the aircraft. 
ENCRYPTION — With respect to data, the intentional scrambling of data 
intended to prevent those who should not be able to understand the data 
from understanding it.  To be effective, encryption must be reversible. 
FAR PART 91 — See “14 CFR Part 91”. 
FAR PART 121 — See “14 CFR Part 121”. 
FAR PART 135 — See “14 CFR Part 135”. 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) — An agency of the executive 
branch of the United States government that exercises oversight of aviation. 
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FIRST OFFICER (FO) — A required flight crewmember designated to be second-
in-command of a flight.  The FO provides assistance to, support for, and 
emergency replacement of the captain.  The FO may or may not actually be 
manipulating the controls at a certain point in time. 
See also “Captain”. 
FLAPS — Secondary flight control surfaces attached usually to the inboard 
trailing edges of the wings that the pilot can use to increase rate of descent 
without increasing airspeed, or to provide additional lift during certain 
phases of flight (usually, slow airspeed operations such as takeoff and 
landing). 
FLIGHT DATA — The collection of parameters that describe the condition of the 
aircraft, either in real time or historically. 
FLIGHT DATA EXAMINATION SUBSYSTEM (FDES) — The part of the 
proposed Real-Time Flight Transmission System, the subject of this thesis, 
that is used by crash investigators to receive data from the FDW for use in 
post-crash analysis. 
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER (FDR) — A flight recorder that records flight data, 
including such items as landing gear position, position of flaps, trim position, 
position of slats, position of rudder, position of ailerons, and airspeed, 
altitude, heading and vertical speed. 
FLIGHT DATA WAREHOUSE (FDW) COMPUTER SYSTEM — The part of the 
proposed Real-Time Flight Transmission System, the subject of this thesis, 
that receives flight data from the Internet and stores it.  It includes archive 
and data examination capability. 
FLIGHT DISPATCH — See “Dispatch”. 
FLIGHT LEVEL (FL) — Height above mean sea level with respect to pressure 
altitude (29.92” hg). 
See also “Mean Sea Level”, “Pressure Altitude”. 
FLIGHT OPERATIONS — See “Operational Control”. 
HEADING — The direction in which the longitudinal axis (a line drawn from 
nose to tail) of the aircraft is pointed with respect to some reference, such as 
true north (for true heading [TH]) or magnetic north (for magnetic heading 
[MH]). 
HIGH FREQUENCY (HF) — High radio frequencies (HF) between 3 and 30 MHz 
used for air-to-ground voice communication in overseas operations [Source: 
F01 Pilot/Controller Glossary]. 
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HYPER-TEXT TRANSFER PROTOCOL (HTTP) — The set of rules for 
transferring files (text, graphic images, sound, video, and other multimedia 
files) on the World Wide Web. 
 HTTP concepts include (as the Hypertext part of the name implies) the idea 
that files can contain references to other files whose selection will elicit 
additional transfer requests [Source: S05]. 
HYPER-TEXT TRANSFER PROTOCOL (SECURE) (HTTPS) — HTTPS adds 
public-key cryptography to HTTP.  HTTPS provides a mechanism to securely 
encrypt Internet transmissions, and positive identification of the server to the 
user and/or the user to the server through the use of public key certificates. 
INDICATED AIRSPEED (IAS) — Airspeed read directly from the airspeed 
indicator [cockpit instrument].  IAS is subject to various errors and deviations 
that cause it to be different from true airspeed (TAS).  These include pressure 
altitude, temperature and air compressibility. 
INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) — Information operations that protect and 
defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, 
integrity, authentication, confidentiality and non-repudiation.  This includes 
providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, 
detection and reaction capabilities [Source: A02]. 
INTEGRITY — With respect to information assurance, a property of information 
that assures the information is sound, un-altered, and, if received after having 
been transmitted, what was actually sent. 
INTERNET KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL (IKE) — A method of exchanging 
encryption keys using IPsec [Source: I01]. 
INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP) — A DOD standard protocol designed for use in 
interconnected systems of packet-switched computer communication 
networks [Source: A02]. 
INTERNET PROTOCOL ADDRESS (IP ADDRESS) — A device's or resource's 
numerical address as expressed in the format specified in the Internet 
Protocol. 
 Note 1: In the current addressing format, IP version 4 (IPv4), an IP address is a 
32-bit sequence divided into four groups of decimal numbers separated by 
periods ("dots"), commonly referred to as "dotted decimals." The IP address 
of a device is made up of two parts: the number of the network to which it is 
connected, and a sequence representing the specific device within that 
network. An IP address may be used on private intranets, as well as The 
Internet. 
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 Note 2: Due to inefficiencies that have arisen in address assignment, available 
IPv4 addresses are nearly exhausted. A newer version of IP addressing (IP 
version 6, consisting of a 128-bit numerical sequence) is currently being 
developed. Synonyms Internet Address, IP Number [Source: A02]. 
IP ADDRESS — See “Internet Protocol Address”. 
LOW FREQUENCY — From 300 kHz to 300 kHz. 
MAC ADDRESS — See “Media Access Control Address”. 
MEAN SEA LEVEL (MSL) —  
(1) The average level of the ocean used as the base, or “zero” datum, to 
determine altitude above the surface of the earth. 
(2) Altitude above mean sea level. 
MEDIA ACCESS CONTROL ADDRESS (MAC ADDRESS) — A unique, usually 
non-changeable numerical address assigned to network communications 
hardware.  Layer 2 of the IP stack uses the MAC address to refer to that 
specific hardware device. 
MEDIUM FREQUENCY — From 300 kHz to 3 MHz. 
MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST (MEL) — Specifies dispatch restrictions and 
limitations based on inoperative equipment aboard the aircraft. 
MODE A TRANSPONDER — A transponder capable of operating only in 
“Mode A”. 
 Mode A communicates a discrete, 4-digit octal code to ATC radar that is used 
for unique identification of the aircraft by the radar and ATC systems. 
See also “Transponder”. 
MODE C TRANSPONDER — A transponder capable of operating in both “Mode 
A” and “Mode C”. 
 Mode C, sometimes called “Mode Charlie”, adds altitude reporting capability 
to Mode A. 
See also “Transponder”, “Mode A Transponder”. 
MODE S TRANSPONDER — A transponder capable of operating in “Mode A”, 
“Mode C” and “Mode S”. 
 Mode S adds data communication capability to Mode C.  
See also “Transponder”, “Mode A Transponder”, “Mode C Transponder”. 
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB) — With respect to 
aviation, a federal agency that is concerned with the safety of flight.  The 
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NTSB is the primary investigative body in charge of determining the cause of 
air crashes. 
NAUTICAL MILE — The kind of miles used in aviation.  One nautical mile 
(NM) is equal to 6,076 feet, or approximately 1.15 statue miles. 
 According to “How Stuff Works”:  
“A nautical mile is based on the circumference of the planet Earth. If you were to cut 
the Earth in half at the equator, you could pick up one of the halves and look at the 
equator as a circle. You could divide that circle into 360 degrees. You could then 
divide a degree into 60 minutes. A minute of arc on the planet Earth is 1 nautical 
mile. This unit of measurement is used by all nations for air and sea travel” [Ref: H01]. 
NAVAID — One of several radio navigation systems that allow a pilot to 
navigate with respect to a fixed geographic point regardless of flight 
visibility.  By using NAVAIDs, a pilot is able to navigate through clouds or on 
top of clouds when the ground or other visual references cannot be seen from 
the aircraft. 
OPERATIONAL CONTROL — Control over the initiation, continuation, 
diversion or termination of a flight in order to ensure the safety of that flight 
operation [Source: T01]. 
Also known as “Flight Operations” and “Ops Control”. 
OPERATOR — With respect to aviation, the person or business that operates an 
aircraft.  Examples are a private citizen who owns an aircraft, any of the air 
carriers, a charter company, an agricultural application business or a flight 
school. 
OPS CONTROL — See “Operational Control”. 
PRESSURE ALTITUDE — Altitude with respect to standard atmospheric 
pressure, which is 29.92” hg or 1015.2 hPa. 
REMOTE ACCESS SYSTEM (RAS) — In the context of this thesis, a method of 
accessing a computer system via means other than the Internet, such as 
through a dial-up telephone connection. 
REGULATION — 
(1) (n) A specific binding directive. 
(2) (v) The act of applying binding directives.  For example, the FAA is 
charged with regulation of aviation. 
RELATIVE WIND — Wind direction of the airflow produced by an object 
moving through the air.  For an airplane, the relative wind flows in a 
direction parallel with and opposite to the direction of flight. 
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RUDDER — A flight control surface that allows the pilot to control yaw, which is 
the lateral (side-to-side; left and right) motion of the aircraft.  It is the movable 
surface on the “fin”, or vertical stabilizer, at the rear of the aircraft. 
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS (SATCOM) — A communication system that 
uses radio signals transmitted to and/or from a satellite in orbit above the 
earth. 
SECURE SOCKET LAYER (SSL) — The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is a 
commonly used protocol for managing the security of a message transmission 
on the Internet.  SSL uses the public-and-private key encryption system from 
RSA, which also includes the use of a digital certificate [Source: S05]. 
TECHNICAL STANDARD ORDER (TSO) — A minimum performance standard 
issued by the FAA for specified materials, parts, processes, and appliances 
used on civil aircraft [Source: F03]. 
TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL (TCP) — A set of rules used along 
with the Internet Protocol (IP) to send data in the form of message units 
between computers over the Internet.  While IP takes care of handling the 
actual delivery of the data, TCP takes care of keeping track of the individual 
units of data (called packets) that a message is divided into for efficient 
routing through the Internet [Source: S05]. 
TRANSPONDER — A device installed in an aircraft that responds to a query by 
a ground radar system by sending certain information to the radar, including 
a discrete 4-digit octal code, the aircraft’s pressure altitude and possibly also 
some digital data. 
See also “Mode A”, “Mode C”, “Mode S”. 
TRANSPONDER (MODE A) — See “Mode A Transponder”. 
TRANSPONDER (MODE C) — See “Mode C Transponder”. 
TRANSPONDER (MODE S) — See “Mode S Transponder”. 
TRIM — A secondary control surface that allows the pilot to equalize 
aerodynamic forces on a primary control surface.  Trim is used to eliminate 
the need for flight control inputs for the primary service that would otherwise 
be required to hold the flight surface in a particular position.  The most 
common trim device is the elevator trim, followed by aileron trim and rudder 
(most commonly found on multiengine aircraft). 
TRUE AIRSPEED — The actual speed of the aircraft relative to the surrounding 
air mass. 
ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCY (UHF) — The frequency band between 300 and 
3,000 MHz.  The bank of radio frequencies used for military air/ground voice 
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communications. In some instances this may go as low as 225 MHz and still 
be referred to as UHF [Source: F01 Pilot/Controller Glossary]. 
VERY HIGH FREQUENCY (VHF) — The frequency band between 30 and 300 
MHz. Portions of this band, 108 to 118 MHz, are used for certain NAVAID's; 
118 to 136 MHz are used for civil air/ground voice communications. Other 
frequencies in this band are used for purposes not related to air traffic control 
[Source: F01 Pilot/Controller Glossary]. 
VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK (VPN) — A secure communications channel for 
data networking incorporating IPsec. 
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APPENDIX C — TRANSCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW WITH 
TIMOTHY RIDGELY, BOEING AIRCRAFT COMPANY 
This conversation took place between Tim Ridgely and Paul Schoberg at 
Boeing Corporate Headquarters in Everett, Washington, on 4th June 2003, at 9:30 





[R] Tim Ridgely 
 




[R] That's bad, because they are one of our two major suppliers. 
 




-S- L3, yeah. 
 
[R] You're going to see them, right? 
 
-S- Yeah, I'm going to see them.  The guy at L3 sent me a pretty neat little paper he wrote.  
Pretty short, not nearly as extensive as the one you sent. 
 
[R] Frank Doran? 
 
-S- Frank Doran, yeah. 
 
[R] A guy we work with typically in engineering. 
 
-S- He seems like a really sharp guy. 
 
[R] Yeah, he is.  (unintelligible) 
 










-S- As you know, I'm here from the Naval Postgraduate School, which is in Monterey, 
California.  That is one of two military postgraduate institutions.  The other one is the Air 
Force Institute of Technology, which is in Dayton, Ohio.  Basically, the school is 
concerned with all sorts and manner of technical education in all the sciences -- 
everything from space to any kind of engineering you can think of, mechanical, electrical, 
computer science, physics, math, all that kind of good stuff. 
 
A typical student there is O-3, O-4; we've got some ensigns, we've got some commanders.  
But, typical is O-3 or O-4.  1500 students roughly, maybe half of them are Navy officers, a 
third of them are Marine officers, the other sixth are other services -- Air Force, Coast 
Guard, Army -- and we have a lot of foreign military as well.  There are 20 or 30 different 
countries represented.  And then, there are about 20 civilians of which I am one. 
 
I come to that school as a civilian under a program called Scholarship For Service, which 
is essentially where the government pays for a degree and then you work for the 
government for a period of time.  And, I happen to be there earning a Master of Science 
in Computer Science with an emphasis on Information Assurance, which is a fancy way 
of saying computer security.  Now, our director, Dr. Cynthia Irvine, she goes around the 
world, mostly in government, and finds people who want things done because one of our 
requirements is to do a thesis, a Master's thesis. 
 
One of her contacts recently has been the FAA and they've given us several projects to 
do.  One of them is this one.  There's several others, too.  Biometric authentication of 
pilots is one that's being completed now and there's some work being done in the way of 
clearance delivery, flight planning, that kind of stuff.  All with an emphasis on security. 
 
[R] You know, they've got a job opening there at the FAA in D.C. for recorder people.  I don't 
know if you saw that.  It's not really for computer security and that kind of thing, it's 
more the recorder's use of data, rule making, and so on, with the FAA in D.C. 
 
-S- Well, how did I get in this one?  Frankly, they had a problem trying to find somebody 
they felt like they wanted to put on this data recording because the typical student there 
doesn't know a whole lot about aviation that's in the computer track.  I happen to be a 
certified pilot, instructor, blah blah blah, and have been in the business a long time, so 
they said, "Hey you, how would you like to work on this project?"  And, I thought, yeah 
that sounds like a really nice project. 
 
Now, I am in the beginning stages of what I'm doing.  I think you saw the thesis 
proposal, so you're roughly familiar with the kinds of things I'm doing.  I'm gathering 
information at this point.  Really, what I'm after is (A) In general, can this type of thing be 
done?; (b) How can it be done?; and, (C) How do you secure it?  Obviously, me thesis has 
to move toward (C). 
 
So, the reason I wanted to come up here and talk to somebody at your company was to 
find out (A) What have you done in the direction of work recording flight data off the 
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aircraft?  What kind of thinking has gone into it, if anything.  What has your direction 
been?  Do you care?  This is kind of a "let your hair down" thing here.  Tell me the truth.  
If this is something that Boeing is not interested in, doesn't care, or will respond to when 
the FAA comes along and says, "Do this" that's fine.  Things that go into that are: * Is it 
worthwhile?  * Is there enough crash data that is not available where something like this 
makes sense?  And, I realize that as we go into the future we are looking at lots of stuff.  
FDR data, CVR data, video, and the amount of all of that is increasing. 
 
Now, this [referring to Boeing document 1] was highly interesting.  When I got this, I 
said to myself, "OK, I'm going to change the names, I'm going to submit it as my thesis, 
and say There You Go."  Because, essentially, there's a lot of stuff in here. 
 
[R] A lot of people were involved in that.  I wasn't myself, but one of my colleagues 
attended, represented Boeing in that forum, and there were a number of industry ... the 
industry was well represented.  The RTC, NTSB, FAA and a number of suppliers and 
airlines were involved. 
 
-S- I kind of see this as a statement of the problem.  It's more, all right, these are some of the 
things that are involved, but it wasn't really a "here's how we're going to proceed".  It was 
kind of a look-see at the problem. 
 
[R] And that was only one of many, many, many, many, MANY issues. 
 
-S- And, I will say this also.  When my computer science faculty approached me with this, 
they said, "Oooo, really cool, really neat idea, nobody has ever thought of this before."  
So, they thought this was interesting, too, in terms of the depth of looking at it that has 
been done.  So, I've gone through this whole thing and talked to Frank Doran, so I'm 
starting to spool up a little bit. 
 
[R] OK.  So, like I say, there wasn't a whole lot in here, but there were a few pages worth of 
their thoughts. 
 
-S- Well, the working group 2 had the most interesting stuff to me. 
 
[R] ... back in this "B".  And there was a tiny bit up front in section 10, but back in "B" ... 
 
-S- Is that way toward the back someplace? 
 
[R] Yeah ... [shuffling through paper looking for the section] ... you may not have brought 
that stuff with you.  There were a bunch of ... 
 
-S- I may not.  This is the only thing I got from you.  It doesn't have any "D"'s. 
 




[R] But they did talk some classic data link technology, high speed data link for accident 
investigation, infrastructure costs, technical issues, so there are a few pages. 
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-S- OK.  Top level.  What's your feeling.  How do we do this? 
 




[R] ... and what I can offer you.  I've worked at Boeing for 18 years.  I have worked FDR 
systems in the past.  Currently, I'm working CVR.  I'm a project engineer. 
 
-S- So, you know Jim Treacy down at FAA then. 
 
[R] I know who he is.  He's not my systems and equipment counterpart.  I work with Paul 
Sider in the local FAA.  He's my specialist.  Or Tim Chong in the past.  Jay Yee.  In 
Washington, the focal is George Cassodie.  He's working on the rule making for 
upcoming recorder requirements. 
 
-S- This exact stuff, then. 
 
[R] Well, we can talk about that briefly.  I'm the DER.  I don't know if you're familiar with 
FAA DER's.  I'm a designated engineering representative (DER), so the FAA appoints me 
to find compliance of design with applicable FARs.  So, I cover the voice recorder system. 
 





-S- You work on (unintelligible) 
 
[R] It's, ah ... I think it worked well and it's been in place for many, many, many, many, 
MANY years.  There's always room for improvement.  So, that's kind of my perspective.  
As far as my non-DER role, I'm a lead engineer.  We do production releases to build the 
airplanes, whether it's wiring or schematics or functional test requirements and parts lists 
and those kind of things.  We work with the suppliers for new development of parts.  We 
support in-service airplanes.  We support the factory in the build process.  We support 
airlines in service that have (unintelligible) in field service offices about our systems, and 
we coordinate with industry and suppliers and regulators around the world in 
development of parts and certification of parts - getting them on airplanes.  That's kind of 
my role.  I have a limited amount of time.  I've done basically no preparation for this.  It's 
the direction of management.  We're all under tight budgets and nobody is paying us to 
do this. 
 
-S- I understand that. 
 
[R] We're happy to tell you what we know and work with you and we want to support you 
in your efforts and the FAA in their efforts in working with you ... 
 
-S- I appreciate it. 
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[R] ... in what I can do.  Some of the information I can share because ... well, some of it I can't 




[R] If you ask me details about the SATCOM data rates, I don't know. 
 
-S- That's OK.  That's not really the focus of this conversation. 
 
[R] So, there may be technical things I just don't know the answer to, and other things are 
either proprietary data that need to stay within the company.  So, with that said ... 
 
-S- Frank Doran is real good about technical information.  He and I will go over all that kind 
of stuff. 
 
[R] Yeah, and I haven't seen that paper.  I'll ask Frank to send me a copy of that. 
 




-S- He wrote it.  It's not real detailed, it's just kind of top level. 
 
[R] Is this a recent thing?  I don't see a date on here. 
 
-S- It's within two years. 
 
[R] They participated in this forum, I believe, and many other industry forums. 
 
-S- He didn't mention this to me, but kind of veiled maybe did mention it.  Well, you know, 
he talked about something like this, but he didn't mention RTC. 
 
[R] Well, I know there were a number of people and I think this list ... who was on a different 
approach and stuff.  I know Honeywell attended this.  So, how can I help you?  What 
specifics? 
 
-S- Ultimately, I'm going to get down to the security of such a system.  And, when we talk 
security, we use a CIA model.  It's nothing to do with Central Intelligence Agency, it's C-
I-A, which is Confidentiality, Integrity of the data, Availability of the data, and the other 
"A" we don't care about.  Anything that feeds into those areas is what ultimately I'm 
concerned with.  So, I'm imagining that when we have a system in place and we're 
beaming data all over the world, we're using SATCOM, we're using VHF, we're using 
UHF, we're using XHF -- whatever isn't defined at this point.  And, to secure the data so 
that it gets someplace is really what I'm going to be after.  Now, what that means 
depends on what those pipes are.  So, I guess the first question I have is: How do we do 
this?  Is it your feeling that a satellite system is ultimately where something like this 
would end up, do you think a hybrid system?  I've even thought in terms of ... you know, 
no airplane virtually flies in its own airspace.  You've got other airplanes around.  So, 
maybe we beam data to other airplanes.  The chances they all would crash at once are 
probably pretty low.  Somehow we collect the data.  I don't know.  Have you guys 
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thought at all about that type of issue, and what's your feeling about how to implement 
beaming this kind of data off of the airplane. 
 
[R] I guess part of it goes back to the bigger picture of why would we do this?  Would we 
need to do this?  Maybe you don't want to discuss that, maybe that's a given. 
 
-S- No, I do want to discuss that.  Because, frankly, let me tell you the end result here.  From 
what I've seen, talking to Frank, looking at this document, all this kind of stuff, my 
bottom line feeling right now is probably cost-benefit isn't there.  But, a lot of what I'm 
trying to do is maybe find that it is there. 
 
[R] We can talk a little about the need and then go on.  Make an assumption that yes there is 




[R] You know there's always challenges with recovering the data.  There's been a continual 
evolution of the recorders, from wire recorders to foil recorders to mag tape and now to 
solid state.  Duration has increased from 30 minutes to two hours on the CVR side, and 
25 hours on the FDR side. 
 
-S- I didn't know that. 
 
[R] As far as CVR, the FAA current rule is only 30 minutes, but there's a recommendation 




[R] Two hour duration. 
 
-S- Is that going to retro everybody? 
 
[R] The anticipation is that there will be a retrofit requirement to go to two-hour recorders, 
which will make them all solid state. 
 
-S- It probably will help a lot of people, because I imagine they're smaller, lighter weight. 
 
[R] They're smaller, lighter, and you don't have the maintenance.  That's what the airlines 
care about.  Then you don't have to mess around with capstan and motors and grease 
and their liability is much, much higher.  And it definitely is lighter.  So, we expect to 
have to go to two hours and the FDR has been 25 hours.  As far as I've heard, I haven't 
heard anything from industry about concerns of increasing the FDR duration.  That's a 
pretty long duration.  You get a number of flights, typically, in there.  That's been 
sufficient.  There has been talk about making the CVR even longer than the two hours, 
but most of the investigators that I've talked to feel that two hours is sufficient. 
 
-S- What about video?  Do you see any requirements for that coming down? 
 
[R] There is a recommendation from the NTSB, I don't know if you're aware of the NTSB 
website.  You may want to look at some of those recommendations the NTSB puts out.  
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There is a recommendation for flight deck video or image recording.  The current 
thought process is that they should be at least the same duration as the CVR, because 
they want the correlation between the video and the audio and the FDR as well.  
Whether that will happen or not, I don't know.  I participated over, actually over about 
the past five years in Euro-K, if you've ever heard of them.  The RTCA?  They're the 
European equivalent.  European organization for civil aviation electronics, and they had 
sub-committees that worked on MOPS (minimum performance specs) for all the 
recorders, and just recently released a document called ED-112, which replaced other 
industry documents that called out from FAA TSO's.  I don't know if you're familiar with 
the TSO.  The current ones, C-123A for example, is the voice recorder, it refers to ED-56A.  
This new document replaces that and combines the requirements for all the recorders.  
FDR, CVR, image, data link, con-v recorders, deployables.  It's all in one document.  So, 
there's a section in there for flight deck image recording.  There were a number of 
accident investigators that made the case for it.  There were representatives from the pilot 
unions, ALPA and IALPA, and there were some restrictions on the data and they were 
supportive of it, whether they could sell it to their constituency.  And those guys always 
point to, well, you've got stuff in place ... you know, in the U.S. it's a law: protection of 
the data, but in other places it's not.  You know, the Cali accident was ... 
 
-S- ... a good example ... 
 
[R] It was right on TV. 
 
-S- The voices are out there. 
 
[R] Yeah, so the union guys often point to well, you can't control the CVR repeatedly, how 
do you expect us to believe you can control the image, and it's much more sensationalism 
and we don't want somebody to see their loved one flying into the ground.  It's much 
more graphic. 
 
-S- You see, now, that if you start talking about feeding all this data over some sort of data 
link, securing that is an issue. 
 
[R] Right.  It's a very big concern.  So, the image recording...  You know, the NTSB is pushing 
for it.  Whether the FAA buys into it, I don't know.  I think there's a lot of behind-the-
scenes wrangling.  There's been a lot of rule making that is expensive for the airlines.  
They went to 88 parameters for the FDR recently, ah, they're talking about adding more 
parameters aimed toward the 37 [Boeing 737] rudder stuff.  There are expected rule 
making changes and we can talk more detail about going to a two-hour recorder, data 
link recording, battery backup for the recorders, and so on.  And so there's a push kind of 
either get it in there now or it's going to be a long time because we can't just keep piling 
up new major requirements on the airlines. 
 
-S- Especially these days. 
 
[R] Right.  So, the NPRM -- I don't know if you know the rule-making process -- but, that 
hasn't come out yet.  So, I think there's a lot of discussion behind the scenes, whether that 
would be included in there and then industry comment or the GAO or the other dollar 




-S- See, that's the bottom line that I've heard is that we can have very sophisticated recording 
on board the aircraft, but we don't lose the data that often, so does it really make sense to 
put in all this infrastructure to beam it off the airplane?  Let's go to a perfect world.  All 
right, we've got 5,000 airplanes flying out there.  Every one of them has got video, cockpit 
voice, FDR, all this stuff's happening for 48 hours in all cases.  It's all being beamed 
someplace.  It's in a secure box on the ground and everybody is happy.  But, that's 
prohibitively expensive. 
 
[R] There are a lot of costs associated with that.  Working with our air safety organization 
investigators, I have not had a put from them saying, "Hey, this is good.  We need this.  
We want this." 
 
-S- Yeah, if you talk to the NTSB there general position is, you know what ... in most cases 
we don't even need the flight data.  We can figure it out from other means.  You know, if 
we have it, oh isn't that nice.  That's some of the older guys that will say that to you. 
 
[R] Well, they sure like to have everything. 
 
-S- Of course they do. 
 
[R] ... you know, and your brother's birthday, the wind speed on the day your mom got 
married, and so on. 
 
-S- OK, so ... 
 
[R] As far as your answer to when you do this, I mean, you know, there always is difficulties 
... and, well, often times there's difficulties in recovering the data.  One whether ... there 
has been a lot of stuff where the airlines just haven't maintained the system, or haven't 
confirmed that all the parameters are working, so there's move in the industry to require 
periodic checks of all the parameters. 
 
-S- I thought there was a yearly... 
 
[R] Yeah, but there are certain things that aren't detected without fail modes, that aren't 
detected realistically unless you're in specific flight modes.  So, there's a lot of discussion 
about how thorough that check needs to be and what can you dispatch ... you know, can 





[R] So, there's a lot of ... you know, that's one issue about having valid data.  Going to the 
longer duration helps, going from tape to solid-state helps.  There is concern about 
recovery of the data, ah, locating the data using the beacons -- the underwater locator 
beacons -- there has been some discussion about the robustness of those and the 
attachment of those to the recorders.  If you find a beacon and it's way over there ... and 
the recorder is way over there ... 
 
-S- ... way over there ... 
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[R] ... buried in the mud somewhere, and so there's work of ... this new document increases 
the testing that's required for crash survivability for having the beacon attached to the 
recorder under the various G-tests that the manufacturers have to do as part of their TSO 
qualification.  So, those are some of the issues. 
 
There is also some discussion about deployables.  Because some people say, you know, 
the thing is in the water and it's 3000 feet or 5000 feet of water and we've got to hire the 
Navy with their deep sea submersibles and that's expensive and it takes a month and we 
can't find the thing, and so there are ... the manufacturers of the deployables are saying, 
yeah - everybody should have this. 
 
-S- I've got to say that makes a lot of sense to me.  Somehow you determine that it's time to 
deploy and you shoot the thing off, and moments later the crash occurs, and we've got all 
the data.  Maybe that's the simple system.  Maybe that's the best infrastructure and not all 
this communications stuff, I don't know. 
 




[R] One of the guys that participated in this industry forum was from the Air Force Safety 
Center in Albuquerque.  I think they're in Albuquerque. 
 
-S- I want to say they're at Kirkland. 
 
[R] And, so, this guy was responsible for the recorder readouts and representing the Air 
Force interests.  The military is going to more COTS type stuff because they want to 
reduce their costs whether it's AWACS planes or Air Force One or wedge-tail stuff for the 
Australian Air Force.  They're going more toward the TSO commercial recorders, so this 
guy participated.  So, he may have some insights for you.  I can give you his name and 
his number as far as deployables or down links and data, as far as how they do that. 
 
-S- Oh yea, I'd love that. 
 
[R] I'll remember to do that.  So, he may have some insight from the military. 
 
-S- Efford Smith... 
 
[R] Effort Smith, yeah.   
 
-S- You think in Albuquerque. 
 
[R] Yeah, I have his business card at my desk. 
 
-S- OK, great. 
 
[R] And I'll give you Allied names and numbers.  Allied has been in it a long time.  The two 
we use are L3, which used to be Lockheed and Loral, and they all go back to Fairchild or 
Sunstrand Allied, or Honeywell to Allied Signal to Sunstrand.  So, these guy shave been 
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it in a real long time and they have participated in many industry forums, whether it's 
ARINC or RTCA or this Euro-K.  They participated in this.  At least, L3 is involved in the 
maritime recorders and the commercial ships and so...  yeah, it would be good to talk to 
some of the Allied people. 
 
-S- I think this is a prelim, that's why it isn't quite as extensive. 
 
[R] Yeah, this was a (unintelligible) I got e-mailed from Jim Cash who is an NTSB guy.  This 
is off the RTCA.  I don't know if you guys at your school or something belong to RTCA.  
If you're a member then you can go onto their website and download stuff for free, 
otherwise you've got to order and pay. 
 
-S- I'm sure that's not a problem.  We are the Navy [laughter]. 
 
[R] You may already be a member and you've just got to get the password and then you can 
go in and get the soft copies and (unintelligible). 
 
-S- If I can jog us aside for just a second ... 
 
[R] ... sure ... 
 
-S- ... the FAA wanted us to do this.  It appears to me almost like the left hand doesn't know 
what the right hand is doing, because the people we were talking to were kind of ... oooo, 
gee, new stuff here.  Then there's RTCA and they're doing all this.  I don't know... 
 
[R] Well, they were right in the middle. 
 
-S- Yeah, that's right.  This time comes from the FAA chief and the NTSB chief writing the 
letter saying, do this.  So, I almost question well, why am I doing what I am doing then, 
but... 
 
[R] Well, it's kind of unfortunate.  We all live in the real world and the dollar budgets, but 
there was this recorder symposium-seminar in D.C. this week.  Actually, right now as we 
speak.  Unfortunately, nobody here could attend.  But, I think it was an SAE-sponsored 
forum with the NTSB, and not just aviation but maritime and trains and trucks and all 
kind of recorders.  That would have been interesting.  And there will probably be some 
minutes and materials coming out of that, so you might want to watch the SAE website 
or NTSB.  The FAA as far as our contact, or my contact, (unintelligible) it's more with ... 
you know, I talk to one or two people there and that's it, and they're focused on the 
recorder side and I don't know what all various down linking, free airspace, and all that 
stuff that's going on. 
 
-S- We've got another problem, too.  Suppose we send Qantas over the Pacific toward 
Sydney and somewhere left of Fiji something goes wrong.  How do we get the data out 
there?  That's a different problem than if you're over Cleveland. 
 
[R] They still send stuff all the time, right? 
 
-S- That's right. 
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[R] They've got to send position reports whether it's by voice or by data ... 
 
-S- Yeah, but those are different animals.  That's a lot less data and a lot less out.  If you're 
talking flight parameters you're talking a bunch of slices per second and it either has to 
happen real-time or it has to happen in a burst of some kind, or whatever.  So, I'm still 
trying to figure out what's your feeling?  Can a satellite component of this exist?  Is that 
too expensive?  Is there equipment on board the airplanes now that's basically there that 
could be used?  I even had one guy come up to me and say, "What about all these cell 
phones you've got in your seat?  Can't they climb on to that somehow?" 
 
[R] Well, I mean there is ... and here we get into the proprietary stuff ... but, there is the 
"Connections by Boeing".  It's been in some of the news lately with the (l.h.) with 
Lufthansa for Internet, for e-mail services. 
 
-S- And there's some data there, yeah. 
 
[R] There's significant data there.  As far as the actual rates... 
 
-S- ... yeah, if every passenger ... 
 
[R] ... I couldn't tell you if I did whether it supports that stuff.  I didn't know.  This is just an 
L3 maintenance manual for the recorders, and so I was glancing at this (unintelligible).  
Yeah, they talk about digitize the stuff and then the rate of data stream going, you know, 
so here's the rates in the CVR ... 
 
-S- ... per channel ... 
 
[R] ... what they're stuffing into the memory.  If you want to keep up with it then you've 
pretty much got to stuff that to the ground somewhere. 
 
-S- And then you've got to figure you're not getting 100% of that in your transmission 
necessarily, so you've got to plan for more. 
 
[R] Yeah, I don't know the overhead associated with the message transmission and the XBR 
rates, but I mean, you know, this gives you an idea of some of the rates, whether existing 
SATCOM systems or connections support that, I don't know. 
 
-S- And video blows you out of the water.  This is small compared to video. 
 
[R] And video, you know, there's a lot of discussion of frame rates and resolutions.  Is four 
times a second sufficient, is it not, for certain things is it ... you know, they're talking a 
general flight deck view.  (unintelligible) You know, for the general environment in the 
flight deck versus looking at a display or something, or watching the crew actions. 
 
-S- Crew actions and displays are two different issues.  Crew actions are one thing, but you 
almost want to have a camera just focused on the instruments to see what they're seeing. 
 
[R] Well, now, depends on what you're trying to accomplish.  The resolution frame rates are 
driven by the need and what are you going to do with the data.  If you're already 
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recording the data on the flight deck ... or, on the flight recorder ... do you need to have a 




[R] OK, so supposedly ... 
 
-S- But, what about weather radar?  We're not recording that.  So, what is the crew seeing? 
 
[R] I'm not an accident investigator.  And how often, you know, if you see the jerky hand 
motion -- is that fine? -- or do you need to see a smooth motion?  You know, you need to 
be ... the resolution ... do you need to be able to read stuff on the display, or just see that 
it's not blank, or see that it's not upside-down, or it's not flashing, or all garbled, 
scrambled data.  What do you need?  Are you looking for smoke, you know?  Are you 
looking for the two guy struggling with some of the accidents, ah, theories that are going 
on.  The guys are doing stuff and this guy's going like this, you know the non-verbal 
communication.  So, there's a lot of discussion among these investigators of what really is 
the fundamental need, and then you get down to requirements that support meeting 
those fundamental needs. 
 
-S- Again, in a perfect world you've got 60 frames per second and everything is perfectly 
clear and you're recording and downlinking all of that. 
 
[R] Again, in this ED-112 document there are requirements for frame rates and resolutions 
and color or not color and all that stuff.  You're right, with the image there's going to be 
more data.  Another thing we expect rule making on is recording some data link 
messages.  You know, all the clearances and all that stuff used to be by voice and it's all 
on the voice recorder.  Well, now you've gone to data link messages and they're hitting 
buttons on a display and sending messages, so the NTSB is ... ah, some of this stuff's in 
ICAO and, well, we don't have rule making yet, but we expect it and the details are not 
clear what's going to be required, but stuff that's up-linked over VHF or SATCOM and 
displayed to the crew will need to be recorded somewhere. 
 
-S- Is ACARS, are those transmissions, ACMS, that kind of stuff, is that recorded on the 
ground, do you know? 
 
[R] We had some talks in these industry meetings.  We had one meeting at SETA in Geneva.  
SETA is one of the two main ground stations that are used, as far as I know, for that kind 
of data -- ARINC and SETA -- and they said they were really adamant, we keep that data 
and we keep it for business purposes and quality control and for financial reasons, so 
much per bit and quality and keep the data and we can show our customers we're 
meeting our contracts and this is how much they charge.  And they were adamant there 
is no regulation or law or requirement for us to keep the data for a certain period of time. 
 
-S- Or, at all.  As far as I know, I think they're right. 
 
[R] So, as far as counting on ... and that's one of the reasons that a lot of the discussions were, 
"Why do we have to record this stuff on the airplane when all that stuff's on the ground?"  
Well, it's not always on the ground, and if it's on the ground it's not always easy to get to.  
So, the data link is an additional chunk of data that may be recorded on the airplane and 
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have to be taken into account.  That's not expected to be real soon (unintelligible) the 
data, though, but the (unintelligible). 
 
-S- Well, RTCA basically said that anything leaving the airplane or arriving at the airplane 
needs to be recorded -- that affects the safety of flight (unintelligible).  So, ... 
 




[R] You know, obviously, well you know ... do I really care that they're saying "give me three 
cases of of whisky, two wheel chairs, and I want to stay at the Red Lion."  Kind of 
"company-type" messages, and then ... 
 
-S- Yes, I do. 
 
[R] ... because that's a crew workload issue.  This guy's talking about the hotel and he drives 
into the swamp in Florida.  So, there are different issues, and the other guy says I  ... I can 
tell what's going on, there's voice recording, and if there's crewmembers that survived I 
have those people.  I have all the air traffic control radar data, blah blah blah blah blah.  
So, there is a lot of details about what needs to be recorded.  RTCA ... you know, this 
report is a compilation of consensus of "the industry".  It was intended to be a look out 
ten to fifteen years from now.  What are the issues and what are the needs, kind of thing.  
Some of those come into rule making, I believe, and many of them will never become rule 
making.  ARINC, Euro-K, RTCA -- none of those have any "authority" on an airline or an 
airframer or a pilot or an operator or anybody. 
 
-S- (something about the FAA) 
 
[R] Unless this stuff becomes, ah, a national agency requires it. 
 
-S- To their credit, I think that the regulators don't want to put a whole lot on people if they 




-S- In general.  Sometimes they go a little overboard, but in general. 
 
[R] And there's always that ... they always butt heads, you know, it's kind of like it takes four 
kids getting hit on the road and getting killed before a stop light goes in.  It's a similar 
thing.  The NTSB and the FAA butt heads often. 
 
-S- Well, it's the classic FAA paradox.  You know, on the one hand they're there to promote 
safety and on the other hand they're there to support industry. 
 
[R] Promote the business. 
 
-S- That's right, so... 
 
 131 
[R] There is that concept, ah, that contention there.  Getting back to "do we need to do this?"  
Like I say, I haven't had a big input from many airlines, from our air safety groups, 
saying yes we need to do that.  Our counterparts in the NTSB have not pushed for that at 
all.  I'm not sure whether it's because they ... not because they don't feel there's a need for 
it ... but, it's ... we'll make incremental improvements here rather than big-picture, huge 
steps.  If we get two hours recorders and we get data link recording and we can get a ten-
minute battery back-up for the recorders for when the ship loses power, and we make the 
beacon more robustly attached to the recorder, and we add some new parameters or 
increase frame rates on some surfaces, these are all great things and we would be real 




[R] I don't know. 
 
-S- Well, hopefully, if we do good design on it and look at all angles and secure the thing 
and figure out exactly what it takes to beam stuff all over the place, we can make it 
painless to put such a system in.  You've gone through this, obviously. 
 
[R] Parts of it. 
 
-S- Did anything jump out at you as a whole?  Something that was not considered 
overlooked. 
 
[R] No, I think it was pretty thorough, they had a number of meetings and ... 
 
-S- That was my feeling, too. 
 
[R] Pretty good collection who have many, many years and different perspectives.  But, I'm 
not sure about the airline participation, but I know that there were a number of vendors 
and air framers and NTSB and FAA.  Many of the people I've met from other industry 
meetings and they're they experts.  They're the national resource specialists for recorders 
and for other issues there.  I'm sure the downlinking, one of the things would be the 
privacy concerns.  In some places that's a real issue and some places it's not.  We have an 
industry meeting in Kiev and we had some of the regulators from the Ukraine -- "What is 
the problem?"  We tell the pilots that this is the way it is, they salute and say yes, and 
that's the end.  What do you mean, privacy, unions, pilots?  We tell them what to do.  
Here, ALPA and IALPA are strong and they have probably some legitimate concerns.  
I'm sure that would be one of the concerns.  Is the data accessible?  The encryption, the 
protection of the data is always, you know ... 
 
-S- If you can encrypt it, somebody can decrypt it. 
 
[R] Exactly.  You hear about ... oh, you know, somebody found this little portal to get in and 
Microsoft has a patch out now, but we had 83,000 VISA bill accounts were accessed and 
pilfered and all it takes is one especially when somebody in the media, scrupulous ... 
unscrupulous, I'll give you five million bucks if you give me that video of that British 
Airways flying into the ground. 
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-S- But, to be honest, the transmission of the data is probably not the weak link in the 
security there.  It's the storage.  We can use public key cryptography or any kind of 
cryptography or any kind of encryption that you want to imagine.  Make it such that 
you'd have to have 50,000 super computers taking a billion years to crack the key, but 
then we're all gone and we don't care -- let 'em crack it.  That's not the problem.  The 
problem is somewhere along the line it's decrypted, it's sitting somewhere on a disk, 
whatever ... 
 
[R] But, you do that today. 
 
-S- There's your problem. 
 










-S- They are. 
 
[R] They are at the FAA or somewhere at the air traffic control centers, that data is sitting 
there for at least 30 days. 
 
-S- I don't know if you've ever been to a center or anywhere else. 
 
[R] I've been to the Auburn one down here. 
 
-S- They have banks and banks of recorders.  It's pretty old technology. 
 
[R] Yeah, but they have that data. 
 
-S- But, they have them. 
 
[R] They're sitting there. 
 
-S- A bunch of tapes. 
 
[R] Yeah.  And whether the newer ones have solid state, whatever, but in some media, some 
form, that data is the same data that you're talking about, is there. 
 
-S- Now, if I'm United Airlines and I fly my airplane from Seattle to San Francisco and I land 
and I've got some data on board the airplane in the recorders, is it not true that I own that 
data as United Airlines?  That's my data? 
 
[R] I can't say this unqualified, but I believe the answer is yes.  Now, they have certain 
obligations to keep that data in certain incidents or accidents for a certain period of time 
 133 
in the FARs, I think in the 121, the operator rules, they have to keep that data.  But, I 
believe you're right.  It's their data. 
 
-S- All right.  So, United owns the data.  We've got pilot's unions, we've got all these people 
concerned with the privacy of the data, if we're beaming this stuff over some satellite link 
or some VHF link or something, who is recording it?  Do I now burden the airlines to 
record it?  Does Boeing offer the service?  Does the FAA do it?  Does the NTSB do it?  
And, if the FAA does it, now all of the sudden United's data is in possession of the FAA. 
 
[R] Right, yeah, those are all issues ... 
 
-S- That's the hole I've seen with all of this stuff.  Everybody talks about well, here's what's 
on board the airplane, here's the recorders, here's the bit rates, here's what the SATCOM 
can do, here's all of this stuff and nobody really goes into OK now we're going to record 




-S- And all that kind of stuff, so... 
 
[R] And for how long who's going to control it and who has the right to it and the legal 
ramifications and the litigation and all that stuff. 
 
-S- But, you see, that's a perfect avenue for somebody like me to come in because that is a 
computer science issue.  It's an information assurance issue. 
 
[R] Well, it goes... 
 
-S- It goes beyond that, too. 
 
[R] It goes far beyond that. 
 
-S- It does. 
 
[R] Who is going to record it?  You don't have to be a computer science expert to do that, and 




[R] So.  I'm afraid I don't know.  I don't have answers.  Those are all good questions.  But, as 
far as some of that data being there somewhere ... 
 
-S- It is ... 
 
[R] But, currently all of that data is sitting there somewhere. 
 
-S- And then we have the non-investigatory aspects, too.  A lot of the data is being used for 
monitoring maintenance status of all kinds of systems. 
 
[R] And the FOQA program. 
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-S- Yeah.  And can we use down linked data, would it enhance that at all?  I don't know.  
Probably not because in that case, everything is on board the aircraft, the aircraft lands 
safely, you've got all this stuff recorded ... 
 
[R] ... you've got a crew to talk to 
 
-S- ... got a crew to talk to.  Everything's happy, so. 
 
[R] You know, we do down link stuff over ACARS now.  Maintenance messages... 
 
-S- Yeah, sure. 
 
[R] Ah, (system) faults (time), that kind of stuff ... I'm an hour out ... 
 
-S- ... yeah ... 
 
[R] ... hey, here's the faults 
 
-S- ... right ... 
 
[R] ... come up with your plan, get the parts, because we've got to get turned around and let's 
go.  Now, that data is down loaded, or down linked, through ARINC or SETA to the 
company to the airline. 
 
-S- Yeah, I have a friend who is a dispatcher for QANTAS.  She and I have talked about quite 
extensively from their prospective.  She was quite amazed because I said, well, go out 
and find out what QANTAS is doing with this stuff.  She came back and said, "Wow!  
These maintenance guys can talk to the airplane when it's in flight!"  She was just amazed 
by that.  And, you're right.  All that stuff does fly around, but ... and, it's talked about in 
here, but in terms of data linking I don't know it's really that important.  All right, there is 
a person who directed me to ask this question.  I kind of asked it before ... 
 
[R] OK (laughing) 
 
-S- And it's probably a proprietary answer and you'll probably say I can't answer that. 
 
[R] Ask it anyway. 
 
-S- All right.  It's kind of back to the "what systems are on board the airplane that we can tie 
into?"  You've got Internet links, you've got cell phones, you've got that kind of stuff.  Is it 
your feeling ... you see, the issue here is that we don't want to put more equipment on the 
aircraft if we don't have to.  Can we tap into those existing things, do you think? 
 
[R] Not everybody ... there's no guarantee somebody is going to have a cell phone. 
 
-S- But, if Boeing sells a 757 to somebody, what's on that airplane? 
 
[R] It varies widely by customer.  The only communications system that you can be 
guaranteed to have is VHF.  Not everybody has HF, many do, but if you're flying 
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domestic routes or if you're flying in Japan, if you're within VHF range, why pay another 
$100,000 or whatever (I'm pulling that out of the air) to equip your airplane and carry 
that weight around.  Non-revenue ... 
 
-S- ... please note that Mr. Ridgely has just quoted a price for ... 
 
[R] it's a binding contract [kidding].  So, the only ones you would be guaranteed of is VHF, 
and not everybody gets ACARS.  Everybody gets two VHFs for voice and there's a third 
VHF dedicated to ACARS if they get it.  Many people have HF.  Not everybody has 
SATCOM, many people do.  No commercial planes we deliver have UHF. 
 
-S- Right, that's for the military. 
 
[R] So, you've got VHF always.  Sometimes you have HF.  Sometimes you have SATCOM.  
Like I talked about, the new "Connections", and I don't know the details of the frequency 
range that it operates or the data rates. 
 
-S- OK, so for the record, there isn't an array of systems that you can pretty much count on 




-S- That's what I told him, but it's nice to hear that. 
 
[R] You have the VHF, the VDL Mode 2 VHF data link, VHF data radio, and I don't know 
the details of the data rates there, but I believe that was an improvement over data rates 
and quality and we can use that VHF data link.  And that's probably your best chance of 
having something on the plane that you're not going to have to add.  It may only be on 
certain routes.  When you get into some of the other routes, you know transoceanic 
routes there's different requirements for equipment.  If you're operating in a FANS 
environment, you might have to have stuff coming on (ADSB) for automatic position 
reports.  But, if you want to get something on every airplane, whether it's flying from 
Chicago to Detroit or Chicago to Hong Kong, you can't count on the same equipage on 
those planes at all. 
 
-S- OK, so then the follow-up question I guess would be alright so the two VHF systems are 
guaranteed, but come on, I mean these people are spending millions of dollars for an 
airplane, what's another $100,000.  Most people do get a bunch of stuff. 
 
[R] We deliver many, many, many airplanes with no HF. 
 
-S- I don't think I can use that for data link anyway. 
 
[R] Well, there is HF data. 
 
-S- Yeah, but... 
 
[R] We are delivering that.  ARINC has a bunch of ground stations worldwide.  I think the 
data rate would not support something real-time.  SATCOM is quite expensive.  The 
larger airframes typically have SATCOM, flying the long, transoceanic routes where you 
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may be flying polar routes and stuff where you some more problems with HF and you 
need good communication.  I don't know whether the data rates would support that.  
And then you get into the other issue.  Hey, what about my dispatch?  I've got all of this 
automatic down link, so I don't need my on-board recorders any more, right? 
 
-S- I don't think that's ever going to be the feeling. 
 
[R] So, can I dispatch without the download or do I have to have that working to dispatch?  
Can I get MEL relief?  So, those are all peripheral questions. 
 
-S- Yes, those are good questions. 
 
[R] You know you can dispatch now with one recorder or the other not working for up to 
three days, but you've got to have the other ... you can go with no CVRs as long as you 




[R] Fails.  Or faulty and you can't repair it for 72 hours.  So, that would be part of 
(unintelligible). 
 
-S- Well, at this point, the language that the FAA has been using with us on this project is 
"Backup Recorder", which would indicate to me that it's not an MEL issue and gee, it's 
nice to have, but yet it's funny.  It's kind of like taxes, you know, it never goes away and 
it always gets worse. 
 
[R] Yeah.  So, as far as equipage, there's nothing that's going to be on every airplane today 
that would support what you need. 
 
-S- So, we would be talking about an additional system.  Now we're talking to the airlines, 
we're saying you pay this money. 
 
[R] Right.  Or, it could be an optional system today that would need changes.  Maybe the 
SATCOM doesn't support the data rates and it would need to be updated, improved, 
more robust in order to do that.  So, either a new system, requiring a system currently 
that exist that is not mandatory on every airplane, making that mandatory.  Or, taking a 
system that is mandatory, improving it to meet the needs, or developing a new system 
basically that's dedicated toward that stuff.  All those have ka-ching, ka-ching written all 
over them. 
 
-S- Yes, they do.  Alright, and then just, another ... one other thing that I'm thinking here.  
This is kind of a technical question.  We've got data flowing around on an airplane on 
some kind of data bus.  How accessible is that?  Is it easy to, I'll use word "steal" the data? 
 
[R] Well, the existing ... ah, I can talk about some of it, I don't know all the details.  The CVR, 
for example, right now our audio systems on the airplanes are basically analog audio 
systems. 
 
-S- They are analog. 
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[R] Yeah, I mean a lot of the control between the various audio components is digital control, 
but the audio signals, basically, we have analog audio going to the butt end of the 
airplane to the CVR.  It's digitized and stored, which is in the recorder. 
 
-S- OK, so the recorder has an analog input and it ... 
 
[R] Yeah, four channels, four analog inputs.  Left seat, right seat, observer, and the area mic.  
You've got four separate audio lines going back there, now newer airplanes which we are 
in the middle of building, may or may not have a completely digital audio system.  The 
FDR currently has a digital bus.  You have an acquisition unit, whether it's a 
(unintelligible) video or a flight data acquisition unit or it's a in the main cabinet or it's 
modular electronics.  That is a digital bus going back to the recorders. So, I mean, that 
data is there on that bus.  You know, what the fan out is of that or the loads, but I'm sure 
it could handle another load.  Some of that stuff is parallel to the FDR and the QAR - 
quick access recorder or maintenance recorder, whatever you want to call it - out of that 
same bus, whatever you want to call it. 
 
-S- And this is a ... is there, ah ... 
 
[R] It's a serial bus, it's not very fast.  I don't know the details or whether they're (? "ARINC 
717") or the bus characteristics (unintelligible) hook into the ARINC. 
 
-S- Are you putting things like ethernet on board the airplanes now? 
 
[R] There is no ethernet in the recorder systems.  As far as I know, there may be ... there's 
ARINC 629 stuff on the 777, the new airplane may or may not have ethernet.  As far as I 
know, we're not putting ethernet on the existing models, but that's certainly being 
considered and I think the A380 is going to have ethernet. 
 
-S- How many years in the future is it going to be before we do this? 
 
[R] Do what? 
 
-S- Downlink stuff.  30? 
 
[R] You sound confident that it will happen. 
 
-S- I think it will, you know, 200 years from now.  I don't know.  100 years, 50, 30... 
 
[R] I don't know.  Maybe, maybe not.  Then you get into the into the ground side of it, just 
the logistics of, you know, who's going to own the stations?  Where are the stations going 
to be?  You've got a downlink station in Africa, well that station's not working because 
everybody vandalized it and stole the gas and the generator.  Nobody likes to fly in 
Africa because all your ground navaids are not working because they've been pilfered. 
 
-S- Yeah, but who needs ground navaids when you've got satellites? 
 
[R] They come down somewhere.  And whether they all come down in one place or they 
come down various places and are linked over landlines and are linked to the repository 
of the data ... I don't know.  I came across this.  I make no claims about this.  We're 
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moving, so I'm going through data.  So, I came across this sometime, I think somebody 
did their little pitches at one of our industry meetings ... 
 
-S- ... sure ... 
 
[R] ... and this is purely a sales pitch, but this talks about ... you know, this is some company 
with their products of down linking data and they've looked at some of this.  Monitoring 
medical and patient monitoring, environmental, internet access, data security, reliability 
... here's some scenarios on why you should give you all your money so we can do this 
for you.  Ground stations that they're proposing and here's our card.  I will not be 
keeping this.  I will be tossing it; you're welcome to take it and do with it what you will. 
 
-S- OK, I'll probably be tossing it myself. 
 





[R] I have not felt the push from industry to do this. 
 
-S- Which makes me again wonder why the FAA has sent us a pile of money to, among 
other things, send me here to talk to you when (unintelligible) this sort of thing.  They 
seem quite interested in this system.  Anyway, I ... is there anything else you can think of 
to add from a Boeing perspective? 
 
[R] No, you know we are fully committed to safe airplanes and accident investigation and 
having the data that you need to resolve what happened and prevent that from 
happening again.  It's something that is very important to us.  We support that actively 
and we support industry activities.  Like you say, at the Euro-K I went, and another guy 
went to the future flight data collection committee, an ARINC committee that is working 
on new specifications.  We just haven't had a push at all from the NTSB or the FAA or the 
JAA or airlines to do this.  I don't know if Frank told you something different, but ... 
 
-S- No, actually Frank pretty much said the same thing.  He basically said they have looked 
at it and it's a problem that's too big to chew right now.  Yeah, we're aware of it, but. 
 
[R] I think that's part of it, like I said the investigators know they only have so many chips 
and they want to use them where they can kind of get the most for their literal dollar and 
their political dollar, and they would much rather have two hours recorders and require 
a 10-minute backup for the voice recorder, so you have recording if you lose ship's 
power, and data link recording and possibly video recording on the flight data than push 
for something like this. 
 
-S- Because the incidence of data loss is just not that big. 
 
[R] Usually we almost always recover the recorder.  Almost always.  I'm sure there are cases 
where it wasn't, or one recorder was and the other one wasn't, but ... 
 
-S- Didn't they have that in Pennsylvania.  Didn't they get the, ah ... 
 139 
 
[R] I mean, there are cases.  I don't think they got 'em, in New York City I don't think they 
got the recorders. 
 
-S- I don't think they got anything there. 
 
[R] Yeah, they just melted.  They were just lost in the rubble, so.  But, I think the incidences 
of those are very, very few.  The NTSB guys can give you ... I assume you're going back 
to D.C. to talk to them.  Dennis Grosse is the guy I work with, and he's the national (? 
reco) specialist for recorders, so I'm sure he can quote this accident or that accident.  But, 
my impression is that there were very, very few where the recorders were not recovered. 
 
-S- Actually, the bigger incidence is unreliable or missing data or spotty data, that kind of 
stuff. 
 
[R] Or the recorder was damaged and we couldn't retrieve the data, and that's been ... the 
incidences of that have been reduced by ... 
 
-S- ... better equipment ... 
 
[R] ... having solid-state recorders, more robust you know.  3400-G impact and 1100-degree C 
fire, it's a pretty robust recorder.  There is a recommendation from the NTSB to have dual 
recorders, one forward and one aft, to increase having the data available.  So, there are 
cases where one recorder couldn't get off because the tape was melted, well solid state 
addresses that.  Well, it happened 40 minutes ago and they only had a 30-minute 
recorder, the two-hour recorder addresses that.  Some changes in the beacon attachment 
helps locating it in a timely fashion, a cheaper fashion, much better.  Having the (? con-B) 
recorders, which may or may not become rule making would increase the changes of 
having that, in recovering at least one of those recorders. 
 
-S- I'll have to speak like a flight instructor.  Better pilot training ... just don't crash. 
 
[R] There you go.  But, you know, they're very useful in the incidents and not the accidents.  
We support that stuff and if there is a big push to actually do that we participate actively 
in that because that would have a big impact on us (unintelligible) our customers. 
 
-S- Well, that's the bottom line for you folks.  I mean, you want to have the best product, 
and... 
 




[R] We want a safe product.  We want a good product.  We want a product people will buy 
it, over and over. 
 
-S- Yeah, exactly. 
 
[R] So, you know, we're for safe airplanes.  Once again, I'm speaking from a knothole.  I'm an 
engineer.  I've participated in industry with a number of investigators and manufacturers 
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and worked with our air safety people, but I'm not an accident investigator and I don't 
speak for the whole Boeing company, but from my position I don't see any push to do 




[R] There are probably are other things that the money could be spent on that would have a 
bigger impact on airplane safety than downloading data, whether it is crew training, or 
whatever it is. 
 
-S- I suspect my final report back to the FAA is going to go along the lines of, well, for these 
reasons boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, it doesn't look like this is the 
direction we want to go.  Exactly what you're saying.  Let's get some of these other things 
first.  That's been my impression since I first got into the project, but you know you have 
to slice it and dice it.  They want that answer, so... 
 
[R] Sure.  Ask the same questions over.  Ask different people.  Ask different questions and 
think about it, and the people at Allied may have a different opinion and when you go 
back to the NTSB they may have a ... they may be working behind the scenes to do this ... 
a recommendation. 
 
-S- And I was ... I told you on the phone the other day that I had run across something at 
NASA that's along these lines, and I had hoped to bring something here to you that you 
could see.  But, unfortunately, the guy that I'm working with has been on vacation the 
last couple of weeks, so I haven't got the stuff myself to give to you. 
 
[R] That would be interesting. 
 
-S- But, if I do get something that you may be interested in I could send it up to you. 
 
[R] That would be good.  I'd like that. 
 
-S- But, basically what I know is that they have a system like this that's in a Lear 25 and a 757 
and they're flying it around the skies and I've seen shots of the video that's been 
downlinked. 
 
[R] Oh yeah, I mean we down link stuff all the time in the flight test program, whether it's 
audio or video. 
 
-S- Right, but their ... NASA's thing was exactly this.  So, ah, they were trying to put together 
a system that, in some fashion, I'm not sure what communications link they're using or 
any of that kind of stuff, but I do know they're flying it around the sky right now.  So, if I 
run into any more juicy stuff on that ... 
 
[R] Yeah.  That would be interesting. 
 
-S- They're somewhere in Ohio.  Dayton, I think.  It's not Wright-Pat, it's somewhere out that 





-S- Thank you to your management for allowing you to be here and ... 
 
[R] You bet.  Hopefully, you got some information that will be worthwhile to you. 
 
-S- Well, among other things you have confirmed a lot of things that I already thought, but 
you've give me some additional things to think about, so that's good. 
 
[R] And, you know, when you talk to the ALPA and the IALPA guys, you may have or plan 
to, but, they may have ... I can give you names and numbers for the guys that 
participated in the recorder ... recent industry activity, and they kind of represent those 
unions in the recorder world, so they may have some ... there may already be a ... 
 
-S- ... position paper out ... 
 
[R] ... by the union guys. 
 





-S- The reason for that is that when I first wrote the thesis proposal for this project, it 
included ALPA, it included a lot of stuff, and my computer science-focused director said, 
"What are you talking to ALPA for?  Where's the computer security for that?" 
 
[R] Are you really evaluating whether this should be done, or are you just saying assuming 
we've got to do it, here's how it could be done, but in order to do that you would need to 
know all the concerns.  What are the top-level system requirements that my design has to 
address, and privacy is one of them, so that's why I would talk to ALPA. 
 
-S- I will be talking to them, it's just that I had to scale it down and what I sent you is the 
scaled down version, but it's going to go back up again. 
 
[R] There's a guy at Northwest who is a captain there who is ALPA that has participated in 
some of these meetings.  He is interested in flight deck video recording privacy issues, so 
he might be a good guy.  Lindsay Fenwick. 
 
-S- At Northwest in Minneapolis? 
 
[R] Yeah.  I'll have to see if I can get his name there's a guy from BA as well, Malcolm Carey.  
Lindsay Fenwick.  Everett Smith from the Air Force.  ALPA, and then you'll need 




[R] Any other contacts or organizations that I might be able to give you to link into? 
 
-S- No, I think that's more than enough. 
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[R] More than enough. 
 
-S- I'm going to be down at the FAA this afternoon in Renton. 
 
[R] On this issue? 
 
-S- Yeah.  On this issue. 
 
[R] Is Paul Fider part of your audience? 
 
-S- He isn't.  Jim Treacy and Tom Kraft. 
 
[R] They're not the regular working guys that I would ... 
 
-S- No, I was doing a little snooping.  You're anonymous, by the way.  I went out on the 




-S- But, the fellow I'm going to meet this afternoon has got stuff out there.  He's been in the 
business 35-some-odd years and he's worked on, you know, blah blah, all this kind of 
stuff. 
 
[R] Yeah, yeah that will be good. 
 
-S- He's going to be an interesting man to talk to. 
 





[R] Never heard of him.  That's the response you will get from them. 
 
-S- Sometime that's good. 
 
[R] But, yeah, my ... (? if they hadn't been qualified) they actually changed, they wrote 
papers (unintelligible).  Jay Yee, Paul Fider, Kim Chong were the three guys that 
(unintelligible). 
 
-S- Alright, sir. 
 
[R] Alright.  Well, let's, ah ... 
 
-S- Thank you, thank your management ... 
 
--- < END TRANSCRIPTION > --- 
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APPENDIX D — TRANSCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW WITH 
JAMES TREACY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 
This conversation took place between James Treacy and Paul Schoberg at 
the FAA office in Renton, Washington, on 4th June 2003, at 2:00 PM.  Mr. Treacy 
is a senior executive with over 35 years of service with the FAA and in the 
aviation industry.  In his career he has specialized in avionics and cockpit 




[T] James Treacy 
-S- Paul Schoberg 
 
[T] He’s associated with Boeing Connections, and he used to be an EMC guy, I guess he still 
is, but anyway they have a research program or had a research program with the FAA in 
which they did some work into this area of transmission of voice and flight recorder 
stuff. 
 
-S- Connections did? 
 
[T] Yeah.  Well, it’s either ongoing or just nearly finished.  They haven’t published the report 
as I understood it, but if we got permissions from the administrators of the research that 




[T] But, of course, they’re talking about transmission over the Connections network is 
probably what they’re doing.  I actually don’t know much about what they did, only that 
they explored that idea of transmitting the information in real time. 
 
-S- Well, let me tell you where I’m at, at this point.  This is for me a relatively new project 




-S- It was interesting talking to ... do you know the man’s name? ... Tim Ridgely?  You may 
not know him.  He said you wouldn’t know him, so... 
 
[T] Mmmmm ... don’t recognize the name, no. 
 










-S- ... an engineer type.  And, he was a real good source of information.  One of the things he 




-S- You don’t really need to look through it. 
 
[T] Is this the standard for the recorder that they published? 
 
-S- No, this is sort of a blue sky “what can we do?” working group.  I think it’s near the 
beginning here ... (shuffling through papers) ... anyway, it doesn’t matter.  Basically, what 





-S- They said: “Form a group, go forth and figure out what we’re going to do with flight 





-S- And this report details a lot of stuff, they broke them into three working groups.  One of 
them had to do with technical issues, one of them had to do with regulatory issues, and 




-S- Alright, and so they broke it down very well.  They identified a lot of problems.  They 
said, “here’s what we can do today, here’s what we think we can do...” but nobody 




-S- This is one source of information that I have found very enlightening.  Another one, I’m 




-S- I’m sure you know them. 
 
[T] I know the company, but I don’t know their connection with the recorder systems. 
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-S- Tim over at Boeing was saying oh yes, we work with them, and I mentioned the guy I’m 




-S- They had some interesting things to say, too.  They evidently looked at the problem and 
they have kind of sliced it and diced it and talked to people in satellite communications, 
people in all kinds of communications, they’ve looked it from the standpoint of what 
their recorders do, so they’ve looked at it also. 
 




-S- No worries.  I did not record that, by the way. 
 
[T] It’s OK. 
 
-S- OK.  Ah, so L3 has looked at it and they’ve talked about it and he’s been engaged in 
things.  So, what I’m finding is there’s an awful lot of people out there that are working 




-S- They’re actually flying the system.  They’ve got it in a Lear 25 and a Boeing 757 and 
they’re flying around Ohio and they’ve got things bouncing around, and ... 
 
[T] Oh, I didn’t know that, either. 
 
-S- So, that’s pretty interesting.  I don’t have detailed information on that because the 








-S- Frankly, when I got this thing, I said, “Ah, well I’ll just change some of the names and 
hand it in and say there’s my thesis.”  It’s pretty complete, it really is. 
 
[T] (laughter) Yeah. 
 





-S- Now, to get to that ... I don’t know if you know the background of what exactly it is I’m 
doing and where I’m from and all that kind of stuff. 
 
[T] I really don’t know that much about ... other than it looked as though you’re primarily 
interested in the way in which you would actually deal with the data that would come 
down and how you would sort it and save it and all that stuff. 
 
-S- Yeah.  Well, briefly, I’m at the Naval Postgraduate School.  It’s one of two military 
postgraduate schools ... 
 
[T] I’m somewhat familiar with it, yeah. 
 
-S- And I happen to be one of probably less than 50 civilian students down there.  Basically, 




-S- And, the person who kind of runs that show down there, Dr. Cynthia Irvine, she’s one 
who is kind of a go-getter.  She goes out and finds people to do research of her because 




-S- And she ran into some FAA sorts back in Washington and said, “You know, some of the 
guys back in Monterey are talking about the idea of beaming this stuff off the airplane.”  
And everybody in Washington said, “Oooo, neat!  Let’s have you look into that.”  So, 




-S- ... and voiced some interest and so on.  So, I wrote a thesis proposal.  I think you have a 
copy of it. 
 
[T] Ah, no, I don’t think I got it. 
 
(talking over each other about the thesis proposal) 
 
-S- I have a thesis proposal and basically what I did is I looked at what the problem 




-S- ... and kind of answer the question of can we do this? Is it cost effective? How do we do 




-S- Now, given that I’m in the security end of things I have to eventually get to some security 

















-S- Evidently you have had a very noteworthy career ... 
 
[T] Varied career, I think you would say. 
 
-S- ... very noteworthy time in the FAA.  So, I feel like you’re a very good resource for all of 




-S- Neat idea.  Wow.  Probably ain’t gonna happen. 
 
[T] Ah, that’s probably right, yeah. 
 





-S- Now, Tim this morning, from Boeing’s perspective, had some very interesting things to 
say.  I’m kind of interested now in the FAA’s take on such a thing, being in the position 




-S- And, also a little bit of how are we going to do this if we do it?  Suppose, in a perfect 
world, we had video at 60 frames per second and we had 10,000 data parameters for 




-S- ... and we had 50 channels of audio and all of that was getting beamed to the ground 






-S- Alright, so... 
 




-S- How do we do that? 
 
[T] Right.  Yeah.  Right.  Well, there’s a ... yeah ... even if you had it all, how are you going to 




[T] Yeah, OK, you probably ... well, I don’t know how much you know about the FAA.  
Despite what they may say on the web we are a very reactive organization and it’s a very 
mature industry.  We’ve been beating on these problems for 40 years, probably, and a lot 
of the solutions are about as good as they can get in some of the things and there’s some 
things that you can’t fix.  There’s a lot of conservatism.  Don’t change it if it’s not broke, 




[T] And, ah, the recorder business is kind of an oddball.  After all, nobody wants to have a 
crash and it doesn’t do anything to prevent a crash other than the next one afterwards if 
you find what went wrong.  So, we all recognize we need to record it, but it’s kind of a 
lower priority as far as the quality of the systems because in and of itself it can’t cause the 
accident, or we make pretty sure that it can’t because of the way it’s connected it’s not 
going to kill your communications and it’s not going to mess up your control systems 
even though it’s recording parameters from it, so the main safety stuff for that is it’s ... 
you buffer it or you have it from secondary sources so that even if it shorts out you’re not 
going to lose the primary stuff that the crew needs to fly the airplane. 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 
[T] So, from that perspective it’s kind of an after thought almost.  Yet, the accident 
investigation is very costly, very expensive, extremely difficult.  Something I’m very 
happy that I don’t get involved in personally except once in a while. 
 




-S- I know you’re not NTSB, but I’m just curious.  What do you think the NTSB would think 
of this kind of system? 
 
[T] Well, I’ve talked to them when we talked earlier.  They’re not great fans of it. 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
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[T] It depends, OK?  They’re primary concern is that the data that’s recorded is complete.  
The idea of transmitting it from an airplane that’s in distress bothers them, because ... 
 
-S- It bothers me, too. 
 
[T] ... because you’re not necessarily going to be in an orientation or a capability to transmit 
the signal to a receiver that can get it. 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 




[T] So their concern is primarily if this were in addition to the recorders they’re all for it, if 
it’s a replacement for the recorders, uh-huh [negative] they don’t like it. 
 
-S- Well, the description from the FAA of my project is backup FDR/CVR recording. 
 
[T] And the big problem with that is expense.  I mean, if it’s a backup, what’s the payoff?  
You’ve got to equip all the transports if you’re going to do it ... with it ... in doing that, 
really the equipage is only to translate the information from the data concentrators to 
some sort of a data link and send it. 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 
[T] But, any ... right now any installation that’s not absolutely necessary is just not 




[T] Right now they’re flat on their back and under water.  So, ... 
 
-S- So, the last thing they want is Jim Treacy to come down and say, “Hi, I’m from the FAA, 
we’re here to help you, and the way we’re going to do that is...” 
 
[T] Right.  Or anybody ... right ... we have this idea and it’s not going to increase their 
efficiencies, it’s not going to increase passengers, it just has no economics except negative 
for them. 
 
-S- Maybe, maybe not.  I mean, there is a lot of talk in reports like this about recording 
parameters for the purpose of evaluating equipment, you know, ah, maintenance trends, 
that kind of thing.  You don’t need to beam that across the airwaves someplace. 
 
[T] You don’t have to send that, that’s right. 
 
-S- So, the recorder ... 
 
[T] And, they already do that.  There are programs like GAIN and the quick access recorders 





[T] ... but they’re done as part of the airline’s operations to do just as you suggest, to improve 
their turn around time for things that have failed on the airplane, to let them know 
what’s gone wrong so they can fix it easier, troubleshooting, and also the FOQA stuff, 
which stands for Flight Operations Quality Assurance ... 
 
-S- .. quality assurance ... 
 
[T] ... I think, yeah.  Which is kind of tracking to see how the airplanes are going, to see if 
there’s something wrong with the operating procedures, to see if there’s something 
wrong with the way the crew interacts with the airplane, in some cases for the ... some of 
the airlines like American, for instance, has a program where they are looking for 
mistakes that the crewmembers make to see ... a pretty good program, from what I 
understand of it ... to see if either there is some quirk that kind of leads people astray.  It’s 
trying ... kind of a no-fault kind of thing.  You know, the FAA ... 
 
-S- It would have to be because ALPA is going to go nuts if ... 
 
[T] Right.  It’s kind of fledgling thing with the FAA’s cooperation with them, and I think a 
couple of other airlines may have similar things, but the FAA has a traffic cop mentality.  
We’re going to write you a ticket and you’re going to pay the fine.  We’ll pull your ticket, 
you know, and you can’t fly.  So, we’re not friendly with guys who make mistakes.  And 
yet, a lot of the time ... so, as a result, you don’t get the information about the fact that the 




[T] So, if it’s a no-fault kind of thing, at least you can find out what’s going on and, you 
know, unless the guy is absolutely egregious ... that’s one of the basis of these programs 
... unless, you know, it’s willful violation – they’re drunk, or something – it’s a human 
mistake.  Let’s try to find out why it happened and see what we can do to fix it in the 
future, that kind of deal.  But, that’s not prevalent in the industry, it’s much more the 
punitive kind of things, even though they’re trying to change it, but there’s a lot of 
suspicion about things like that, so...  Sometimes you get cooperation, sometimes you 
don’t.  We’re kind of off the subject. 
 




[T] You’ve got the bandwidth problems, you’ve got the network problems, too, because right 
now about the only thing you have is the ARINC network and the company radio data 
links, which are pretty crude data links, but they’re actually out there, and they use them 
for airplane AOC (airplane operational communications), sort of, it’s flight plans, 
weather, passenger requests, stuff like that. 
 
-S- Meanwhile, we have Internet connections now where theoretically every passenger on 
the plane can plug in the computer and ... 
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[T] Well, it’s ... they’re starting ... that’s right.  And yeah, and that’s a possibility.  All of that, 
of course, is ... we generally look at that as saying that’s non-essential and you don’t 
transmit anything that’s really important or necessary over it, but you can use it, that’s 
true. 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 
[T] I don’t know that there are a whole lot of airplanes other than a few that have that 
capability, but they’re sort of coming.  They’re in there for first class and a few places. 
 
-S- One of the questions I had for Tim this morning was what is there on the airplane that we 




-S- And he smiled and he said that if you buy an airplane from us, you get two VHF radios.  




[T] Yeah, you’ve got ACARS data link.  Right. 
 
-S- Three if you’ve got ACARS. 
 
[T] Right.  Yeah.  But, you know, the airphones are fairly prevalent on a lot of the airplanes, 
at least in the business class and the first class cabins, and the system is there. 
 
-S- Well, alright.  We’re successful on the war on terrorism.  Every terrorist is dead.  The 
economy is going great guns.  The Dow is through 20,000.  People are flying left, right 
and center.  There’s not enough capacity out there.  Airlines are turning people away and 




-S- This is going to happen in seven years.  So, now we have all of the money in the world to 
play with, it’s approaching the year 2015, which these people are talking about.  How do 
we do this? 
 
[T] Yeah.  Right.  I thought about that a little bit.  I haven’t really sat down and looked at it 
the way you probably would when you look at it.  I think, just given the physics of the 
bandwidth that you’re dealing with and the amount of data that we’re talking about, it 
would seem like you would need something that if you were going to do it, it would be a 
selection, or there would be a ... you wouldn’t transmit all the time, but you would send 
it out when you’re in trouble.  That probably does not help you for some kinds of 
accidents, although it depends on how you trigger the transmission. 
 
-S- You’re flying a 767 into the World Trade Center.  As far as the airplane is concerned, it’s 
fat, dumb and happy. 
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[T] No, it’s not, actually.  You get various kinds of warnings, and that’s what you could kind 
of think about, or at least that’s one possibility.  As you approach the ground like that, 




[T] If you’re about to collide with another airplane, you would get TCAS alerts. 
 
-S- But, the Trade Center doesn’t have TCAS. 
 




[T] But, if you’re flying in cruise configuration that close to the ground, you get a GPS [sic] 
warning.  It will give you one. 
 
-S- So, what you’re saying, then... 
 
[T] So there are things on the airplane which can alert the system to say start transmitting, 




[T] ... rather than transmit all the time, which is costly expensive.  But, that’s probably a 
refinement rather than, you know, how would you actually do it. 
 
-S- I think it’s very important, because if you’ve got 5000 airplanes and they’re all 
transmitting, “I’m out here in cruise, I’m out here over Cleveland” ... 
 
[T] Yeah, and ... 
 




-S- Now, I don’t need all this huge network, and... 
 




[T] That’s there the satellite ... and the expense, too, because if you were to transmit to the ... 
I’ve always been kind of a fan of low altitude satellites because of the low power and the 
pretty simple kinds of transmitters that you need in order to connect to them, but the 
problem for that is ... for the full-time system ... is the expense of each call. 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
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[T] But, if you’re not doing it all the time then, well, it really isn’t all that much of a factor.  
So, you know, it’s those sorts of things that you can look at. 
 
-S- So, you would say, then, that there’s ample ways of the airplane determining by itself I’ve 
got to transmit now. 
 
[T] In addition to the crew just having emergency ... 
 
-S- ... having a button ... 
 
[T] ... he hits 7600 on the ... transponder code. 
 
-S- That was actually part of NASA’s thing on their system that they’re flying around.  It’s a 




-S- That’s what they call it. 
 
[T] Yeah, right. 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 
[T] I agree.  That makes sense.  Not always, you know not all the accidents happen that way, 
so ... they don’t know they’re in trouble in a number of cases in the ... and the, ah, but ... 
those are refinements, as I say, it’s not the basic problem.  But, some sort of filter on the 
amount of transmission is most likely necessary because ... of course, very fortunately for 




[T] And so, it doesn’t make sense to transmit 360 days a year and full-time when ... 
 
-S- Yeah, we’ll let the on-board systems handle, you know, the day-to-day recording and 
stuff. 
 
[T] Right.  I don’t know.  The other kind of questions, would we mandate something like 
this?  Probably not.  The video people are kind of interested in the video. 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 
[T] The ... it’s mainly from trying to sort out what happened because from recorded 
parameters you can infer a lot.  The accident investigators at NTSB are really pretty 
sharp. 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 
[T] But, we’ve had a few accidents here in recent years where you’re not recording the 
parameters, you can’t tell exactly what happened, ah you’re ... 
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-S- Or somebody goes like this [making hand gesture] in the cockpit and you don’t know. 
 
[T] Yeah.  Right.  Yeah.  And we’re still at somewhere between 60-70% crew error is probably 
cause, so having more information about what’s going on in the cockpit probably makes 
good sense if you’re going to improve things in that area.  And there, you’ve got all of 
those kind of security and privacy things.  If the ALPA guys today, as you probably 
know, the voice recorder is erasable.  So, they come in and can erase what they said.  
They’re not going to be happy about TV cameras.  You know, you’ve got all of those 
political, labor kind of problems that go with it. 
 
-S- That’s right, and then you also have this issue: it’s one thing if you have a recorder in the 




-S- ... proposal now and everything is on board the aircraft, but as soon as you start beaming 




-S- ... ALPA’s going to go nuts with that, I think. 
 
[T] Yeah.  Right. 
 












-S- And you can probably answer this one.  If I’m United Airlines and I fly from point A to 





-S- I own that data. 
 
[T] Right.  That’s right. 
 






-S- OK.  So, if we had this kind of system and we’ve got, say, a satellite network out there 




-S- Is the FAA going to have a nice, big computer someplace? 
 
[T] Probably not.  No. 
 
-S- OK, so now we’re mandating the airlines ... 
 
[T] ... to put this on and now somebody has got to use it.  Is it going to be the airlines?  




[T] And the FAA would probably like it if they could use it for tracking ... 
 
-S- Ah huh ... 
 








[T] Yes.  I can’t give you an answer to that one.  The FAA tends to think that it’s, well, the 
operators and the manufacturers have the primary responsibility and we kind of look 
over their shoulders.  So, we hardly ever do anything if we can say that the 




[T] And, ah, the work together kind of thing is ... it’s difficult because of the competing 
interests, but there is interest in doing that.  In order to make something like this work, 
though, you would almost have to have it for something other than just the accidents and 
that makes it really tough to ... how do you release it for that?  How do you make it ... I’m 
a big fan of the no-fault idea. 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 
[T] I don’t think there are many aviation professions who are willfully violating the rules just 





[T] ... they’re generally mistakes.  And, people make mistakes and, you know, we’re trying to 
make sure they don’t get killed as a result of them. 
 
-S- At least not Part 121, you don’t find that kind of flying. 
 
[T] Yeah.  Right.  Right.  And even the small guys, they’re not as well qualified, I know that 




[T] So, in fact I’m not ... 
 




[T] But, you know, it’s complex business and it’s easy to make mistakes. 
 
-S- Yes, it is. 
 
[T] Anyway, off the subject again.  Yeah, I don’t have an answer for you on who would pay.  
That’s a tricky one, but I think to have it ... to get it going ... you would probably need to 
be something more than just for accident investigation, otherwise there is no benefit to be 
had that would justify the expense. 
 
-S- Right, and when you start thinking about the unique thing here being transmitting it 








-S- They ought to have the computers on the ground. 
 
[T] Yeah, except that they’re going to say, “Oh, but we don’t trust it, you know, so we want 
the stuff and ... we want the stuff from the tapes, too.”  But, certainly, that would be the 
problem if it were the full-time one.  If it’s only transmitted from the airplanes that are in 




[T] It’s not that huge a job, so...  Especially if you’re only talking about the 121 carriers, 
maybe the 135 carriers, if you start going into the business jets and things like that then it 




[T] So, I don’t know, so ... 
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-S- Well, a lot of those guys ... they’re not required to ... 
 
[T] ... they don’t have to have ... 
 
-S- ... collect flight data anyway, so ... 
 
[T] A lot of them have it, but they’re not required to. 
 
-S- Right.  It’s been described to me that if you look at the wish list, suppose you call the 




-S- And some kind of analog recording.  Alright.  There’s your baseline.  And the wish list is 




-S- That something like this is way out on the end, that ... 
 
[T] ... I think that’s right ... 
 
-S- ... you’d like to get two-hour recording mandated first, which sounds like it’s going to 




-S- Digital audio, stuff like that. 
 




[T] Ah, yeah.  Actually, it’s ... there’s a simple solution, but you can’t get it implemented and 
that’s have the headsets required, because the audio quality in the cockpit because of the 




[T] ... especially on some of the older airplanes.  Even on some of the new ones it’s pretty 
bad.  They’ve paid better attention to the audio quality in the cockpits, and so they’re a 
little easier.  But, mostly ... I don’t know if you’ve ever listened to some of the real 




[T] So ... 
 
-S- Actually, I haven’t, I’ve never ... well, that’s not true.  I’ve heard a couple of them. 
 
 159 
[T] Yeah.  Yeah. It depends.  It depends on where the microphones are.  The ones that come 
over the interphone is really pretty good. 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm, sure. 
 




[T] But, the area microphone where the ambient noise sources are closer than the 
crewmembers to the microphone, they’re pretty tough. 
 




-S- Isn’t the purpose of that microphone ... 
 
[T] No, not necessarily, because the crewmembers don’t use ... necessarily use the interphone 
for their communications, they don’t wear the headsets necessarily. 
 
-S- Oh, I see what you’re saying.  That’s what you meant by headsets required, OK. 
 
[T] Yeah, unless you’re speaking into your microphone, and you don’t have to, you have the 
hand out. 
 
-S- Well, thinking of my own flying, you’re right.  I prefer to take the cans off the head and 
talk to the guy. 
 
[T] Mmmm hmmmm... 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 
[T] Yup.  So.  So, yeah.  I think the characterization that this would be pretty far out on the 
upper part of the tree, not low hanging fruit, is probably true. 
 




-S- In other words, you know ... usually you don’t fly in a vacuum.  There’s somebody out 
there. 
 
[T] Right.  Ah, well, that’s pretty much what you have today on the VHF radio comm. 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 













[T] The ... what ... OK ... the broadcast data bus is starting to go on that, but exactly what is 
transmitted is not really clear yet. 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 
[T] But, that’s a different way of helping the collision system, the surveillance system, 
because the ones we have today can’t broadcast intent.  In other words, they can pretty 
much determine where the airplane is, somewhat crudely if all you’re getting is 
transponder codes, ... 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 
[T] Ah, but if you tie the broadcast data system into airplane-to-airplane reception system, or 
simply a system that periodically goes out and said, “Here I am, I’m UAL 917, and I’m at 
FL240, speed, heading, stuff like that...” 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 
[T] You have a lot better location on the guy, especially with the advent of GPS systems. 
 
-S- You could transmit some kind of coordinates, stuff like that. 
 




[T] So, that’s possible, and there’s systems that are looking to do that.  I think that’s going to 
happen.  For various reasons, I think despite our improvements on the runway 
incursions, that’s the area that I think you get the biggest bang for the buck on, because 
we’ve got a lot of traffic on those runways and when the weather goes down the guys in 
the tower can’t really see them ... 
 
-S- Especially at larger airports, literally you can’t see them. 
 
[T] Yeah.  Right.  And, so, I think something like that makes a lot of sense, but it’s not there 
yet.  There are a lot of people looking at various kinds of systems that would do that, but 
right now they’re not out there.  And, the other thing is the intent part of it.  If you have a 
flight management system, the system is programmed to tell you ... one of the 
weaknesses of the TCAS system is that it’s only giving you your current information, 
your closure rate ... you don’t know that the guy’s intending to level off in ten seconds ... 
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-S- Yeah, exactly. 
 




[T] And, so, you get far more false alarms than real near mid air collisions. 
 
-S- That’s one thing ... especially with the early TCAS units, they drove me nuts!  You stick 
the stupid box in the airplane ... I spent all my time hitting “NO” ... 
 
[T] Yeah.  Right. 
 




-S- ... doing stuff.   
 
[T] Right.  Yup.  Yeah, well, they got it ... they filtered it down with the change seven a lot, 
but still you’re orders of magnitude from identifying real potential collisions versus ones 




[T] Because you just don’t know what the intention is and whether he’s going to do that or 








[T] So, yeah, the broadcast data, I think, is real.  I think the Capstone program up in ... are 
they using that?  BSB?  I don’t know if that’s part of what they’re doing.  They’re using 
GPS.  They may be using some of that.  Not airplane-to-airplane, though, if anything it’s 
a ground surveillance kind of thing, but ... but, that’s certainly possible. 
 
-S- The only reason I mention the airplane-to-airplane is thinking about if you did broadcast 
everything all the time, tremendous network involved.  Maybe all you’ve got to do is just 
broadcast ... somebody else in the near vicinity hears it, records it, end of story. 
 
[T] Ah, got to be able to do that.  Yeah.  Ah, ... 
 
-S- Because, I think that, you know, when you look at the network required for something 



















[T] ... we’re trying them ... trying to bring them along.  I don’t know, that’s an area that has 
always been kind of intriguing, you know, people recognize that the resource is there ... 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 
[T] ... it’s sort of not used.  There was an effort to use the airplanes in that manner to collect 
weather information. 
 
-S- Mmmm!  Mmmm hmmm... 
 










[T] It just couldn’t get over the hurdle of “Well, what’s in it for me?” kind of thing.  And, ah, 
so, those things have not worked out too well. 
 
-S- Well, there’s technology and then there’s reality. 
 
[T] (laughing) Yeah. 
 
-S- You know, we can do a lot of things, but ... 
 
[T] ... could do it ... 
 
-S- ... do we need to? 
 
[T] Right.  Right. 
 
-S- I’m kind of a fan of the KISS principle. 
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[T] Yeah.  Agree. 
 
-S- So, I wonder if deployable units aren’t the way to go.  Maybe there’s ... and Boeing talked 
about this, this morning ... where you have a recorder that’s deployable and milliseconds 
before the flaming hole in the ground you get a little thing that pops out and it’s got a, I 




-S- Yeah.  Maybe that’s the infrastructure that makes sense to improve the reliability of 




-S- I don’t know. 
 
[T] Ah, I’m trying to remember, going back ... didn’t Lockheed make a recorder that was like 
that? 
 
-S- Mmmm hmmmm... 
 
[T] You know, a G-switch kind of thing ejected it in the event that you had one.  I don’t 
remember that they ever actually had an airplane accident with one of them where they 
actually ... 
 
-S- I don’t know of one. 
 
[T] ... I can’t remember.  I don’t remember one. 
 
-S- Yeah.  Well, that’s were this ... the guy at L3 might be interesting because Lockheed is 
part of the L’s there. 
 




[T] OK.  I started out working for Lockheed, but not that part of it.  Don’t know.  I don’t 
know the answer to that.  The ... I don’t know what you do in the deep water ones.  
You’ve got the ... 
 












[T] Right.  Might be weight and complexity and when it fires off inadvertently and all those 
kind of things would be a problem. 
 




-S- ... I can just see, you’ve got grandma and the kids lined up, you know, waiting for the 
airplane to taxi into the gate and all of the sudden this thing goes shooting out of the ... 
 
[T] (laughing) Right. 
 








-S- I guess, you know, the deeper I get into this the more I start to say, “Well, why did the 
FAA ask NPS to put me on this project?” because it’s obvious from hundreds of pages – 




-S- ... that it’s been sliced and diced and looked at, so why is that they wanted us to do this? 
 
[T] I don’t know. 
 




-S- I’m not sure how you got involved with this. 
 
[T] Ah, I got a call from ... it’s round about.  I think, somebody at the postgraduate school 













[T] Because I’m not primarily working the recorders and stuff like that, it’s more flight 
controls and displays and, well right now fuel tanks, but... 
 




-S- Well then, I guess I will move forward from here. 
 
[T] I hope it hasn’t been a wasted effort for you. 
 
-S- No, ah ... 
 
[T] It’s kind of a frustrating area, I bet.  You don’t know what to do. 
 
-S- Well, it’s like this.  When you sign on to a thesis, sometimes the answer is yes and 
sometimes the answer is no, and you don’t know that when you go in the front door.  
You say, alright, here’s the question, here’s the problem, let’s go find out. 
 
[T] Yeah.  Well, I think that the investigation of how you could do it and what it would cost, 
or what you could do and what it would cost, is probably worthwhile doing. 
 
-S- Yeah, it is. 
 
[T] I mean, it will answer ... even a negative answer is good to know. 
 




-S- Yeah, I don’t know.  I mean, that’s ultimately going to be the report back to ... I think it’s 
Jim Cash?  Maybe? 
 
[T] OK.  I don’t know. 
 




-S- I should know that.  I should know who our folks have talked to back there. 
 
[T] Who requested it and you’re going to ... yeah, that makes sense. 
 
-S- But, I am getting a better picture as time goes on here and everyone adds a little bit and 
you have, too, so ... 
 




-S- I’d be happy to send you the thing when it’s done.  I don’t imagine there’s going to be 
any great revelations in there for you, but if you’re interested ... 
 
[T] I’m interested and I’ll send it on to a couple of the guys who work recorders in D.C. and 
stuff like that, yeah. 
 
-S- Whom I may run into, I don’t know, I’m hoping to get back there and dig up some folks 
at NTSB and so on. 
 
[T] OK, very good. 
 




-S- Like I said, I looked you up on the Internet and I thought, Wow!  This man is ... 
 
---< END TRANSCRIPTION >--- 
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